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ABSTRACT 
China began its current economic reform in the late 1970s. Since initiating its refonns, 
China has restructured its banking sector from the old Soviet-style and monopoly 
banking system. Meanwhile, since China launched its equity market in the early 1990s, 
selling new stocks and bonds appeared to be another significant channel for 
enterprises to raise investment funds. 
This thesis investigates the influence of financial development on economic growth in 
China mainly by examining the banking sector and stock market performance. This 
study employs a consolidated dataset covering 30 provinces for 18 years to conduct 
the panel technique. Meanwhile, a monthly dataset of 10 years has also been 
established to explore Granger-causality tests of the financial development and 
economic growth linkages. 
The main findings of the research are that at first China's economic growth is driven 
by the quickly accumulated capital stock attributed to the rapid increase of fixed assets 
investment while the contribution of labour input to GDP growth is statistically 
modest. Secondly, on aggregated level, the Granger-causality estimated result does not 
support the hypothesis that China's banking sector has been playing a leading role in 
the process of economic growth. Meanwhile, based on the introduction of five 
banking sector indicators, the panel estimation result indicated that China's banking 
sector has not statistically generated any contribution to the economic development. 
Thirdly, the Granger-causality estimated results concluded that economic growth is the 
Granger-cause of the stock market capitalisation while no causality relationship exists 
between stock market development and economic growth when in term of market 
liquidity and volatility. The causality relationship was finally testified on the basis of 
investigating the whole financial market, in which circumstance the estimated result 
further confirmed that financial development is the effect rather than cause of China's 
economic growth. 
Overall, the thesis presents enough evidence to support the argument that the financial 
sector development has been acting the demand- following role in economic growth 
process in the context of China. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Purpose of the thesis 
China initiated its current economic reform in the late 1970s with a sense of price 
liberalisation, enterprises reform and financial sector reform. Prior to the 
implementation of these reforms, the Chinese economy had functioned with the 
Soviet-style administrative-command model. The reforms set in motion by Deng 
Xiaoping introduced dramatic change: the country moved from the 
administrative-command model to a market-socialist model. Throughout the virtually 
three decades of reform, China's economy appears to be a dual-track economy 
consisting of (1) small and medium-scale private-owned enterprises that operate on 
the basis of market principles and are not particularly favoured by state policy and (2) 
large scale corporatised state-owned enterprises that remain subject to political 
directives and support. 
Since initiating its reforms, China has been forced to restructure its banking sector 
from the old Soviet-style and monopoly banking system. Originally credit allocation 
was highly tied to state economic plans, however, as the current state-owned 
commercial banks remain the property of the state, but subject to the reforms, they 
now grant loans in keeping with the objectives of the contemporary government and 
party officials. This gives preferential treatment to state enterprises. Meanwhile, since 
China launched its equity market in the early 1990s, selling new stocks and bonds has 
emerged as another substantial channel for enterprises to raise investment funds. 
Throughout the development of the last decade, China's stock market has been 
strongly characterised by central-planned initiatives though the reform has gradually 
been undertaken by adopting the trial-and-error approach. 
Having implemented the reforin for nearly three decades, China has obtained 
extraordinary achievements in both economic growth and social development. The 
purpose of this research is to investigate the relationship between financial 
intermediation and economic growth in China, by examining the influence of both the 
banking sector development and stock market expansion. The study aims to identify 
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whether the financial sector development is acting as the supply-leading factor or the 
demand-following effect. In other words, this study is about identifying how the 
development of financial intermediaries contributes to the economic growth in the 
context of China. 
Since the early 1970s, the relationship between financial intermediation and economic 
growth has been extensively studied in two stages. Before 1990s, a number of 
researchers such as Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), among 
many others, produced considerable evidence that financial development correlates 
with growth. However, their work has been found to lack analytical evidence. After 
1990s, the link between financial development and growth has been investigated on 
the basis of the endogenous growth model, where the performance of financial 
intermediaries is treated as an endogenous determinant within the growth model. 
Progressively empirical studies, generally based on the cross-country panel analysis, 
provide evidence of the effect of financial development on growth and of the 
corollary. 
Although a positive correlation between growth and indicators of financial 
development was largely discovered in both cross-country/section study and panel 
analysis, the financial/real causal relationship had not been explicitly identified in the 
early empirical study. Since Patrick (1966) introduced the now common terms - 
'supply-leading' and 'demand- following' finance, the attention has been increasingly 
placed on observing the direction of causality based on different data sample 
according to individual research criteria of data selection. 
The existing empirical studies on financial-growth nexus largely concentrate on 
cross-country analysis, including both developed countries and developing countries 
(see, for instance, King and Levine, 1993a, b and c; Murinde and Eng, 1994; 
Fernandez and Galetovic, 1994; De Gregorio and Guidotti, 1995; Neusser and Kugler, 
1996; Al-Yousif, 2002). In addition, the direction of causality between financial 
development and economic growth has also been extensively examined by using 
firm-level and/or industrial-level data of cross-country (for example, among many 
others, Jayaratne and Strahan 1995, Rajan and Zingales 1996, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 1996; Demetriades and Hussein, 1996, Ram 1999, Morris et al. 2001). 
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However, this issue remains empirically controversial: the empirical results have not 
yet offered any clear-cut answer upon this issue, but rather the direction of causality 
seems to vary from study to study (and from country to country). 
Nevertheless, it is surprising to notice that China is seldom included to the 
cross-country empirical studies data sample partly due to the unobservable or missing 
data. The statistical analysis on financial-growth nexus been applied to China very 
recently (Aziz and Duenwld, 2002; Boyreau-Debray, 2003). It is worthwhile applying 
the panel analysis technique - cross-region and time-serial to a single country China 
based on certain criteria. Moreover, despite the short history of China's stock market 
development, the Granger-causality of stock market expansion and economic growth 
is also employed. Consequently, the researcher is able to obtain a more accurate 
picture of how financial intermediaries in China - banking sector and stock market - 
influence the real sector growth; the corresponding policy implications will be drawn 
based on the estimated findings. 
1.2 Structure of thesis 
The thesis contains nine chapters. In general, the current chapter briefly provides the 
background and purpose of this thesis. The literature review is covered in Chapter 2. 
From Chapter 3 to Chapter 8, the empirical research of this paper is illustrated in 
detail, including the policy implications. Chapter 9 provides the conclusion for the 
entire research. Specifically, the rest of the thesis will be organised as follows. 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on the theoretical and empirical evidence on the 
relationship between financial development and economic growth. The chapter starts 
from a discussion of the four a priori possibilities concerning the causal relationship 
between financial development and economic growth. The theoretical framework 
surveys the literatures on the interaction between the real and the financial sectors 
from three perspectives - micro level analysis, AK model (endogenous growth) 
interpretation and functional approach; while the empirical evidence mainly reviews 
the statistical result by using both cross-country estimation and Granger-causality 
examination. Meanwhile, the illustration is emphasised on the domestic financial 
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liberalisation while leaving the external financial liberalisation untouched. 
Additionally, given that the establishment and fast expansion of stock markets is a 
pervasive phenomenon occurring within the financial de-repression process in many 
less developed countries (LDCs), the role of stock market in domestic financial 
liberalisation will be examined. 
Chapter 3 introduces the background information of China's financial sector reform, 
including the banking sector refon-n and stock market development, followed by a 
brief survey on China's economic reform in terms of price liberalisation and 
enterprises corporatisation. Chapter 4 presents the methodology employed in this 
study with the analysis of the Error Correction Model (ECM), panel data analysis and 
Granger-causality analysis. In addition, data description section provides detailed 
information on each variable employed in this research. 
Chapter 5 to 7 present the empirical result upon the finance-growth nexus hypothesis 
testing in a methodology-oriented way. Particularly, Chapter 5 analyses China 5s 
economic growth pattern on national aggregated level in both long-term and 
short-term by exploring the benefit of ECM. In Chapter 6, panel data technique is first 
applied to examine the economic growth pattern where the influence of structural shift 
(sectoral change) will also be taken into consideration. Then the impact of banking 
sector development is demonstrated concentrating on banking sector development 
gauged by five indicators. The empirical estimation is not only conducted on 
cross-province and time-serial data, but also on eight sub-regional panel datasets. 
Chapter 7 examines the impact of financial market on economic growth by using 
Granger-causality technique. The analysis is first conducted on the annual aggregated 
level data by focusing on credit market. This is followed by the analysis on another 
important financial intermediary component - stock market development upon 
economic growth by using monthly data on national level. 
The policy implications are exhibited in Chapter 8, followed by a conclusion chapter 
summansing the theoretical studies and empirical findings while a future research 
agenda is also suggested in Chapter 9. 
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Chapter 2: Financial development and economic growth: literature 
review - theoretical background and empirical evidence 
2.1 Introduction 
Classical economists in nineteenth century ignored financial intermediation as an 
important element in explaining economic growth until Bagehot (1873). For the first 
time, he gives explicit examples of how money market developments in England 
could make capital flow across the country in search of the highest rate of return. 
Further in his exposition, Bagehot becomes even more explicit about the connection 
between financial development (and trade) and economic growth. "The 'loanable 
capital' lay idle in the banks till some trade started into prosperity, and then was lent 
in order to develop that trade; that trade caused other secondary developments; those 
secondary developments enabled more loanable capital to be lent; and that lending 
caused a tertiary development of trade; and so on through society. " (Bagehot, 1873, 
Chapter VI, p. 52) 
Although Bagehot's argument on the connection between finance and economic 
growth is explicit, it did not take centre stage in the thinking of classical economies 
(Sinha, 200 1). It was Schumpeter (1911) who put the role of financial intermediation 
at the centre of economic development. It is the first time that Schumpeter articulates 
statements about how financial transactions take central stage in economic growth. 
Four sections are included in this chapter. Apart from the introduction section, Section 
2.2 surveys the four a priori possibilities concerning the causal relationship between 
financial development and economic growth. The theoretical background for the 
real/financial relationship, including the earlier controversial arguments over this topic, 
the prevailing AK model (much used in endogenous growth theory) demonstration 
and the most recent functional approach is illustrated in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 
provides the empirical evidence on the real/financial nexus from two aspects: country 
case study and statistical analysis. In the latter aspect, cross-country estimation 
(including panel analysis) and Granger-causality are illustrated thoroughly. Section 
2.5 demonstrates the importance of stock market development in the domestic 
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financial liberalisation process with substantial empirical evidence. The summary of 
this chapter is given in Section 2.7, after highlighting the research space (including the 
applicability of those existing research methods) for this research in Section 2.6. 
2.2 The causal relationship of financial-growth nexus 
According to Graff s survey (200 1), there are four a priori possibilities concerning the 
causal relationship between financial development and economic growth. 
Financial development and economic growth are not causally related. There is 
no significant impact of one on the other. The observable correlation between 
them is the result of a historical phenomenon: economies grew, and so did the 
financial sector, but the two each follow their own logic. Modem economic 
growth was governed by real factors, whereas financial development was 
rooted in the history of financial institutions. 
Financial development follows economic growth. Economic growth causes 
financial institutions to change and develop, consequently encouraging the 
financial markets to grow. Financial development is thus demand-driven. As 
the growing scale of economic activities requires more and more capital 
(liquid and fixed), institutional raising and pooling of funds for industry 
provides a vital alternative channel for starting up enterprises apart from 
relying on individual fortunes. Additionally, it is also an important 
complementarity for retained profits for business and economic expansion. 
The present diversity of financial system within a country stems from the fact 
that various institutional arrangements can equally well fulfil the two basic 
functions of any financial system: transferring savers' deposit to investors, and 
selecting the most appropriate uses for investible funds. 
Financial development determines economic growth. The line of causation 
runs from financial development to real development, which can be interpreted 
in the following two aspects: (1) financial development is a precondition for 
economic growth. As can be shown historically and on the purely theoretical 
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grounds, inadequate financial systems are major impediments to economic 
growth. This view is held by most economic historians that have investigated 
the financial development of the now developed countries. Meanwhile, 
theoretical economists gives the rationales for the assumption that well 
functioning monetary and banking system and capital markets are crucial for 
economic growth. (2) Provided that no impediment exists in the real factors for 
economic growth, sophisticated financial systems can generate high and 
sustained rates of economic growth. The proponents of this view stress that the 
banking systems ability to create money and channel it into productive and 
innovative projects, which eventually promoting the growth of entire state 
economy. 
iv) Financial development may be an impediment to economic growth on 
occasions. This view conceives the financial system as inherently unstable. 
Though the line of causation still runs from financial development to real 
development, the focus lies on potentially destabilising effects of financial 
overtrading and crises rather than on the smooth functioning of the financial 
system. 
2.3 The way financial development affects growth - theoretical framework 
Economists in studying the theories of economic growth in 1950s, such as 
Solow-Swan model, developed by Robert Solow (1956) and Trevor Swan (1956), 
included no role for financial intermediation. For all practical purposes, the economies 
were seen to be well approximated by a one-good model, where there no independent 
investment function was taken into account. Thus, Solow-Swan model implicitly 
assumed the (financial) capital market works very well such that all intended savings 
flow into investment without any problem. In these circumstances, the growth model 
that dominated had only two elements in productions: capital and labour. However, 
when researchers talked about capital, it was understood to be physical capital. 
Neither financial capital nor human capital played any role. Economists understood 
right after the development of Solow-Swan model that the model could not explain 
large parts of economic growth, which was so-called 'Solow Residuals'. For instance, 
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Arrow argues that the increases in per capita income cannot be explained by increases 
in the capital-labour ratio. Romer (1986) incorporates Arrow's idea into a so-called 
'new growth theory' macroeconomic model. Nevertheless, financial activities have 
not been seriously included in the growth model until the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
2.3.1 Earlier literature on real/financial relationship 
By concentrating less on the macroeconomic aspects, Gertler (1988) reviews the 
traditional literature on real/financial interaction and describes the micro models of 
financial intermediation and how these financial arrangements eliminate at least part 
of the negative consequences of the positive infonnation and transaction costs. 
2.3.1.1 The traditional literature 
The financial system did not have an explicit central role in Keynes's theory of output 
determination. In the General Theory, Keynes mentions the importance of financial 
consideration in the theory of investment behaviour, which was termed as 'state of 
confidence', including the borrower's belief about prospective yields from investment 
projects and lender's confidence in financing borrowers. Keynes concludes that the 
collapse in confidence of either lenders or borrowers was sufficient to trigger an 
economic downturn in investment and economic activity. 
Following the General Theory, the macroeconomics literature largely ignored the 
potential link between output behaviour and the performance of credit market. They 
shifted the emphasis from the overall financial market to money as the financial 
variable most relevant to aggregate economic behaviour. The models in these papers 
demonstrated how the demand and supply of real money balances could determine the 
real interest rate, thus influencing the aggregate output'. Although considerable debate 
arose over the empirical significance of the linkage between money and real activity, 
the emphases were focused on either the importance of 'real factor' such as 
multiplier/accelerator mechanism and fiscal policy, or providing support for the 
importance of monetary mechanism. 
' Those models also tended to include some form of real balance effect so that the real amount of 
money balances influences the level of aggregate demand directly. 
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Staying in line with the 'debt-deflation' theory, another contemporary economist, 
Irving Fisher (1933), argued that the severity of economic downturn resulted from 
poorly performing financial markets. In Fisher's view, it was the high leverage of the 
borrowing sector that made the economy initially so vulnerable. Based on his 
empirical result, Fisher points out that the contraction in net worth of borrowers 
because of the deflation induced the borrowers to cut back on current expenditures 
and future commitments, thus sending the economy further down, continuing the 
spiral of falling output and deflation. 
The research done by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) on the relationship between 
money and output provided evidence for the central importance of money in the Great 
Depression - the exogenous fall in money supply directly leads to the fall in output 
and prices. From the view of endogenous money, the fall in money supply arose from 
a combination of fall in the demand to hold money, following fall in prices, output, 
and banks response to loan defaults. Nevertheless, it has been argued that their study 
was rather a monetarist case but deemphasised the significance of all other aspects of 
the financial system. Furthermore, the commercial banks were the only financial 
institution to attract attention from macroeconomists as a component of their liabilities 
entered the money supply. 
Similarly, Mishkin (1978) analysed the data from Great Depression and provided the 
evidence for financial performance to the business cycle propagation mechanism, 
which supported the presence of Fisher's 'debt-deflation' theory. Specifically, 
Mishkin found that the rise in consumer real indebtedness resulting from declining 
incomes and deflation induced consumers to lower spending on durables and housing, 
which in turn magnified the decline. 
Gurley and Shaw (1955) started a new strand of work toward the overall interaction 
between financial structure and real activity, where the distinctive feature lied on the 
emphasis of financial intermediaries and particularly the role of the intermediaries in 
the credit supply process as opposed to the money supply process. Meanwhile, they 
also criticised the exclusive focus on money, the volume of which was regarded as 
given, in Keynesians and Monetarists model in analysing the real/financial 
connection. 
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Gurley and Shaw noted that in the early stage of financial development, commercial 
banks are typically the only major form of financial intermediation providing both 
transactions and lending services. According to Tobin (1964), a bank is a financial 
institution whose liabilities (that is bank deposits) are treated as money. In that case, 
banks can provide loans to finance investment, and then money is created. In these 
circumstances, the money stock is a useful proxy for financial activity since the supply 
of money (a major component of commercial bank liabilities) is closely related to the 
overall level of financial intermediaries. However, they also argued that the exclusive 
focus on money became less justified and the importance of money diminished as the 
intermediary system evolved and non-bank lending institution with non-monetary 
liabilities. 
According to Gurley and Shaw, the economy's overall 'financial capacity' is more 
relevant to the level of aggregate output rather than money stock is. 'Financial 
capacity' refers to the measure of borrower's ability to absorb debt without having to 
reduce current expenditure or future spending commitment. By helping overcome the 
impediments to the flow of funds between savers and investors, financial 
intermediaries made it possible for certain class of borrowers to obtain both greater 
quantity of credits and better credit terms, to which extent it is believed that the 
financial intermediaries perfon-ned important services to economy behaviour. 
Shortly after Gurley and Shaw (1955) emphasized the importance of the financial 
system, Modigliani and Miller (MM) (1958) derived the formal proposition that real 
economic decisions were independent of financial structure. The MM theorem was 
attractive because it provided researchers with a rigorous justification for abstracting 
from the complications induced by financial consideration based on a range of highly 
restricted assumptions such as absence of uncertainty, bankruptcy risk and the 
assumptions on nature of tax system. For instance, Hall and Jorgenson (1967) used 
MM theorem as a convenient rationale for ignoring capital market considerations 
when solving the firm's investment choice problem. For similar reasons, financial 
variables started disappearing from empirical investment models. Furthermore, the 
methodological revolution in the 1970s also helped shift the attention away from 
financial factors. To shift the obstacle posed by the emphasis on individual 
optimisation in developing macroeconomic models, Brock and Mirman (1972) 
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developed the stochastic competitive equilibrium growth model suggesting that 
financial structure was irrelevant. 
2.3.1.2 Micro level analysis 
Since Akerlof (1969) used 'lemon' problem to illustrate the asymmetric infon-nation 
between buyers and sellers about product quality can cause a market failure, the basic 
idea of 'lemon' problem had been largely applied to the financial market inefficiencies 
that might distort the economic behaviour. Jaffee and Russell (1976) explained how 
unobserved differences in the perceived 'quality' of borrower can induce credit 
rationing. Later on, Stiglitz and Weiss (198 1) exploit the informational asymmetries to 
motivate a form of credit rationing where the market denies funds to borrowers with 
characteristics identical to those receiving loans. The key unobserved factor is the 
potential risk of borrower's projects. Based on their assumption, a rise in interest rate 
lowers the average borrower quality as it drops out the relatively safe project first. 
After a certain point, the further increases of interest rate may lower the lender's 
expected return, making the loan supply curve bend backwards. 
Many papers explored the asymmetric information problem initiated by Jaffee and 
Russell and by Stiglitz and Weiss. A very influential study done by Mankiw (1986) 
analysed a credit market destroyed by lemon problem and showed how a small rise in 
the riskless interest rate can lead to a large reduction in lending, even probably 
resulting in a market collapse. This result occurs because the increase in the riskless 
rate forces up the loan rate, which reduces the average quality of borrowers. 
Apart from emphasising how the 'lemon problem' affects the debt market, many 
researchers also expanded this topic into equity market. Myers and Majluf (1984) and 
Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss (1984) discuss how asymmetric information about the 
value of a firm's existing assets can restrict its ability to issue new shares. Outside 
lenders must discern whether the share issue is a legitimate effort to either obtain new 
financing or diversifying risk, or is instead simply an attempt to pass off bad assets. 
This problem may lower the price the firm can obtain for its equity, and in extreme 
cases, make it prohibitive to issue new shares. Evidence for this phenomenon is that a 
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fin-n's announcement of a new issue typically leads to a significant decline in its 
market value. 
In these circumstances, Fama (1985) states that the bank credit is vital for certain 
classes of borrowers, especially when equity finance is not available as the perfect 
substitute. He argues that this feature of bank lending arises because of the 
comparative advantage banks develop in gathering information about borrowers. This 
advantage implies that in many situations, intermediation is the most efficient way to 
minimise informational distortions. 
Diamond (1984) also provides an example of how it is possible to formally explain 
intermediary-like institutions. Since it is difficult or costly for lender's to observe the 
returns to borrower's projects, in order to economise monitoring costs, Diamond 
argues that it is optimal for a competitive financial institution to channel funds 
between savers and borrowers. To avoid duplication of monitoring costs, it is clearly 
efficient for the institution to perform as a 'delegated monitor' of borrowers, on behalf 
of depositors. 
Following Diamond's path, a number of studies had been undertaken towards the link 
between intermediation and real activities (see Boyd and Prescott, 1986; Moore, 1987; 
Morgan, 1987). In particular, Eckstein and Sinai (1986) argue that financial 
mechanism is important for predicting business fluctuations. Scheinkman and Weiss 
(1986) provide an early example of the new approach that demonstrates how 
borrowing constraints can increase the variability of consumption, output and 
employment. The paper considers an environment where two representative 
individuals face negatively correlated productivity risks. In a frictionless envirom-nent, 
the individuals can directly insure these risks by lending and borrowing, in which 
circumstances the individual risks do not induce aggregate fluctuation. In a setting 
where these markets do not exist, the individuals must self-insure by adjusting 
consumption, saving, and labour supply. Scheinkman and Weiss demonstrate how this 
behaviour at the individual level leads to cycles in aggregate activity. Williamson 
(1987) incorporates his model of intermediation and credit rationing into a simple 
business cycle framework to study the interaction between financial and real variables. 
Productivity disturbances, in the form of mean-preserving spreads to project returns, 
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change default possibilities, thereby affecting the degree of credit rationing and the 
level of investment and output. 
2.3.2 The AK gowth model 
2.3.2.1 Model specification 
There are several growth models which take into account financial markets, 
intermediaries and financial functions. By performing certain functions financial 
markets eliminate some types of market frictions and thus influence economic growth. 
For example, Aghion and Howitt (1992) develop a model in which financial system 
affects steady-state growth by changing the rate of technological innovation. They 
found that both the average growth rate and the variance of the growth rate are 
increasing functions of the size of technological innovations. Rebelo (1991) states that 
financial system affects the rate of capital formation and thereby influencing the 
steady-state growth. 
To capture the potential effects of financial development on growth, most recent 
economists prefer to start with the simplest endogenous growth model - the 'AK' 
model, where aggregate output is a linear function of the aggregate capital stock: 
Y =AK t 
(2.1) 
This production function comes from one of two underlying framework (Pagano, 
1993). One is a competitive economy with external economies as in Romer (1989), 
where each firm faces a technology with constant returns to scale but productivity is 
an increasing function of the aggregate capital stockK,. For instance, consider an 
economy with N identical firms, each producing output y, = Bk' with its capital t 
stock k,. Suppose that B is regarded as a parameter by individual firms but actually 
responds to the average capital stock according to B= Ak, -' . Then aggregate 
output, Y= Ny, is give by Eq. 2.1. Alternatively, the AK model can be derived t 
assuming that K, is a composite of physical and human capital as in Lucas (1988), 
the two types of capital being reproducible with identical technologies. 
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For simplicity, assume that the population is stationary and that the economy produces 
a single good that can be invested or consumed - and, if invested, depreciates at the 
rate 5. Then gross investment equals 
I, = K, - (I - oflK, (2.2) 
In a closed economy with no government, capital market equilibrium requires that 
gross savings S, equals gross investment I,. It is convenient to assume that a 
proportion I-0 of the flow of saving is lost in the process of financial 
intermediation: 
OS, 
= I, (2.3) 
From Eq. 2.1, the growth rate at time t+I is g, Y +, 
1Y, -I=K, -,, 
1K, - 1. Using 
Eq. 2.2 and dropping the time indices, the steady-state growth rate can be written as 
I 
g=A- - o5 = Aos-9 y 
(2.4) 
which is achieved on the basis of capital market equilibrium condition Eq. 2.3. The 
gross saving rate SlY is denoted by s. 
Eq. 2.4 briefly reveals how financial development can affect growth: it can raise the 
proportion of saving funnelled to investment, 0; it may increase the marginal 
productivity of capital, A; and it can influence the private saving rate, s. 
2.3.2.2 Funnelling savings to firms 
In the process of transforming savings into investment, financial intermediaries absorb 
resources, so that one unit of money saved by households generates less than one unit 
worth of investment due to the fraction 0 in Eq. 2.3. The remaining fraction I-0 
goes into banks as the spread between lending and borrowing rates, and to securities 
brokers and dealers as commissions, fees and etc. 
This absorption of resources by the financial sector is primarily a reward for services 
supplied, but it may also reflect the X-inefficiency of the intermediaries and their 
market power (Pagano, 1993). In addition, Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1991,1992) 
note that the financial intermediaries activities are also burdened by taxation (in form 
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of high reserve requirements, transaction taxes, etc. ) and by restrictive regulations. 
Moreover, financial repression and lack of competition may widen the margins 
charged by financial intermediaries, thereby hampering the economic growth. Hence, 
the growth rate g can be enhanced if financial development reduces the leakage of 
resources, i. e. raises 0 in EqA 
2.3.2.3 Improving capital allocation 
In the AK model, financial intermediaries increase the productivity of capital, A, 
thereby promoting growth in two ways: (i) collecting information to evaluate 
alternative investment projects; and (ii) inducing individuals to invest in riskier but 
more productive projects by providing risk sharing. 
The informational role of financial intermediaries has been linked to productivity 
growth by Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), in whose model firms may be faced with 
two investment options: a safe but low-yield project or a risky but high-yield one. 
Unlike individual investors, financial intermediaries are regarded that with their large 
portfolios and their professional knowledge and judgement, they can diversify the risk 
and choose the most appropriate investment project. Thus, savings channelled through 
financial intermediaries are allocated more efficiently, and the higher productivity of 
capital results in higher growth. 
Financial intermediaries also enable investors to share risks. This risk sharing role is 
not performed only by insurance markets but also by banks and securities markets, 
which allow individuals to share the uninsurable risks. In the absence of banks, 
households can monitor liquidity shocks only by investing productive assets that can 
be promptly liquidated, thus often forgoing investment that are more productive but 
also more illiquid. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) argue that this inefficiency can be 
considerably reduced by banks which pool the liquidity risk of depositors and invest 
most of their funds in more illiquid and more productive projects. This argument has 
been later incorporated into an endogenous growth model by Bencivenga and Smith 
(1991), which shows that banks increase the productivity of investment both by 
directing funds to illiquid, high-yield project and by reducing the investment waste 
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due to premature liquidation. Consequently, this productivity gain leads to faster 
growth. 
Alternatively, as another vital form of financial intermediaries, security markets 
provide an important venue for individuals to share liquidity risk. Levine (199 1) point 
out that individuals defence liquidity shocks by selling shares on the stock market 
rather than withdrawing money from the bank, while the stock market also allows 
agents to reduce risk by portfolio diversification. This twofold insurance Rinction 
increases individuals' willingness to invest in less liquid but more productive projects. 
As a result, setting up a sophisticated stock market raises the productivity of 
investment and the growth rate. 
2.3.2.4 Influencing the saving rate 
Financial development can also affect growth by altering the saving rate s, while the 
sign of the relationship between savings and economic growth is ambiguous, as it has 
been noticed that the development of financial intermediaries may reduce savings, and 
thereby growth. By distinguishing the endowment shocks and rate-of-return risk, 
Pagano (1993) stresses that households would gain better insurance against 
endowment shocks (such as health hazards) and reduce rate-of-return risk (such as that 
due to the volatility of stock returns) by better diversification as the financial markets 
develop, while the effect of each case on household's saving behaviour is ambiguous. 
As long as the household face with constant relative risk aversion, the introduction of 
insurance markets would certainly reduce the need for precautionary saving to counter 
the first type of risk 2. As a result, in an endogenous growth model, it appears that the 
fall in saving rate lowers the growth rate, providing one occasion in which financial 
development can hinder the growth. An analogous result is also achieved by Devereux 
and Smith (1991) by examining the countries share endowment risk via international 
capital markets. Additionally, they also demonstrate that if the risk aversion 
coefficient is above 1, the response of saving to diversifying portfolios through 
securities markets to reduce the second type of risk is negative; and positive otherwise. 
2 Pagano (1993) points out that this result is based on the consumer's utility function having a positive 
third derivative, which is a condition to satisfy the utility functions with constant relative risk aversion. 
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Correspondingly, the response of growth to the existence of securities markets is 
ambiguous. 
Using an overlapping generations model with three-period-lived households, Jappelli 
and Pagano (1992) indicate that binding liquidity constrains increase the saving rate, 
because young people cannot dissave as much as they would like. From Eq. 2.1, this 
increase in the aggregate saving rate s translates into faster growthg. By the same 
token, liberalisation of the consumer credit or mortgage market leads to a reduction in 
saving and growth, which provides another instance of financial market development 
tending to reduce growth. 
2.3.3 Functional approach 
In general, the feature of financial intermediaries within different stages of financial 
development can be displayed as Table 2.1. The costs of acquiring information and 
making transactions create incentives for the emergence of financial markets and 
institutions. If there is perfect competition, all traders are price takers, as in Arrow 
(1964)-Debreu (1959) model, there is no need for a financial system that expends 
resources researching projects, monitoring managers, or designing arrangements to 
ease risk management and facilitate transactions 3. Hence, there would be no role of 
financial intermediation in economic growth under conditions of perfect competition. 
However, due to the existence of informational asymmetry, financial markets and 
institutions may arise to modernise the problems created by information and 
transactions frictions, by serving one primary function: they facilitate the allocation of 
resources, across space and time, in an uncertain environment (Merton and Bodie, 
1995). 
The theoretical underpinnings of the relationship between financial development and 
growth can be traced back to Schumpeter (1911) and most recently, Goldsmith (1969), 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973). Schumpeter (1911) used the relationship between 
the banker and entrepreneur to illustrate the importance of the financial system in 
choosing and adopting new technologies; while McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) 
highlighted the importance of financial system in promoting the use of better 
3 For specific analysis, see Levine 1996. 
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Table 2.1: Financial intermediation and the stages of financial development 
Stage of financial development Financial intermediaries 
Completely underdeveloped No intermediaries, investment comes from 
investor's own savings and retained earnings 
Financial backward Inforinal financial institutions such as credit 
unions 
Early stage of development Banking institutions dominated by state banks, 
often controlled by the government priority 
projects or sectors 
Medium stage of development Commercial banking system supplemented by 
(Financially more developed) bond and stock markets 
High stage of development Fully developed banking system (including 
(Financially most developed) commercial and investment banking) and 
capital markets (including debt, equity, and 
I money markets) 
Source: Gills et al., 1992; Lardy, 1998; McKinnon, 1973 and 1993; Stiglitz, 1993. 
agricultural techniques. However, neither of them incorporated all of the ftinctions 
into their stories of financial development. 
Levine (1996) considers models which take the process as a whole, that is, which 
describe the macroeconomic consequences of the existence and the development of 
the financial structure as a whole and not of each particular financial instrument or 
market separately. The overview by Levine consists in large part of description of 
so-called functional approach. The functional approach focuses on the relationship 
between quality of functions performed by financial sector and economic growth. In 
principle, these functions are the same for different countries and do not change over 
time. However, the quality and type of financial structure significantly differ across 
countries. While focusing on functions, this approach does not diminish the role of 
institutions. Indeed, the functional approach highlights the importance of examining 
an under-researched topic: the relationship between financial structure - the mix of 
financial instruments, markets and institutions - and the provision of financial services. 
This approach concentrates on the financial system as a whole, and not on some 
particular institution, like commercial bank or instrument, like money. Figure 2.1 best 
illustrates the frwnework of functional approach (Levine, 1996). 
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Figure 2.1: A functional approach to finance and growth 
Market Frictions: 
- infon-nation costs 
- transaction costs 
Financial Structure: Financial Markets, 
Contracts, Intermediaries 
Financial Functions: 
- Mobilising savings 
- Allocate resources 
- Exert capital control 
- Facilitate risk management 
- Ease trading of goods, services, 
contracts 
Channels to Growth: 
- capital accumulation 
- technological innovation 
Growth 
Source: Levine, 1996, p. 691. 
Specifically, the primary function of financial intermediaries can be interpreted in the 
following four perspectives: mobilising savings, acquiring information and allocating 
resources, diversifying and pooling of risks, and monitoring managers and exert 
corporate control. Meanwhile, the linkage with economic growth is also presented in 
each perspective. 
i) Mobilising savings 
Individual investors are usually too small to have sufficient funds to fund large 
indivisible projects. In this circumstance, financial intermediations allow individual 
small savers to access large investment projects through the mechanism of fund 
pooling. On the other hand side, without access to multiple investors, many 
production processes would be constrained to economically inefficient scales (Sirri 
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and Tufano 1995; Levine, 1996). Furthermore, mobilisation involves the creation of 
small denomination instruments, which provide opportunities for households to hold 
diversified portfolios, invest in efficient scale firms, and to increase asset liquidity 
(Levine, 1996). By enhancing risk diversification, liquidity, and the size of feasible 
firms, therefore, mobilisation improves resource allocation (Sirri and Tufano 1995). 
In a financially underdeveloped society, savers tend to have little inclination to place 
funds in financial assets, even if they have access to them. The wealth may be held in 
cash, or invested in non-productive assets such as gold (Tong, 2002). The objective of 
mobilisation of savings therefore is to provide incentives for savers to use their 
savings productively. These incentives include interests, dividends, and profits 
provided by both bank and non-bank financial institutions. In financially backward 
societies this may be done largely by informal mechanisms. At a more advanced state 
of financial development, mobilisation may be achieved through formal financial 
intermediaries. In the most financially sophisticated societies, mobilisation may be 
achieved directly, by investing in bonds, stocks, or other capital market instruments. 
Mobilising the savings of many disparate savers is costly, however. The process of 
mobilisation involves (a) overcoming the transaction costs associated with collecting 
savings from different individuals and (b) overcoming the informational asymmetries 
associated with making savers feel comfortable in relinquishing control of their 
savings (Levine, 1996). In light of the transaction and information costs associated 
with mobilising savings from many agents, numerous financial arrangements may 
arise to alleviate these frictions and facilitate pooling. Specifically, mobilisation may 
involve multiple bilateral contracts between productive units raising capital and agents 
with surplus resources. The joint stock company in which many individuals invest in a 
new legal entity, the firm, represents a prime example of multiple bilateral 
mobilisations. To economise on the transactions and information costs associated with 
multiple bilateral contracts, pooling may also occur through intermediaries as 
discussed above, where thousands of investors entrust their wealth to intermediaries 
that invest in hundreds of firms (Sirri and Tufano, 1995). 
Besides the direct effect of better savings mobilisation on capital accumulation, better 
savings mobilisation can also boost technological innovation and thereby encouraging 
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growth (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). Putting it into an agricultural context, 
McKinnon states that the accessing the external financial resources is likely to be the 
virtual possibility for poor farmer to finance his investment for new technology 
adoption in a rather shorter time. "Without this access, the constraint of self-finance 
sharply biases investment strategy toward marginal variations within the traditional 
technology. " (McKinnon, 1973, p. 13) 
ii) Acquiring information and allocating resources 
It is difficult and costly to evaluate firms, managers, and market conditions as 
discussed by Carosso (1970). Individual savers may not have the time, capacity, or 
means to collect information on a wide range of enterprises, managers, and economic 
conditions. Savers will be reluctant to invest in activities about which there is little 
reliable information. Consequently, high infort-nation costs may keep capital from 
flowing to its highest value use. Information acquisition costs create incentives for 
financial intermediaries to emerge (Diamond, 1984; Boyd and Prescott, 1986). 
Consider investments in firms. Large research, legal, and organizational costs are 
involved. These costs can include evaluating the firm, coordinating financing for the 
firm if more than one investor is involved, and monitoring managers. Without 
intermediaries, each investor must pay all these cost. As a result, the costs might be 
prohibitive for any single investor. In response to this information cost structure, 
however, groups of individuals may form (or join or use) financial intermediaries to 
economise on the costs of acquiring and processing information about investments. 
Instead of each individual acquiring evaluation skills and then conducting evaluations, 
an intermediary-such as a bank, mutual fund, or pension fund-could perform these 
tasks for a group of investors and lower the costs per investor. So, by researching 
many firms and allocating credit to the best ones, intermediaries can improve the 
allocation of society's resources. 
Economising on information acquisition costs facilitates the acquisition of information 
about investment opportunities and thereby improves resource allocation. Essentially, 
financial intermediaries act as middlemen between those who have funds but do not 
want to invest by themselves and those who do not have funds but want to make the 
investment. They provide indirect means of transferring funds from savers to 
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borrowers or investors. Without financial intermediaries or with the inefficient 
inten-nediaries, a substantial waste of the investment resource may be caused by this 
4 missing link'. 
The ability to acquire and process information may have important growth 
implications. Since many firms and entrepreneurs will ask for capital, financial 
intermediaries and markets that are better at selecting the most promising firms and 
managers will induce a more efficient allocation of capital and faster growth 
(Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990). Apart from identifying the best production 
technologies, financial intermediaries may also boost the rate of technological 
innovation by identifying those entrepreneurs with the best chances of successfully 
initiating new goods and production processes (King and Levine, 1993c). 
iii) Diversifying and pooling of risks 
Financial intermediaries help diversify risk for small investors. Large projects carry 
large risks. It is difficult for small investors to invest in large risky investment projects 
by themselves. Financial intermediaries allow them to pool risks. They can form 
portfolios of large risky investment. The portfolios themselves would be insulated 
against high risk if they diversify. It allows the small investors to access this avenue 
without high risk. The major risk considered here is liquidity risk. 
According to Levine (1996), liquidity is "the ease and speed with which agents can 
convert assets into purchasing power at agreed prices" (ibid, p. 692). Hence, real estate 
is less liquid than equities, and equities traded domestically are typically more liquid 
than those traded abroad. Liquidity risk arises due to the uncertainties associated with 
converting assets into a medium of exchange. Informational asymmetries and 
transaction costs may inhibit liquidity and intensify liquidity risk. These frictions 
create incentives for the emergence of financial markets and institutions that can 
enhance liquidity. Liquid capital markets, therefore, are markets where it is relatively 
inexpensive to trade financial instruments and where there is little uncertainty about 
the timing and settlement of those trades. Within liquid capital markets, savers can 
hold liquid assets-like equity, bonds, or demand deposits-that they can quickly and 
easily sell if they seek access to their savings. Simultaneously, capital markets 
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transform these liquid financial instruments into long-tenn capital investments in 
illiquid production processes. In another words, the financial intermediaries mitigates 
liquidity risk that primarily causes the industrial revolution, which consequently leads 
to the economic growth (Hicks, 1969). 
Economists have modelled the emergence of financial markets in response to liquidity 
risk and examined how these financial markets affect economic growth. For instance, 
in Levine (1991), savers receiving shocks can sell their equity claims on the profits of 
the illiquid production technology to others. Market participants do not verify whether 
other agents received shocks or not; participants simply trade in impersonal stock 
exchanges. Thus, with liquid stock markets, equity holders can readily sell their shares, 
while firms have permanent access to the capital invested by the initial shareholders. 
By facilitating trade, stock markets reduce liquidity risk. As stock market transaction 
costs fall, more investment occurs in the illiquid, high-return project. If illiquid 
projects enjoy sufficiently large externalities, then greater stock market liquidity 
induces faster steady-state growth. 
Apart from the stock market, financial intermediaries such as banks may also enhance 
liquidity and reduce liquidity risk. In Diamond and Dybvig's (1983) seminal model of 
liquidity, it assumes that it is prohibitively costly to observe shocks to individuals, so 
it is impossible to write incentive compatible state-contingent insurance contracts. In 
this circumstance, banks can offer complete insurance to savers against liquidity risk 
while simultaneously facilitating long-run investments in high return projects through 
providing demand deposits and choosing an appropriate mixture of liquid and illiquid 
investments (Levine, 1996). Banks replicate the equilibrium allocation of capital that 
exists with observable shocks. By eliminating liquidity risk, banks can increase 
investment in the high-return, illiquid asset and accelerate growth (Bencivenga and 
Smith, 1991). 
iv) Monitoring managers and exerting corporate control 
Financial intermediaries arise not only to reduce the costs of acquiring information ex 
ante, but also to mitigate the information acquisition and enforcement costs of 
monitoring firm managers and exerting corporate control after financing the activity. 
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For example, firrn owners will create financial arrangements that induce firm 
managers to manage the firm in the best interests of the owners. Meanwhile, outside 
creditors-banks, equity and bond holders-that do not manage firms on a day-to-day 
basis will create financial arrangements to compel inside owners and managers to run 
finns in accordance with the interests of outside creditors. The absence of financial 
arrangements that enhance corporate control may impede the mobilisation of savings 
from disparate households and thereby keep capital from flowing to profitable 
investments, which is pervasively known as the problem of adverse selection in 
banking (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1983). 
Before the money is loaned out, outsider lenders must verify the accuracy of 
information being provided by the insider borrowers. However, insiders have 
incentives to misrepresent project returns to outsiders while it is socially inefficient for 
outsiders to monitor in all circumstances. Verification costs imply that outsiders 
would rather constrain firms from borrowing to expand investment because it is 
perceived that higher leverage implies greater risk of default and higher verification 
expenditures by lenders. Thus, outsiders are able to hand over all monitor 
responsibilities to financial institutions as depositors and only obtain the agreed 
interest payment in whatever outcomes. As a result, financial intermediaries such as 
collateral and financial contracts tend to lower monitoring and enforcement costs 
hence reduce impediments to efficient investment (Williamson 1987b; Bemanke and 
Gertler 1989,1990; Thadden 1995; Levine, 1996). Furthermore, if borrowers must 
obtain funds from many outsiders, financial intermediaries can economise on 
monitoring costs (Levine, 1996). The financial intermediary mobilises the savings of 
many individuals and lends these resources to project owners. This "delegated 
monitor" arrangement economizes on aggregate monitoring costs because a borrower 
is only monitored by the intermediary, not all individual savers (Diamond, 1984). 
Besides financial institutions as banks, stock markets may also have the capability of 
promoting corporate control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). For example, public 
trading of shares in stock markets that efficiently reflect information about firms 
allows owners to link managerial compensation to stock prices. Linking stock 
performance to manager compensation helps align the interests of managers with 
those of owners (Diamond and Verrecchia 1982; and Jensen and Murphy 1990). 
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Similarly, if takeovers are easier in well-developed stock markets and if managers of 
under-performing firms are fired following a takeover, then better stock markets can 
promote better corporate control by easing takeovers of poorly managed firms. The 
threat of a takeover will help align managerial incentives with those of the owners 
(Scharfstein, 1988; Stein, 1988). 
However, arguments are also voiced against the importance of the stock markets in 
corporate control. Stiglitz (1985) makes three additional arguments about takeovers. 
First, if an acquiring firm expends lots of resources obtaining information, the results 
of this research will be observed by other market participants when the acquiring firm 
bids for shares. This will induce others to bid for shares, so that the price rises. The 
firm that expended resources obtaining information must, therefore, pay a higher price 
than it would have to pay if 'free-riding' firms could not observe its bid. Thus, the 
rapid public dissemination of costly information will reduce incentives for obtaining 
information and making effective takeover bids. Second, there is a public good nature 
to takeovers that may decrease the incentives for takeovers. If the takeover succeeds, 
and the share price rises, then those original equity holders that did not sell make a big 
profit without expending resources. This creates an incentive for existing shareholders 
to not sell if they think the value of the firm will rise following the takeover. Thus, 
value-increasing takeovers may fail because the acquiring fin-n will have to pay a high 
price, which will reduce incentives for researching firms in the hopes of taking over 
them. Third, current managers often can take strategic actions to discourage takeovers 
and maintain their positions. This argues against an important role for liquid stock 
markets in promoting sound corporate governance. 
Moreover, it has been doubted whether the improvement in stock markets is able to 
speed up economic growth since the resource allocation may be hurt during the 
process of takeover (Shleifer and Summers 1988; Morck et al., 1990). A takeover 
typically involves a change in management. Existing implicit contracts between 
former managers and workers, suppliers, and other stakeholders in the firms do not 
bind new owners and managers to the same extent that they bound the original 
managers. Thus, a takeover allows new owners and managers to break implicit 
agreements and transfer wealth from firm stakeholders to themselves. While new 
owners may profit, there may be deterioration in the efficiency of resource allocation. 
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Thus, overall welfare may fall. Levine (1996) summarises that the hostile takeovers 
are inevitable in the well-functioning equity markets, which may lead to a fall in the 
efficiency of resource allocation. 
2.4 The way financial development affects economic growth - empirical 
evidence 
Various empirical works can be found on the identification of the relationship between 
financial development and economic growth, particularly country-case study and 
econometrical statistics are two major approaches adopted by researchers. The 
empirical work in early stage was mainly conducted with case study method. As the 
econometric techniques being used improved gradually, more and more evidence has 
been provided through the statistical analysis. In this section, the most existing 
empirical evidences on relationship between "real" and "finance" are reviewed in the 
following two major categories: country-case studies and statistical analysis, where 
the latter one contains two aspects - cross-country correlation analysis (including 
panel estimation) and Granger-causality analysis. 
2.4.1 Counfty-case studies 4 
Country-case studies provide a rich complement to cross-country comparisons. For 
example, Cameron et al. (1967) scrutinised the historical relationship between banking 
development and the early stages of industrialisation for England (1750-1844), 
Scotland (1750-1845), France (1800-1870), Belgium (1800-1875), Germany 
(1815-1870), Russia (1860-1914), and Japan (1868-1914). The researchers carefully 
examine the legal, economic, and financial linkages between banks and industry 
during the industrialisation of these seven countries. Particularly, the studies provide a 
detailed description of the evolution of the financial system during a period of rapid 
economic development. Finally, the conclusion has been drawn that the banking 
system plays a positive, growth-inducing role, especially in Scotland and Japan. 
This section is mainly derived from the idea of Levine (1996). 
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However, the most damning criticism of country-case studies is that "it relies heavily 
on subjective evaluations of banking system performance and fails to systematically 
control for other elements determining economic development" (Levine, 1996, p. 37). 
Meanwhile, what is the actual reason for Scotland's rapid growth and whether 
Scottish banking can explain its faster economic growth than England did during 
1750-1845 are two most debated issues. During this period, Scotland began with per 
capita income of less than one-half of England's, while by 1845, per capita income 
was about the same. Analyses of this phenomenon differ. Cameron (1967) asserts that 
the dominant factor affecting Scotland's potentialities for economic development is 
the important political event - Union of 1707 which made Scotland an integral part of 
United Kingdom. Thus, the outstanding performance of Scotland's superior banking 
system - comparatively stable over this period, suffering fewer and less panics than 
elsewhere in the UK - can help explain its rapid growth. Some analysts suggest that 
taking the advantage of rich natural resources, a well-educated work force, access to 
British colonial markets, and starting ftom a much lower level of income per capita 
than England, Scotland undoubtedly enjoyed a period of rapid convergence toward 
England's income per capita level. Other researchers, Pollard and Ziegler (1992) for 
example, remain sceptic on the premise that Scotland had a well-functioning financial 
system but put much more emphasis on the deficiencies in the Scottish system. 
The relationship between financial development and economic growth has also been 
carefully examined for many other countries. For example, Haber (1991,1996) 
compares industrial and capital market development in Brazil, Mexico and the United 
States between 1830 and 1930. He finds that the differences in capital market 
development had a significant influence on the rate of industrial growth. Specifically, 
Haber recognises that even though financial liberalisation occurred in both Brazil and 
Mexico which gave more firins easier access to external finance, the liberalisation 
procedure was much more mild in Mexico than in Brazil and consequently, the 
decline in concentration and the increase in economic growth was much weaker in 
Mexico than it was in Brazil. Thus, Haber (1996) concludes that less developed 
capital markets is a crucial obstacle to the economic growth in the nineteenth century. 
As summansed by Levine (1996), "the body of country-studies suggests that, while 
the financial system responds to demands from the non-financial sector, 
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wel I -functioning financial systems have, in some cases during some time periods, 
importantly spurred economic growth" (p. 40). 
2.4.2 Statistical analysis 
2.4.2.1 Cross-country correlation analysis 
The early econometric statistic work on this nexus was done by Cameron (1961), who 
simply concentrated on a single country - France - and noted that economic 
development was associated with the "Credit Mobilier" (Sinha, 2001). 
Although those economists interpret the importance and effect of financial 
development on growth, they did not include a measure of financial intermediaries as 
a determinant variable when they conduct their empirical work. It was Goldsmith 
(1969) who first explored this relationship for many countries simultaneously. Using 
data on thirty-five countries from 1860 to 1963, he finds that rapid economic growth 
is often accompanied by rapid financial development. He uses the size of financial 
intermediation or "financial depth", measured by the total assets of financial 
intermediaries divided by the GDP of the corresponding year, as a proxy for financial 
development. 
However, it has been found that there are several drawbacks within Goldsmith's study. 
It does not systematically control for other factors influencing economic growth. 
Economic theory tells us that apart from the size of financial intermediaries, the 
propensity to save, enhancement of human capital, rate of population growth, fiscal 
and monetary policy, laws and regulations, are all direct or indirect contributors to the 
GDP growth. In Goldsmith's study, it seems that he pays less attention or even 
neglects the influence of these factors on economic growth. Additionally, Levine 
(1996) suggests that a 35-country-sample is too limited to capture the characteristic 
accurately. Meanwhile Goldsmith does not examine whether financial development is 
associated with productivity growth and capital accumulation. Summing up all these 
critiques, a general conclusion can be drawn that Goldsmith's contribution is 
important but incomplete. 
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After Goldsmith, there has been a flourishing body of empirical work aiming at testing 
the sign and magnitude of financial depth on economic growth based on cross-country 
analysis. The basic equation tested has the following form: 
yj = 60 + 61 FDj +A Xi + ei 
where yj is the rate of growth of country i, FDj is an indicator of financial depth, 
Xi is a set of control variables, and ej is the error tenn. 
Several indicators of financial depth have been proposed in the literature and different 
indicators will proxy different aspects of the financial system. Initially, the indicators 
were based on monetary aggregates, such as MI or M2, mainly because there 
aggregates are widely available. However, they may be a poor proxy for financial 
development since they are more related to the ability of the financial system to 
provide transaction services than to the ability to channel funds from savers to 
borrowers (Khan and Senhadji, 2000). Indeed, economies with underdeveloped 
financial systems may have a high ratio of money to GDP, as money is used as a store 
of value in the absence of other more attractive alternatives. Consequently, researchers 
have shifted from narrower monetary measures (Ml and M2) to broader definition, 
such as M3, which is generally referred to as liquid liabilities of the banking system. 
Some economists, however, argue that M3/GDP is not appropriate measures of 
financial development (see, for instance, Juttner, 1994; Levine and Zervos, 1998). In 
particular, Levine and Zervos (1998) argue that M3/GDP only measures financial 
depth and "does not measure whether the liabilities are those of banks, the central 
bank or other financial intermediaries, nor does this financial depth measure identify 
where the financial system allocates capital" (p. 542). In other words, they suggest that 
increases in M3/GDP are not necessarily associated with increases in credit, and credit 
is clearly one of the aspects of financial development that might generate economic 
growth. More recently, credit to the private sector has been favoured as an alternative 
measure of financial intermediation. The main advantage of this indicator is that, by 
excluding credit to the public sector, it measures more accurately the role of financial 
intermediaries in channelling funds to the private sector. 
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The pioneering empirical study on financial-growth nexus is done by King and Levine 
(1993a, b and c). They systematically control for other factors affecting long-run 
growth, examine the capital accumulation and productivity growth channels, construct 
additional measures of the level of financial development, and analyse whether the 
level of financial development predicts long-run economic growth, capital 
5 accumulation, and productivity growth 
They construct four indicators of level of financial development, which is a 
refinement of the traditional practice exercised by Goldsmith and able to measure the 
functioning of the financial system more precisely: a) the size of financial 
intermediaries, i. e. "financial depth", measured by liquid liability of the financial 
system as a percentage of GDP; b) the degree to which the central bank versus 
commercial banks are allocating credit, using the ratio of bank credit divided by bank 
credit plus central bank domestic assets; c) share of total credit allocated to private 
non-financial firms which equals the ratio of credit allocated to private enterprises to 
total domestic credit; d) the ratio of credit to private non-financial enterprises to GDP. 
The basic assumption underlying these measures, as demonstrated by Levine (1996), 
is that "financial systems that allocate more credit to private firins are more engaged 
in researching firms, exerting corporate control, providing risk management services, 
mobilising savings, and facilitating transactions than financial system that simply 
funnel credit to government or state owned enterprises" (p. 32). 
As far as the measures of economic growth are concerned, King and Levine 
decompose growth into two components: the rate of physical capital accumulation and 
everything else, and then three indicators has been presented as follows: (1) the 
average rate of real per capita GDP growth; (2) the average rate of growth in the per 
capita capital stock; (3) total productivity growth, which defined as real per capita 
GDP growth minus the real per capita physical capital stock times a production 
function parameter that takes a experimental value of 0.3. 
By studying eighty countries over the period from 1960 to 1989, King and Levine 
(1993b) find that there is strongly positive relationship between each of the four 
financial development indicators and the three growth indicators, long-run real per 
See Levine, 1996. 
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capita growth rates, capital accumulation and productivity growth, thereby they 
conclude, "the data are consistent with the view that financial services stimulate 
economic growth by increasing the rate of capital accumulation and by improving the 
efficiency with which economies use that capital" (1993b, p. 735). Furthermore, to 
examine whether finance simply follow growth, their research paper suggests that the 
initial level of financial development, taking the value of financial depth in 1960, is a 
good predictor of subsequent rates of economic growth, physical capital accumulation 
and economic efficiency improvements over the next thirty years. The similar result 
has also been obtained by Murinde and Eng (1994), Neusser and Kugler (1996), 
Al-Yousif (2002). 
Using finn-level and industrial-level data for a broad cross-country and data on 
individual states of the United States, a number of research works present evidence 
consistent with the view that the level of financial development significantly affects 
the rate of economic growth (see, for example, Jayaratne and Strahan 1995; Rajan and 
Zingales 1996; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1996)6. More specifically, Beck et 
al. (2001) indicate that with higher levels of overall financial-sector development, 
economies grow faster, industries depending heavily on external finance expand at 
faster rates, new finns form more easily, firms' access to external financing is easier, 
and firms grow more rapidly in economies. 
The criticism on King and Levine's finding comes out almost immediately after their 
papers were published. Fernandez and Galetovic (1994) point out that if the King and 
Levine's observation sample is split between OECD and non-OECD countries, the 
positive correlations become insignificant for OECD countries. Then they added more 
countries and divided the sample into three groups based on per capita income at the 
start of the sample period, and consequently, the results show as the initial income 
falls, the correlations become larger and more sigpificant7. 
However, there are still numerous economists who insist that finance is a relatively 
unimportant factor in economic development. For example, Lucas (1988) asserts that 
the role of financial development in economic growth is "over- stressed" by most 
6 See Levine, 1996. 
7 See Sinha, 2001. 
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economists 8. Similarly, Dornbusch and Reygue (1989) question the evidence in 
support of the financial-led growth paradigm is "episodic" and a "vast exaggeration"9. 
Furthermore,, it has been noticed that some scholars of development economics do not 
10 even mention or discuss financial system when interpreting their views 
Another well-known exception is documented by De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995), 
showing that the correlations become negative when the sample is restricted only to 
Latin America countries. This finding is in line with the fact that in the 1970s, the 
banks in Latin America became active but imprudent lenders and as a result, the 
over-expanding banking sector activities contributed to a more vulnerable and fragile 
economic system. Not surprisingly, excessive expansion of banking sector in a poor 
regulatory environment hides the true character of financial development but "this 
type of fragility is not accounted for by the variables considered by King and Levine" 
(Sinha, 2001, p. 67). 
It is also worth mentioning in the cross-country analysis that in most recent years, 
with the development of econometric techniques, more and more empirical studies on 
real/financial correlation have been conducted by taking the advantage of panel 
techniques including two major approaches. The generally adopted approach is using 
the difference panel estimator (see, for example, Rousseau and Wachtel, 2000). Using 
difference panel estimator has two vital advantages: (a) differences the growth 
regression equation to remove the bias created by unobserved country-specific effects 
and (b) instruments the differenced values of the original regressors by using lagged 
values of the original regressors to eliminate the potential parameter inconsistency 
arising from simultaneity bias (Beck and Levine, 2002). However, Alonso-Borrego 
and Arellano (1996) argue that the instruments in the difference panel estimator are 
frequently weak, which induces biases in finite samples and poor precision 
asymptotically. 
To reduce the potential biases and imprecision associated with the difference 
estimator, the second major approach is introduced by Beck and Levine (2002). They 
use an estimator that combines in a system the regression in differences with the 
8 See Levine, 1996. 
9 See Habibullah, 1999. 
10 See Meir and Seers 1984; Levine, 1996. 
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regression in levels. The instruments for the regression in differences are the same as 
those used by Rousseau and Wachtel (2000). The instruments for the regression in 
levels are the lagged differences of the corresponding variables. These instruments are 
introduced based on the following additional assumptions: though there may be 
correlation between the levels of the explanatory variables and the country- specific 
effect, there is no correlation between the differences of these variables and the 
country- specific effect. 
2.4.2.2 Granger-causality analysis 
In 1966, based on lessons from the Japanese industrialisation experience, Hugh 
Patrick introduced the now common terms - "supp I y- leading" and 
"demand- following"" finance. He postulated that in the early stages of development, 
financial expansion, through the creation of financial institutions and the supply of 
their financial asset promotes economic growth, thus playing a "supply-leading"' role 
in economic development. In more advanced stages of development, demand for a 
greater variety of financial assets to better accommodate the needs of both savers and 
investors leads to the creation of new financial institutions and a greater array of 
financial assets, which is termed as "demand- following" phenomenon. In this stage, 
the financial system develops in response to the demand for financial services. 
Patrick's seminal work has given rise to a great deal of investigation into the role of 
financial sector, particularly the "financial-led" growth hypothesis derived from the 
"supply-leading" phenomenon "has been popular among governments in several 
developing countries as a means to promoting development" (Habibullah, 1999, 
p. 279). 
Although a positive correlation between growth and indicators of financial 
development was largely discovered in both cross-country/section study and panel 
analysis, an interpretative problem emerged: does the causal relationship run from 
financial development to growth, the reverse, or both ways? In other words, whether 
the financial intermediaries act the "supply-leading" role or "demand- following" one 
had not yet been distinguished by any empirical studies. This unresolved problem 
remained untouched until the first attempt taken by Gupta (1984). Afterwards, 
numerous researchers have applied the similar methods to observing the causality 
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issue based on different data sample according to their individual criteria of data 
selection. However, this issue remains empirically controversial: the empirical results 
have not yet offered any clear-cut answer upon this issue, but rather the direction of 
causality seems varying from country to country. 
As Gupta (1984) interprets it in his book Financial and Economic Growth in 
Developing Countries, the causality between these two variables cannot be described 
as simply as either the economic growth was the result of financial development (i. e. 
supply-leading phenomenon in Patrick's terminology) or the other way around (i. e. 
demand-following in Patrick's terminology). By conducting the causality test with a 
relatively small sample covering 14 developing countries, Gupta expands the causality 
patterns influentially with bidirectional causality: both financial development and 
economic growth complement each other. 
In Gupta's work (1984), the financial variable was approximated by the level of 
quasi-liquid liabilities (M2), while the economic growth was measured by the 
industrial production with quarterly data. The author used this type of time frequency 
to overcome the shortage and the lack of regular annual data during a long time span 
in developing countries. Gupta's empirical analyses, although considered as an 
important step in causality testing, is seen to study the money effects on industrial 
production more than financial aspects of economic growth. Moreover, the growth 
measure used seems to suffer from an approximation bias since the industrial 
production represents only a given part of total production (Boulila and Trabilsi, 
2002). 
Compared to Gupta (1984), the Jung's (1986) study used a vector auto-regressive 
(VAR) framework to test causality between financial development and growth for a 
sample of 56 countries (19 of which are industrial, developed countries), having at 
least 15 annual observations. He found that evidence from less developed countries is 
in favour of a causal direction running from the financial sector to the real activity. By 
contrast, developed countries are characterized by a reverse causal direction: the 
financial services develop as the real activity expands. Nevertheless, although original 
the usage of a VAR framework in testing Granger causality, the results are valid only 
in the case of stationary or co-integrated variables. Since variables are computed in 
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levels, estimates can hardly be expected to be accurate (Demetriades and Hussein, 
1996). 
Murende and Eng (1994) initiated the studies using co-integration and unit root 
techniques within a bivariate VAR framework in testing the issue. The country sample 
used was Singapore with quarterly data spanning the period 1979 to 1990. The 
evidence presented largely supports a unidirectional causality from financial 
development to economic growth. The authors consider that such a result is in line 
with the deliberate financial restructuring policy, implemented by the Government in 
the 1980s. The reforms achieved in Singapore aimed at developing bank 
intennediation and enhancing monetization and financial services in order to increase 
real growth. 
Contrary to Murende and Eng (1994), Habibullah (1999) conducted the financial-led 
growth hypothesis test by using the quarterly data covering the period of 1981QI to 
1994Q4 of seven Asian developing countries, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
Nepal, Philippines, Sri Lanka and Thailand. He asserts that depending on each 
country's stages of development, the causation between finance and economic growth 
varies rather than simply unidirectional in form of either demand- following or 
supply-leading. The financial-led growth hypothesis is only supported on the case of 
Philippines, while demand-following hypothesis - economic growth causes financial 
development - is found in three countries (Malaysia, Myanmar and Nepal) and the 
rest three countries (Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Thailand) provide the evidence of 
bidirectional causality. 
Similarly, Demetriades and Hussein (1996) found considerable evidence of 
bidirectionality between financial development and growth for a set of 16 developing 
countries during different periods. They concluded that causality patterns have 
tendency to vary with countries and more specifically with the outcomes of financial 
reforms implemented. Arestis and Demetriades (1996) tried to distinguish "bank 
based" from "capital-market-based" financial systems in their causality tests. They 
divided their twelve countries sample in two subsets of developed and developing 
countries. The range of the data differs from one country to another but the whole 
span ranges between 1949 and 1992. Cointegration and causality tests achieved tend 
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to corroborate that the causal nature of the linkage is highly influenced by country 
specific financial sector features announced previously by Demetriades and Hussein 
(1996). 
Luintel and Khan (1999) carried out time series tests of the finance and growth 
relationship in a multivariate VAR framework with co-integration tests. They found 
that the long run financial intermediation and growth ties are featured by a 
bi-directional causality for all the countries of the sample. Such outcomes were 
accounted for by the usage of new approaches and methods in testing this causality 
and the higher dimensional system. 
The outcomes converge to the result that country specific features of the financial 
sector are likely to account for the differences between the results of the tests. 
Specifically, results on the causality pattern vary with the success of financial 
liberalization policies implemented in each country and with the development level of 
the financial sector generally. 
2.5 Domestic Financial Liberalisation and Stock market development 
2.5.1 Brief distinction between Domestic FL and External FL 
The most important part of the theories of financial development is likely to be the 
theory of financial repression (FR), while the impact of removing FR is a 
controversial issue. These seminal theoretical and empirical studies offer an essential 
rationale for financial liberalisation (FL)". Correspondingly, the suggestion of 
implementing FL has been voiced broadly to achieve rapid economic growth. 
Most theoretical literatures distinguish Domestic FL and external FL as two stages 
during the FL process. Domestic FL have included more flexibly managed or fully 
market-determined interest rates for both creditors and debtors; reduced reliance on 
public credit programs and interest rate subsidies; and promotion of competition 
11 See McKinnon-Shaw model over TR hypothesis' and the successors provide a large amount of 
evidence that FR affects economic growth negatively. For instance, Courakis, 1984; Gelb, 1989; 
Roubmi and Sala-i-Martin, 1992; Demetriades and Luintel, 1996. 
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among financial institutions by authorising the entry of new institutions, reducing or 
breaking down barriers between bank and non-bank financial intermediation and 
allowing the development of new types of financial services with market-based fees 
and commissions. External FL has been an important component of these programmes, 
with relaxing constrains on capital flow between home country and abroad and 
financial sectors being gradually opened to foreign participation in many cases. These 
two types of financial reform are complementary, in those liberalised domestic 
financial institutions and, through them, the ultimate borrowers and investors are in a 
better position to profit from access to global capital, as well as from the transfer of 
knowledge and technology of financial intermediation from abroad. In addition, 
foreign competition can help to increase the efficiency of domestic financial markets. 
Finally, these financial reforms have typically been part of a much broader package of 
economic stabilisation and pro-market structural reforms. 
However, external FL is assumed to be less relevant here given the following two 
reasons. First, the research in this thesis focuses on analysing how domestic financial 
sector development influences the economic growth in China's context. Second, 
although China's capital account has been liberalised gradually, restrictions remain on 
capital mobility in the form of both outward and inward foreign direct investment. 
Thus, emphasis here is focused on the debate over the feature and consequence of 
Domestic FL. 
2.5.2 The role of stock market in Domestic FL 
A pervasive phenomenon occurring within the financial de-repression process in many 
less developed countries (LDCs) is the establishment and fast expansion of stock 
markets. The issuance of equity and the formation of stock markets are determined by 
some factors both endogenous and exogenous to the process of economic growth 
(Lauranceson and Chai, 2003). The endogenous factors include an increased need to 
access external funding to finance large-scale project and a desire to better manage 
risk (McKinnon, 1973; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; He, 1994). The central of 
exogenous factors is the role played by government, including the favoured system of 
corporate governance, whether an effective prudential framework surrounding stock 
I INIVERSITY LIBRARY 
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markets can be installed and whether the banking system is heavily repressed (Stiglitz, 
1994; Mayer, 1994; Lauranceson and Chai, 2003). 
Some economists of the McKinnon-Shaw school suggest that stock market can be 
understood as a good complement of credit markets in FL process (see, for example, 
Levine and Zervos, 1995); while others propose that stock markets have much more 
significantly positive effect on economic growth whereas credit markets have little 
influence (see, for example, Atje and Jovanovic, 1993). Je Cho (1986) showed that in 
order to achieve resource allocation efficiency, credit markets need to be 
supplemented by a well- functioning equity market. Je Cho (1986) and Levine (1996) 
even argue that equity finance is superior to banking borrowing and 
government-guiding finance. This is because equity finance is seen to have efficiency 
advantages to weaken the rent seeking, adverse selection and moral hazard problems 
which are inherent in bank borrowing and government-guiding finance. The efficiency 
of stock market derives from its liquidity and the ability of shareholders to supervise 
and influence corporate managers through the 'threat of continual auction' when 
12 managers' performance are under expected (Manne, 1965) 
Moreover, according to Grabel (1998), the increase in financial deepening 
accompanied by stock market development is likely to decrease financial market 
volatility by increasing the numbers of both investors and tradable shares, and by 
encouraging the increased production and distribution of reliable information. But the 
recent study of stock market in US, UK and Europe indicates that volatility remains 
even with large number of investors and trades. 
The philosophy of stock market shows that a well-functioning stock market should 
improve both quantity and quality of investments mainly through two precise channels: 
the pricing mechanism and takeover mechanism. However, the empirical work 
suggests that neither of these two mechanisms operate perfectly even in developed and 
relatively mature markets (such as US and UK stock markets) in practice. On the one 
hand, the actual stock market price does not reflect the fundamental value of the firms 
partly due to the arbitrary performance of "noise traders". On the other hand, the 
takeover mechanism may not work as designed because competitive selection in the 
12 Denved from Grabel, 1998. 
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market for corporate control takes place much more on the basis of size than 
performance, and that's why a large unprofitable firm has a greater survival 
probability than a small sound firm (Singh, 1992). Furthermore, the critique also has 
been extended to focusing on rewarding managers for their success in conducting 
financing channels in short-term rather than creating new wealth for the corporate in 
long-term (Singh, 1995). In these circumstances, the stock markets in LDCs are likely 
to perform worse since obviously these emerging markets lack well-defined regulation 
and adequate monitoring. Therefore, some economists argue that those tasks stated 
above should be fulfilled in credit market by such kind of financial intermediaries as 
banking institutions dominating the financial system, which is traditionally found in 
Germany and Japan (Mayer, 1989). 
Nevertheless, some LDCs experiences during the last two decades do not support the 
implications of stock market volatility, since considerable amount of developing 
country finns have been successfully raising capital from those emerging markets 
during this period. In order to examine the features of stock market in LDCs, Singh 
and Hamid (1992) and Singh (1995) study the corporate finance for developing 
country finns in terms of the financing of corporate growth of net assets. These 
researches show that large developing country corporations rely heavily on external 
funds, particularly in form of issuing new shares. This financing pattern is much 
different from the "pecking order" suggested earlier by economic model: emphasising 
less on the share issuing but more largely relying on the retained profit. 
Through his research, Singh (1995) suggests two essential reasons to explain the 
heavy reliance on equity finance by the big developing country firms. First, by testing 
a set of interlinked hypotheses, Singh discovers that unlike the development of US and 
UK stock market in 19th country, the stock market today in LDCs is not an 
"evolutionary response" to market forces. By contrast, the expansion of these 
emerging markets seems much more like a policy-driven progression. In this case, it 
can be easily explained why these markets are usually found for lack of efficient 
regulation and supervision: the significant government intervention prevents a sound 
and legal environment from being set promptly and gradually. The second essential 
reason is that the cost of equity capital keeps falling during the last two decades. 
Relatively speaking, as the dramatic rise of interesting rate brought about by FL, the 
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cost of debt financing relative to that of equity capital is higher. Owning to the rapid 
development of both internal and external financial market, the share price increases 
significantly (partly due to the speculative and arbitrary activities) which brings down 
the cost of equity capital efficiently and makes equity financing a more favourable 
channel for developing country corporations to raise funds. 
In general, although stock market development has found as an important part of the 
process of Domestic FL in LDCs, Singh (1997) stresses that stock market expansion is 
not a necessary natural progression of a country's financial development. LDCs would 
have been better off by reforming and expanding their existing banking-dominated 
financial system rather than by too much emphasising on the establishment of stock 
markets during Domestic FL. It is believed so because the volatility of stock market 
will become more severe in the developing country conditions, which may mislead the 
fund allocation. 
2.5.3 Stock market development and economic growth 
Although an increasing amount of empirical estimation suggests that well-functioning 
banks accelerate economic growth, these studies generally do not simultaneously 
examine stock market development. Beck and Levine (2002) stress that omitting stock 
market development makes it difficult to assess whether (1) the positive relationship 
between bank development and growth holds when controlling for stock market 
development; (2) banks and market each have an independent impact on economic 
growth; or (3) overall financial development matters for growth but it is difficult to 
identify the separate impact of stock markets and banks on economic success. 
An influential study by Levine and Zervos (1998) empirically assesses the relationship 
between growth and both stock markets and banks. Levine and Zervos (1998) find that 
initial measures of stock market liquidity and banking sector development are both 
strong predictors of economic growth. To measure bank development, they use bank 
credit to the private sector as a share of GDP. They use an assortment of stock market 
development measures, including the overall size of the market (market capitalisation 
relative to GDP), stock market activity (the value of trades relative to GDP), market 
liquidity (the value of trades relative to market capitalisation) and market volatility (a 
41 
12-month rolling standard deviation of market returns). As a result, their empirical 
finding indicates that "both stock market liquidity and banking development are 
positively and robustly correlated with contemporaneous and future rates of economic 
growth" (ibid, p. 554). Furthennore, they also draw the conclusion that financial 
factors are an essential part of the growth process. 
However, it has been noticed that statistical and conceptual problems remain in the 
Levine and Zervos (1998) study (Beck and Levine, 2002). First, while theory stresses 
the potential relationship between economic growth and the contemporary level of 
financial development, the fact that they use initial values of stock market and bank 
development implies an informational loss as well as a potential consistency loss. 
Second, the ordinary least squares (OLS) approach taken by Levine and Zervos does 
not account formally for potential simultaneity bias, nor does it control for country 
fixed effects or the routine use of lagged dependent variables in growth regressions 
explicitly. To resolve the statistical weaknesses in the Levine and Zervos study (1998), 
Arestis, Demetriades and Luintel (2001) use quarterly data and apply time series 
methods to five developed economies and show that while both banking sector and 
stock market development explain subsequent growth, the effect of banking sector 
development is substantially larger than that of stock market development. 
Moreover, Zhu, Ash and Pollin (2004) stress that the incomplete manner in which 
Levine and Zervos controlled for outlier in their study (1998) led to the non-robust 
estimated result towards the influence of stock market liquidity upon GDP growth. 
The ad hoc choices Levine and Zervos made (based on a scatterplot of residuals 
approach) were questionable. In particular, Zhu, Ash and Pollin (2004) point out that 
it is not clear that Japan and India should be treated as outliers according to 
Levine/Zervos scatter-plot visual figure. Correspondingly, Zhu, Ash and Pollin (2004) 
re-test the robustness of Levine/Zervos results through additional outlier control 
techniques. As a result, the alternative control techniques indicate that excluding 
Japan and India as outliers appears weak. Additionally, the Levine/Zervos results are 
heavily driven by differences between the high-growth Asian economies and the rest 
of the world. Nevertheless, it appears that stock market liquidity (measured by 
turnover) has no statistically observable independent effect on GDP growth either 
within the Asian Tigers or within the rest of the world (Zhu et al., 2004, p. 69). 
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By controlling the other variables, the resulting evidence from Levine's study (1999) 
indicates that the importance of banks is determined endogenously; thereby increasing 
the relative importance of banks has no impact on economic growth. This result 
implies that the striking importance of bank development could be the result of 
impediments to the development of equity markets or political intervention. Hence, a 
relatively large banking sector might provide the evidence of distortions in the 
performance of market forces, which unlikely to lead to a greater growth. 
2.6 Research space for this empirical study 
From existing empirical studies, it is apparent that the cross-country analysis 
(including panel estimation) is the dominant approach which enables the researchers 
to obtain large amount of observations to guarantee the valid and consistent estimated 
result. However, it is noticed that China has rarely been taken into account either 
jointly or alone. Similarly, Granger-causality technique has not often been applied in 
the context of China either. 
Given China's rapid economic growth, also characterised by unbalanced development 
between coastal and interior area, between south and north region, associated with its 
gradual financial and economic reform, the real/financial nexus hypothesis testing is 
worth conducting by using China's statistical data. Though financial reform in China 
remove a lot unnecessary controls that may hamper economic growth, financial capital 
mobility across regions remains highly restricted. Particularly, firms are unable to 
access the credit market in other cities but restrained in the local credit markets. 
Meanwhile, labour capital distribution is relatively static. Therefore, the entire nation 
can be treated as a union of 30 relatively independent provinces, in which 
circumstances the panel techniques is applicable (Chapter 6). 
Moreover, the major statistical drawbacks in most current Granger-causality empirical 
studies lie with the time frequency of observations. Cross-country with annual data is 
commonly adopted, apart from quarterly data were used occasionally, to guarantee a 
large enough sample size. In addition, Granger-causality techniques have not yet been 
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found applying in one single country to testify the real/financial causal relationship. 
These drawbacks provide a good chance for this research paper to identify the causal 
direction between financial development and economic growth in the country of 
China alone by using monthly data. Thereby, the estimated result drawn 
correspondingly can be regarded as a complementary attempt to the existing empirical 
studies (Chapter 7). 
2.7 Summary 
This chapter mainly provided a general background for real/financial relationship 
from both theoretical and empirical aspects. First of all, four priori possibilities 
concerning the causal relationship between financial development and economic 
growth were distinguished - not causally correlated, financial development determines 
economic growth, financial development follows economic growth and financial 
development deters economic growth occasionally. 
In the theoretical framework section, the theory on real/financial relationship was 
illustrated by using the micro models of financial intermediation to show how these 
financial arrangements eliminate at least part of the negative consequences of the 
positive information and transaction costs. By adopting the idea of 'lemon' problem, 
substantial researches have been undertaken on the question how financial market 
inefficiencies may distort the economic behaviour. 
Among several growth models which take into account financial markets5 
intermediaries and financial functions, AK model is the prevalent endogenous one to 
capture the potential effects of financial development on growth. Though financial 
development indicators have not been explicitly introduced into this model as 
determinant variables, the effects of financial development on saving rate and 
productivity of capital were fully examined. 
The functional approach asserted by Levine (1996) in one of his influential studies 
described the macroeconomic consequences of the existence and the development of 
the financial structure as a whole and not of each particular financial instrument or 
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market separately. Correspondingly, the primary ftinction of financial intermediaries 
and its linkage with economic growth were interpreted in the four perspectives: 
mobilising savings, acquiring information and allocating resources, diversifying and 
pooling of risks, and monitoring managers and exert corporate control. 
This chapter also studied the role of stock market during the domestic FL process. 
Some economists suggest that stock market can be understood as a good complement 
of credit markets in domestic FL process, while some of them propose that stock 
markets have much more significantly positive effect on economic growth than credit 
markets do. Meanwhile, an increasing research observed that the stock markets in 
LDCs are likely to perform worse since these emerging markets lack of well-defined 
regulation and adequate monitoring. Correspondingly, economists suggests that the 
financing pattern of developing country firms should be emphasising less on the share 
issuing but more largely relying on the retained profit. 
Nevertheless, the existing studies do not provide a set of clear-cut conclusions and this 
provides a substantial research space to conduct the financi al- growth nexus 
investigation in the context of China. Therefore, in the following chapters, the 
short-run and long-run economic growth pattern will be discussed in Chapter 5 by 
exploring error correction model technique. Meanwhile, both the sectoral shift effect 
and contribution of banking sector development will be detected by establishing a 
panel analysis framework (based on Cobb-Douglas production function) in Chapter 6. 
Then the Granger-causality nexus between financial market development and 
economic growth will be examined Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 3: Financial sector reform in China: An overview 
3.1 Introduction 
Financial sector reform in China has focused on the reform and development of banks 
and non-banking financial institutions (NBFIs). Though stock market development 
has lagged behind the changes in the real sector, the existence and expansion of 
China's stock market played an important role within the reform process. Therefore, a 
general picture on these two aspects is drawn in the following section where the 
reform and development of China's banking sector is discussed chronologically 
(Section 3.3). This will be undertaken after a brief survey of China's real sector 
reform in Section 3.2. The performance and features of China's stock market will be 
illustrated in Section 3.4. This will be followed by a brief summary for this chapter in 
Section 3.5. 
3.2 China's economic reform 
We cannot understand the China's financial reform without an excursion into its 
economic reform during the past three decades. China began its current economic 
reform in the late 1970s. Prior to the adoption of these reforms, the Chinese economy 
strongly resembled the Soviet administrative-command economy, which is 
characterised as almost complete state ownership, collectivised agriculture, an 
industry managed by directive plans and priorities set by the Communist Party. 
China's reform started with a trial-and-error strategy. China did not adopt a big-bang 
approach to transform the economy; neither did it engage in large scale privatisation, 
in contrast to other East European socialist economies that have enforced a radical set 
of changes together with full implementation of a privatisation programme (Liu and 
Garino, 2001). 
After undertaking a market-oriented economic reform for nearly three decades, China 
has been identified as a "market socialism" economy, which combines market 
resource allocation with state ownership (Gregory and Stuart, 2004). This section 
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main y provides a survey of China's economic reform in respect to price liberalisation 
and enterprises' corporatisation. 
3.2.1 Price liberalisation 
China's price reform started at the beginning of the 1980s, with an experimental out- 
of-plan market for small commodities that proved successful in reducing supply 
shortages. Meanwhile, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have been allowed to sell some 
of their output on free markets whilst an increasingly large fraction of state firms' 
inputs have been purchased on free markets rather than being allocated by the state. 
This led to a dual-track system -a mixed plan and market pricing approach. Under the 
plan track production and prices are frozen at a defined pre-existing level, usually last 
period's output. A parallel market track is carried out at the margin so that fully free 
market transactions can take place outside the plan track at market price usually being 
substantially above the official price. 
Under the fixed price system in centrally planned economy stage, prices bear little 
relation to costs. Hence, the ultimate objective of a firm's operation is to complete the 
production quota allocated by the state regardless the expenses. From the viewpoint of 
economic incentives, the key point within such pricing mechanism is that at the 
margin, decisions are made in the face of market prices. Free-market prices started 
conveying information of real market demand and supply. Consequently, profits and 
costs became the essential criteria for firms to make production decision. For a firm's 
decisions on how much to produce, what inputs to use and what kind of investment to 
undertake, the state-imposed output quota is irrelevant, as long as that quota is smaller 
than total output. What matters for such decisions is the price that will be received for 
any extra output, which is the free-market price (Byrd, 1987). 
The Chinese dual-track system both provides the efficiency gains from price 
liberalisation and protects individual agents from welfare losses because it is designed 
to be Pareto-improving (Roland, 2000). However, it has been pointed out that the 
dual-price system enabled illicit profits made by obtaining goods at market prices 
(McMillan and Naughton, 1992). Buying low and selling high is a normal market 
activity; but the dual-price system has meant that certain well-connected people can 
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buy at artificially low prices then seize the exorbitant profit by selling at high market 
prices. 
China has not yet entirely removed its price control. Controls still remain on a list of 
the more economically significant and strategically important items. Nonetheless 
China is moving towards greater transparency in pricing these items. Govenunent also 
issued rules for holding public hearings on pricing policy decisions. Price 
liberalisation has been pursued gradually. For instance, the National People's 
Congress in March 2001 highlighted the need to improve price setting mechanisms by 
breaking industrial monopolies and removing barriers to trade between China's 
regions. China lifted price controls on 128 items in 2001 as part of preparations to 
enter the World Trade Organisation and persuade the international trade body to 
classify it as a market economy. 
3.2.2 Enterprises corporatisation 
The first two decades of SOE reform applied an incremental approach to reduce the 
scope of planning, increase managerial authority, and rely more on market forces. 
However, making the final move from state to private ownership has been the most 
difficult step to take. Maintaining the state ownership is the key issue for China to 
remain the property of market-socialist economy, which is based on the argument that 
SOEs could adopt corporate governance procedures to make them work efficiently in 
the interest of the owner (the state), just as privately owned capitalist corporations 
could operate in the interests of private shareholders. 
The late 1990s witnessed a more clear SOE policy under the slogan "retain large 
SOEs and release small ones (Zhua Da Fang Xiao)". Smaller state-owned companies 
could go to private owners, but the state should continue to own the largest. Instead of 
simply changing from state to private, the state ownership was to be transformed from 
direct state supervision and management to state shareholding, i. e. SOEs were to be 
corporatised. This means that state remains the owner of the majority of shares but 
management is independent, which aimed at ensuring the corporatised SOEs would 
operate like corporations in industrialised market economies. To do so, the state 
should let an independent management make its own decisions, while the common 
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market principles such as going bankrupt should be also applied to the corporatised 
SOEs. 
However, instead of eliminating the poorly performing firms, the government try to 
save all firrus. Insolvent SOEs can still count on state bailouts. In other words, state 
intervention remains and soft budget constraint is still implicitly and widely applied. 
Since it is politically difficult to allow the bankruptcy occurs in a large local enterprise, 
political pressure on bank authorities remains intense, especially when state ownership 
dominates in China's current banking sector. In these circumstances, bank credit is 
preferentially extended to SOEs despite their poor financial conditions. As a result, the 
Chinese policy that ways can be found to salvage all enterprises has accumulated 
substantial inventories of Non-performing Loans (NPLs) and held over the resolution 
of commercialisation of bank lending (Gregory and Stuart, 2004). It also implies that 
introducing profit as a criterion for success in either corporatised enterprises or banks 
is doomed to fail as long as the soft budget constraint was retained. 
Throughout the reform process, SOEs' investment decision making still suffers from 
political intervention. Since the approval process takes into account the impact of 
investment on regional economic development, the implementation of the majority of 
large investment projects are decided by SOEs' direct political authorities, but not 
based on market research or rate-of-retum considerations. Therefore, it has been 
stressed that the fundamental nature of investment processes in China has not changed 
substantially from the pre-reform circumstances despite the impact of nearly three 
decades of reform (Gregory and Stuart, 2004). 
3.3 Development of China's banking sector 
Initial reform of banking sector starting in 1978 was characterised by the 
establishment of the two-tier banking system, with the establishment of the central 
bank and specialised banks. Later on, a significant development occurred in the non- 
banking sector - the emergence of the non-banking financial institutions, including 
rural and urban credit cooperatives, and trust and investment corporations. 
Commercialisation of state banks, opening the financial sector to foreign competitors, 
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and development of financial markets have only taken place to a limited degree. 
Despite twenty years of reform policy, China's banks are still at an early stage of their 
development. Their main lines of business are traditional deposit-taking, lending and 
payments. Higher-value banking has not yet emerged, although the booming Chinese 
economy is increasing the demand for financial services'. Financial reforms can be 
described in four chronological stages. 
3.3.1 The role of banks and banking before economic refon-n 
During the 30 years (1949 - 1978) after the founding of People's Republic of China, 
China's economy was operating mainly under a highly centralised and planned 
management system. All national economic activities had been organised according to 
mandatory planning. As the private sector was not allowed to exist, all enterprises 
were state-owned (in urban area) and town-and-village-owned (in rural area) in the 
Chinese economy, thus, their products had been turned over to the state entirely for 
the purpose of second allocation conducted by the state. Due to the planned economy 
system, the amount of available funds and raw materials for each firm was determined 
by the state plan. Correspondingly, the financial system before reform was 
characterised by the "all-inclusive Soviet-style mono-bank system" (Tong, 2002, p. 53) 
established in 1950. 
The Chinese financial system was originally designed to serve the planning process 
rather than to perform the functions of a modem financial system. Prior to 1979, the 
People's Bank of China (PBC) controlled about 93 percent of the total financial assets 
of the country and handled almost all lending business, including industrial, 
commercial and rural credits (Yi, 1994, p. 19). Some specialised banks did exist. 
However, they were actually either agents for budgetary grants handed down by the 
Ministry of Finance or business branches of the PBC. For example, the People's 
Construction Bank of China, founded in 1954, was in fact the cashier of the Capital 
Construction Finance Department of the Ministry of Finance; similarly, the Bank of 
China, established in 1949, was the international business department of the PBC. 
Massimo Luppino, December 9 th 2002. A summary of the Chinese financial sector, 
http: //www. tidona. coi-n/pubblicazioni/dicembreO2 2. htm 
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The function of the banking system was confined to facilitating the financing of the 
economic plan. The PBC acted mainly as cashiers, with its functions confined to issue 
currency and credit, and carrying out the settlements of state-owned enterprises 
transactions. All deposits of state enterprises had to be held in accounts at the PBC. 
Credit could only be obtained there. All business transactions between enterprises had 
to be settled through the PBC according to the state plan. The payment of wages could 
only be made through a separate wage fund account, the quota of which was stipulated 
by the state plan and the withdrawal of cash from that account was under the 
supervision of the bank. 
Before the reform period, liquidity in the financial system consisted of two 
components: cash and bank transfers, which were not mutually convertible. Most 
transactions in the consumer goods market were conducted primarily in cash, whereas 
most transactions in the producer goods markets were required to be cleared by bank 
transfers. The monetary authority used the so-called "cash plan" to control the 
currency flow and "credit plan" to control the bank transfer flow. Under such a system, 
the money supply was whatever was required for the implementation of the state's 
producing plan. Since most fixed capital investment projects were financed by budget 
appropriations, the primary objective of the credit plan was to provide working capital 
to industries and commerce. The volume of total credit was deten-nined by the 
government's plans for enterprises production, and the amount of cash injected into 
the economy was based on the level of wage payments by enterprises, which was also 
set by the central authorities. 
In summary, the issuance of currency and credit was determined by the cabinet - the 
State Council - and the PBC was not independent, rather, it was only a government 
agency under the Ministry of Finance and its primary function was to finance the 
physical plan. The role of the financial system in mobilising savings was very limited, 
because the primary source of savings was the government and the state-owned 
enterprises. Meanwhile, the role of financial intermediation in resource allocation was 
also limited, because most investments were determined and financed by the 
government budget appropriations, rather than through the banking system. Apart 
from the banking system, there were no non-bank financial institution and financial 
markets, and bank deposits were the only financial assets. 
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3.3.2 Early years of reform: structural changes in the banking system (1978-1984) 
Banking reforms introduced by the Chinese authorities since 1978 came earlier than 
reforms applied to other sectors. In the early years of reform, efforts were focused on 
the rural areas and in the real sector. Financial sector refonn was limited to structural 
changes in the mono-bank system. Two main roles played by the banking system in 
China were established. One is the supportive role: the banking system should not 
hinder enterprises from exercising their legitimate decision making by themselves. 
The other role is to influence macro-level economic activities. 
In 1978, the PBC was formally established as China's central bank, and separated 
from the Ministry of Finance. In addition, three specialised banks were restored or set 
up to handle loans to specific sectors. The Bank of China (BOC) was restored to 
handle transactions related to foreign trade and investment. While the People's 
Construction Bank of China (PCBC) was set up primarily to serve the construction 
sector and fixed asset investment. The Agriculture Bank of China (ABC) was 
established to take over the PBC's rural banking business. 
This period also witnessed the start of the development of NBFIs. Successful reform 
in the rural areas and the proliferation of rural industries dramatically increased the 
demand for financial services from rural residents. Thus, a network of rural credit 
cooperatives was set up under the supervision of Agriculture Bank of China (ABC) to 
provide small-scale rural banking services to rural residents and township and village 
enterprises. Another type of NBFIs, namely the trust and investment corporations 
(TICs), appeared. The first TIC, the China International Trust and Investment 
Corporation (CITIC) was established in 1979 to raise funds from foreign sources to 
finance domestic projects. CITIC has been the primary source for most international 
bond borrowing made by China during the 1980s. 
This period also experienced important changes in the sources of both savings and 
investment. On the savings side, the decentralisation of financial resources into the 
hands of households led to an explosion in saving deposits. On the investment side, 
bank loans replaced the state budget appropriations as the main source of investment 
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finance. Following a directive of the State Council in 1979, the main source of 
investment funds was shifted gradually from state budget to bank loans. Both the PBC 
and the specialised banks were authorised to grant medium- to long-term loans to state 
enterprises. As a result, the composition of funds allocated to state-owned industrial 
enterprises changed rapidly from budget appropriations in 1978 (70 percent) to state 
bank loans in 1982 (80 percent)2. 
The changes in the structure of savings and sources of investments highlight the 
importance of financial intermediaries in resource allocation. However, despite the 
structural changes described above, the banking system still served the limited 
purpose of financing the physical plan. PBC was assuming the functions of both a 
central bank and a commercial bank as it continued to provide working capital loans 
to state-owned enterprises. Loans were allocated to state-owned enterprises under the 
credit plan, and neither the project's profitability nor the borrower's repayment ability 
was taken into consideration in granting loans. And this is the main source of today's 
non-performing loans. The first stage of China's financial reform did not get rid of the 
characteristic of highly centralised and planned management. Furthermore, the 
mechanism of bank monitoring state-owned enterprises was almost non-existent. 
3.3.3 Starting financial refonn: 
institutions (1984 - 199 1) 
development of banking and non-banking 
The most significant change in this phase was the establishment of a two-tier banking 
system similar to that in market-oriented economies. In 1984, the People's Bank of 
China was formally established as the country's central bank by removing its 
commercial banking activities. A fourth specialised bank, the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) was established to take over the functions of 
financing industrial and commercial enterprises fon-nerly adopted by the PBC. Thus 
the transition from the mono-bank system to a two-tier banking system was completed, 
comprised of a central bank - the PBC, and big four state-owned specialised banks - 
the ABC, the BOC, the ICBC and the PCBC. They were operating exclusively in their 
' See Tong, 2002, p. 2 1. 
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own specialised area while strictly prohibited from being engaged in cross-area 
business. 
The financial sector diversified further after 1984. During this period, a numbers of 
non-banking institutions were also been established, such as People's Insurance 
Company of China (PICC), Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCC). Following the 
establishment of the ICBC, 1,200 urban credit cooperatives were set up to serve urban 
individual and collectively owned enterprises. In addition, new non-state commercial 
banks were established, including the Bank of Communications, CITIC Industrial 
Bank and China Merchants Bank, which were permitted to compete with state 
specialised banks in all forms of business. Meanwhile, another two important 
specialised banks, Bengbu Housing Savings Bank and Yantai Housing Savings Bank, 
were established in this stage, mainly conducting the housing mortgage. The summary 
of the reform of banking and non-banking institutions is given in Table 3.1. 
Since the State Council decided that the PBC would assume the function of the central 
bank in September 1983, the role of PBC has been transferred to oversee the overall 
development and activities of the monetary sector, maintaining economic and 
currency stability. When the economy overheated and credit was out of control in 
1984-85, the Central Bank enforced quarterly credit limits on its branches and on the 
specialised banks. Many of the administrative controls employed in 1985 include the 
order to stop offering loans to inefficient enterprises and to fin-ns that produce poor- 
quality products for which there is little demand. Since 1986, the central bank has 
tried to exercise both direct and indirect control measures, such as setting quotas for 
fixed asset loans. The central bank indirectly controls credit, mainly by its credits to 
the various specialised banks 3. Competition among the state specialised banks 
increased during this period, as they were allowed to cross-conduct business. For 
example, the ABC was allowed to set up branches in urban areas, taking deposits from 
urban residents and making industrial loans. 
A major innovation during this period was that foreign financial institutions were 
licensed to operate in China. Generally speaking, the entry of foreign banking 
institution started from a small number of foreign banks allowed to set up 
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Table 3.1: Bank and NBFI Reform 
Year Name of Bank Feature 
1978 The People's Bank Separated from the Ministry of Finance, the PBC was 
of China raised to the ministerial rank in terms of status and 
functional organisation, and operated solely as the 
country's central bank in since 1984. 
1979 Agricultural Bank Together with rural credit cooperatives, the ABC is the 
of China major source of financing the rural sector. The bank's 
role is to mobilise and direct financial resources from 
within the rural sector, as well as industrial enterprises 
in rural township. 
1979 Bank of China Separated from PBC and became an economic 
organisation responsible to the executive arm of the 
State Council, deals in foreign exchange business and 
settles the international account of China. Its designated 
functions include organising and supplying foreign- 
exchange funds for investment in China's economic 
development and handling renminbi loans and deposits 
related to foreign-exchange operations. 
1979 People's Previously, the PCBC was a branch of Ministry of 
Construction Bank Finance. As from 1981, budgetary grants dispensed 
of China through the PCBC to industrial enterprises for fixed 
capital investment are gradually being changed to 
repayable bank loans with interest. PCBC can also start 
to build up its own assets by expanding deposits to 
strengthen its lending capacity. 
1979 China International Concentrates on attracting foreign capital and 
Trust & Investment technology, acts as an intermediary in organising 
corporation various forms of joint ventures between Chinese and 
foreign partners, woks closely with BOC. Authority 
expanded in 1982 to include setting up of financial 
institutions abroad. 
1982 China's Investment Manages the use of long- and medium-term loans from 
Bank the World Bank and other international financial 
institutions and to attract other sources of foreign funds 
for lending to domestic projects. 
1983 People's Insurance Separated from PBC. Specialises in insurance business. 
Company of China 
1984 Rural Credit Sprung up all over the country during 1984/5, mostly in 
Cooperatives the hands of individuals with different degrees of 
involvement by the local government. Started to issue 
shares and short term loans to members. 
1984 Industrial and The ICBC is to take over from the PBC the entire 
Commercial Bank commercial operation in providing bank credits to, and 
of China taking deposits from, enterprises. It specialises in the 
provision of short and medium ten-n credits to 
enterprises for their working capital requirements and 
loans for technical transformation, and to self-employed 
3 L1, K. W. 1994. Financial Repression and Economic Reform in China. Westport, CT: Praeger. P31-43 
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people and township enterprises. 
1985- Guangdong Dev. Finance the provinces of Guangdong and Fujian and the 
1988 Bank, Xiamen Int. special economic zones of Xiamen and Shenzhen 
Bank, Fujian 
Industrial Bank, 
Shenzhen Dev. 
Bank 
CITIC Industrial Banking arm of CITIC and China Merchants Holdings 
Bank, China Co. Ltd. respectively. 
Merchants Bank 
Bengbu Housing Specialise in housing mortgages. 
Savings Bank, 
Yantai Housing 
Savings Bank 
1987 Bank of Reactivated on a joint stock basis, handles both 
Communications domestic and foreign currency denominated banking 
business, and finances economic development in the 
eastern coastal provinces with the aim to revive 
Shanghai's former status as a financial centre. Total 
asset was RMB2 billion with 50 percent owned by the 
state and 25 percent by the Shanghai municipal 
government. Handles renminbi and foreign currencies 
in both short- and long-term lending and is given 
flexibility to determine interest rate. 
Source. - Huang Hsiao, 1984, Money and Banking in the Chinese Mainland, Taipei: Chung-Hua 
Institution for Economic Research; Tam, On Kit. 1986, Reform of China's Banking; Wang, Yan. 
1988, Financial Refonn: Decentralisation and Liberalisation, in Planning and Finance in China's 
Economic Reform. 
representative in Special Economic Zones. Foreign banking institutions in China fall 
into three categories: 1) branches established by foreign banks, 2) foreign banks with 
representative offices, and 3) joint venture banks between Chinese banks and foreign 
banks, e. g. Chinese Mercantile Bank, Fujian Asian Bank Ltd., Xiamen International 
Bank and its Fuzhou branch. The representative office became the first investment 
vehicle available to foreign banks after China implemented the open-door policy. 
Representative offices provide introduction, contracts, and service promotion for the 
parent banks. In theory, only foreign banks with assets of over USD20 billion may set 
up in China or take a minority stake in a domestic bank. Bank branches offer a more 
complete range of commercial-banking services, including trade finance, foreign 
currency loans, and securities underwriting. Joint-venture banks allow foreign banks 
greater access to the domestic market, but this format limits the foreign bank's control 
over finances and management. Nonetheless, all these foreign banking institutions are 
strictly prevented from conducting renminbi business. 
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3.3.4 Deepening financial reform (1992 -present) 
With the famous "Southern China Inspection Tour" undertaken by Deng Xiaoping, the 
year 1992 marked a new era of economic reform. The economy had started to boom 
around 1980 and the flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) to China increased 
substantially from 1980 onwards. The period also witnessed an expansion of the 
banking sector and the deepening of financial reform. 
A new round of financial reforms started in 1993, when inflation pressure increased as 
a result of booming investment and fast economic growth. After realising that 
measures to control inflation would not be effective without a modem sound financial 
system, the central government decided to embark on a new programme in 1993, 
which consisted of four major contributions: 1) separating the planning credit granting 
from commercial lending by setting up policy banks to give aid to particular sectors or 
a certain amount of SOEs; 2) deregulating the banking sector and establishing new 
banks; 3) improving the legal framework of the financial system; and 4) developing 
financial markets. 
To relieve the commercial banks of special political functions and allow market- 
oriented reform, three policy banks were established in 1994, designated to be the 
main vehicles for policy-based lending in the future which is more or less the same as 
planned credit rationing. They are the State Development Bank, the Agricultural 
Development Bank, and the Export-Import Bank of China. In addition, the banking 
sector started to deregulate and lower barriers to entry. As a result, new non-state 
commercial banks, regional banks, savings banks, and private banks were established. 
The first private bank in China, the Mingsheng Bank, was set up in 1996 by the All- 
China Federation of Industry and Commerce, an association of private enterprises. 
More foreign banks and financial institutions entered China's financial market and 
some of them were permitted to conduct domestic currency business. 
Foreign banks were authorised to open branches in large cities in 1992. By the end of 
2004, the number of operational financial institutions established in China by foreign- 
funded banks and enterprise groups came to 204, including 179 branches of foreign- 
funded banks and 25 locally registered institutions in forms of joint-venture banks, 
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wholly foreign-funded banks and finance corporations; additionally, banking 
institutions from 38 countries and regions had established 223 representative offices in 
China 4. These operational financial institutions were located in 19 cities, mostly 
coastal cities; particularly around 30 percent of them were in Shanghai5. Meanwhile, 
the geographical range of renminbi business operated by foreign-funded banks was 
further expanded - from Shanghai and Shenzhen only up to 18 citieS6 . Apart from 
obtaining the qualification of operating renminbi business, 24 foreign-bank 
institutions have been authorised to provide financial derivatives products. Moreover, 
the inter-bank borrowing (lending) renminbi business of foreign-funded banks was 
increased. All these measures increased the sources of renminbi funds for foreign- 
funded banks and indicated that China's domestic financial market was further opened 
to foreign-funded banks. 
The initial reason for allowing entry of foreign banks was expanding trade with 
foreign countries. However, as more foreign companies are investing in China, the 
demand for financial services has increased. Foreign banks play roles of channelling 
foreign funds to investment in China, and provide financial services to foreign 
companies. The entry of foreign banks also brings modem banking skills and 
technology to China, and increase competition in the financial sector, which would be 
beneficial to China's financial reform. For instance, in 2002, the central authorities 
allowed Newbridge Capital to take a controlling stake in Shenzhen Development 
Bank. This bank, owned by the Shenzhen local government, has 200 branches in the 
most capitalist city in China by the end of 2002, with deposit growing by 50 percent a 
year. In January 2003 Citigroup, the biggest bank in the world, won approval from the 
Chinese government to take its first minority stake in a Chinese bank: 5 percent of 
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, for US$112m. These two remarkable issues can 
be treated as significant indication of how the new, reformist generation of political 
leaders in central government intend to use foreign capital and management skills as a 
way to shake up China's banks (Ziegler, 2003). 
4 Cited from Xinhuanet news, 'Foreign-bank playing important role in China's banking industry', 
hLtp: Hnews. xinhuanet. com/fortune/2004-12/0 I/content 228116 Lhtm, accessed on 25/02/05. 
5 Almanac of China's Finance and Banking, (English Edition) 2000. p135. 
6 The number of opening-up cities increased from two to 18, now including Shanghai, Shenzhen, 
Tianjin, Dalian, Guangzhou, Zhuhai, Qingdao, Nanjing, Wuhan, Ji'nan, Fuzhou, Chengdu, Chongqing, 
Kuming, Beijing, Xiamen, Xi'an and Shenyang. This geographical restriction will be fully removed by 
the end of 2006. 
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Moreover, considerable strides have been made in getting the banking system into 
better shape. In 1998 the PBC was given a federal structure that brought decision- 
making back to the centre and cut across powerful provincial lines. At the end of 1998, 
a total of nine regional branches of PBC have been set up in place of the previous 
provincial branches 7. The big four state-owned commercial banks were also 
recentralised. Not only have they shut down a large amount of unprofitable sub- 
branches, but also they have sacked huge numbers of staff. ICBC has laid off one-fifth 
of its employees, staggering 110,000 peopleg. The banks have hired western 
consultants to teach them about risk-management system, credit-scoring and tackling 
bad loans. 
NPLs were not perceived as a 'problem' until the 1990s. During the highly centralised 
planned economic period, since both the borrowers and lenders are state-owned 
economic identities, the State would help the companies which were not able to repay 
their debts by providing the bank with budgetary allowance to write off the unpaid 
debts (Lou, 2001). Consequently, a huge amount of NPLs put on banks' books 
severely limit banks' ability to lend, becoming an obstacle to the economic growth 
eventually. The South-East Asia Financial Crisis in the late 1990s convinced Chinese 
government the importance of having a healthy financial system. Therefore, how to 
deal with the serious systematic NPLs in Chinese big-four state-owned commercial 
banks (SOCBs) has been listed on the top of the financial reform agenda. 
Among all the available approaches for tackling NPLs, establishing Asset 
Management Company (AMC) was apparently the best option, which was a certain 
type of company implemented since 1999 aiming at dealing with NPLs only. In 
January 1999, the State Council and the PBC authorised the state commercial banks to 
establish separate accounts for NPLs and form AMCs to sell part of the NPLs at a 
discount, or to restructure the loans, in order to help banks to clear up their balance 
sheet as fast as possible9. Following this authorisation, four separate AMCs were 
7 See The People's Bank of China. Brief introduction of the PBC: 
hltp: //www. pbc. gov. cn/rerihan. giianiie/ and htjp: Hwww. g P-bc. ov. cn/fenzhijigou/ 
Dominic Ziegler, 'Casino Capital' in 'A survey of Asian Finance'. The Economist. February 8th 2003. 
9 See Chinaonline, 'China's Troubled Financial Health Reflected in State Commercial Banks', February 
5th 1999. hiq2: //www. chinaonline. com/top stories/industry b2 
- 
99020516. htmi; also 'China's State- 
Owned Banks to Sell Bad Loans; Establish Asset Management Companies' January 19'h 1999. http: // 
http: //www. chinaonline. com/top stories/today b2 9901191 Lhtml 
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established to handle NPLs of the big-four SOCBs respectively. They are: the Cinda 
AMC for the PCBC, the Dongfang (Orient) AMC for the BOC, China Great Wall 
AMC for the ABC, and China Huarong AMC for the ICBC. AMCs in China only deal 
with the NPLs issued before 1996, while those NPLs granted after the beginning of 
1996 have to be tackled by the banks themselves. By the end of June 2000, the four 
AMCs had taken over RMBI. 3 trillion assets from the big four. As a result, the 
amount of NPLs for the big four dropped by 10 percent and the capital adequacy ratio 
rose from 3 percent to 8 percentlo. 
3.3.5 Credit allocation controls 
The direct financial intermediation controls in China was setting the credit ceilings 
specified in the annual credit plan. This traditional tool of credit control not only set 
limits on the total lending of each financial institution, but also imposed sub-ceilings 
for certain categories of loans (World Bank, 1990). As in the credit plan, it specified 
in a detailed manner that the sources and use of funds by economic sectors and types 
of enterprises (Chai, 1981). Under such credit control scheme, financial institutions 
were restricted to increase lending even if they were able to collect more deposits. 
During the reform period, as with the credit ceilings contained in the plan, the extent 
to which the credit plan that have actually been enforced varied substantially. 
Generally speaking, credit plan has been adopted as an effective tool to control the 
economic growth pace. 
In mid-1980s, there was a trend allowing financial institutions to extend additional 
loans if more deposit could be collected. Meanwhile, local branches were given 
greater latitude with respect to loan approvals instead of merely applying directives 
issued by their headquarters. However, when inflation again accelerated in the late- 
1980s and the mid-1990s, credit ceilings were more strictly enforced by PBC. 
Nevertheless, during the 1990s the overall trend has been away from direct quotas 
control and by 1995, only the major SOCBs" remained subject to credit ceilings 
10 
d 
See Chinaonline, 'Asset Management Cos. Receive US$157bn of Bad Assets from Banks', August 
3' 2000. http: //www. chinaonline. com/issues/econ news/current-news/secure/B200072705. asp; also 'A 
little off the Top: Big 4 Banks Drop 10% of Bad Debt', December 19 th 2000, 
hiip: //www. chinaonline. com/indusl[y/financial/newsarchive/secure/2000/december/cOO121506. asp . " According to the official statistics, SOBs refers to PBC, policy banks, wholly state-funded 
commercial bank, CBC, CITIC Industrial Bank and Postal Saving Institutions. 
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(Mehran et al., 1996). A new Commercial Banking Law promulgated in 1995 also 
emphasized the need for financial institutions to incorporate commercial criteria into 
their lending practices (ACFB, 1996). In 1998, credit plan (together with credit 
ceilings) for SOCBs were ultimately abandoned in favour of asset-liability 
management principles. 
However, it should be noted that an annual guiding plan has been implemented 
alternatively by the government to maintain the influence on the volume of SOCBs 
lending. This plan sets recommended target for incremental lending based on 
macroeconomic conditions and is designed to be used as a reference document upon 
which SOCBs should formulate their own plan. Evidence from most recent years 
suggests that the guiding plan has in fact been used quite aggressively by PBC to 
influence credit volume and structure. For instance, when economic growth appeared 
slowing down in 1998, PBC stated that SOCBs were allowed to temporarily discard 
asset-liability management principles such as the loan-deposit ratio, in order to meet 
the targets specified in the guiding plan. More recently, in response to the "over-heat" 
syndrome observed in the economic behaviour in early 2004, the PBC's guiding plan 
was rectified promptly by arousing the cautiousness towards the credit allocation to 
12 certain over-expanding industries . Correspondingly, such plan was 
interpreted by 
SOCBs, even by many other types of financial institutions as well, as the credit 
control targets against the excessive investment in these industries. 
Due to lack of data and a universally accepted definition as to what actually 
constitutes directed credit, it is not possible to determine the precise scale of 
government determined credit allocation. Applying two simplifying conditions to the 
available data can yield a useful indicator of the degree of government involvement in 
credit allocation. First, SOCBs are still the dominant market participants in China's 
financial sector. To identify the DFL in China, it is useful to examine whether the 
SOCBs can treat the non-state credit applicants as equally as to their state-owned 
candidates. Second, it can be assumed that all the credit granted by SOCBs to the state 
sector is directed by government. In the context of China's official statistics regarding 
SOCBs, this involves subtracting from the total, loans made to the agricultural sector, 
town-and-village enterprises, private enterprise and individual proprietors, and 
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Table 3.2: Government involvement in credit allocation since 1978 
Year % of increment of 
total SOB loans 
% of increment of 
loans to SOEs 
Loans to SOEs 
over total SOB 
loans (%) 
1978 8.17 7.76 91.06 
1979 10.25 9.55 90.48 
1980 18.37 17.05 89.47 
1981 18.47 18.01 89.13 
1982 11.20 11.21 89.13 
1983 12.87 12.85 89.12 
1984 32.76 28.26 86.10 
1985 23.91 25.93 87.51 
1986 28.54 27.62 86.88 
1987 18.99 18.22 86.32 
1988 16.81 16.47 86.06 
1989 17.61 18.99 87.08 
1990 22.22 23.06 87.67 
1991 18.97 19.46 88.03 
1992 19.79 19.62 87.90 
1993 22.42 22.85 88.21 
1994 22.03 26.55 91.48 
1995 22.00 23.69 92.75 
1996 20.41 19.86 92.33 
1997 25.05 24.16 91.67 
1998 15.38 14.88 91.27 
1999 7.68 7.36 91.01 
2000 3.66 5.35 92.49 
2001 4.82 5.49 93.08 
2002 13.51 15.31 94.56 
Source: author's calculation based on the statistic data extracted from Almanac of China's Finance 
and Banking (Chinese editions), various issues. 
foreign-funded enterprises' 3. Thus, the intensity of government involvement in the 
credit allocation can then be taken to be SOCB loans to the state sector divided by the 
total lending of SOCBs (Table 3.2). 
From Table 3.2, it is noted that before the establishment of policy banks in 1994, there 
was a downward trend in the government involvement in SOCBs credit allocation, 
though not significant. Since 1994, the proportion of SOCB loans to the state sector 
increased dramatically, which was presumably the result that three policy banks were 
12 The over-expanding industries include steel, electrolytic aluminium, cement, real estate and vehicle. 
" This assumption has been criticised by Laurenson and Chal (2003) that not all SOCBs loans to the 
state sector are in fact policy directed. Some SOEs no doubt would be able to attract credit even in a 
fully liberalised financial system. 
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founded and designated to be the main vehicles for policy-based lending. Apparently, 
the accuracy of this government involvement indicator is affected by the incorporation 
of policy-base lending with the total SOCB loans. Nevertheless, due to the 
unavailability of separate statistics for three policy banks, Table 3.2 still indicates that 
the credit allocation of SOCBs remains largely influenced by government intervention. 
3.4 Development of China's stock market 
3.4.1 The performance of China's stock market 
3.4.1.1 General background 
The development of China's stock market is one of the most important elements of 
China's reform in the financial system. Until 1990 China had no stock market at all. 
The debut of the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) in December 1990 marked the 
start of a new era. Six months later, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) opened for 
business. This marked the stock market's entry into the Chinese economic system 
officially and China's capital market's entrance into its formative stage. During the 
last decade, the growth of China's stock market is outstanding. Compared to the initial 
14 listed companies, including 8 on SHSE and 6 on SZSE in 1991, these two stock 
market exchanges have 1200 listings and a market capitalisation of around USD500 
14 billion by the end of 2002, second in Asian only to Japan 
The development of China's stock market is amazingly rapid. Going public is a highly 
preferable way for a Chinese enterprise to raise funds. It is relatively easy because the 
Chinese public do not yet have access to alternative investment facilities such as life 
insurance or property funds. With a 40 percent personal savings ratio, China has 
considerable surplus demand for outlets for savings. However, large-scale 
manipulation and even fraud in the listed firms' financial reports have hurt investor 
15 confidence 
14 Dominic Ziegler, A survey of Asian finance, The Economist, February 8 th 2003. 
15Massimo Luppino, A summary of the Chinesefinancial sector. December 9h2OO2. 
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Table 3.3: Quota of stock issued, 1993-1997 (RMB billion yuan) 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Issuance quota 5 0 5.5 15.0 3 
3'ource: Introductory Theory of Securities Market, 1999 
However, China's stock market is still characterised as primitive in terms of distorted 
and volatile share price and unsound legal and monitoring system. The origin and 
early development of China's stock market are different from practices of western 
countries. From the very beginning China's stock market was constrained by the 
central planning system and so is going to take a rather different form from those of 
the stock markets in other industrialised countries. To some extent, in despite of 
numerous market activities, the public ownership within a non-market economy 
usually does not provide the conditions necessary for the development of a truly 
functional stock market. In the early stage, a quota system is applied in the process of 
public offering. As Table 3.3 shows, the number of stocks to be listed was limited by 
the quota. The competent state securities authorities proposed the number of new 
stocks for the next year based on the macro financial circumstances, development of 
state-owned enterprise reform and stock market operation situations. State Planning 
Committee implemented the overall balance of the quota allocation at both provincial 
and industry level. Then the quota was allocated to provincial authorities and 
ministerial levels, and candidate issuers were then chosen and approved at the 
provincial and ministerial level before being submitted for approval at the central 
government level. China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) then reviewed all 
documents and determined the suitability of qualification for being listed, and the time 
and size of the shares to be listed on the exchange. If authorisation is not given, the 
public offering will be aborted because it will not be listed anywhere. 
It has been widely accepted that the shareholding system is an effective approach to 
promote the reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Due to the inexperience of 
policymakers, many rules and regulations are less prudential and lagging behind, 
which hardly ensure the growth and supervision of shareholding companies and stock 
markets. Consequently, it is inevitable that many shortcomings in China's stock 
market were not solved at that time. 
3.4.1.2 State-owned shares and Legal person shares 
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In China, most listed companies are corporative SOEs. Shares issued by a typical SOE 
consist of three types: state-owned shares, legal person (corporation) shares and 
individual shares. In general, the state-owned shares and legal person shares are 
subject to restrictions on transfer, but constitute the majority of total shares, taking 
about 66 percent of the total share capital of the listed companies. Individual shares 
are the only tradable shares accounting for around 34 percent. 
The reasons for introduction of this three-type-share structure lie on the central 
planning system during the economic reform process. Prior to the economic reform, 
the ownership structure of an enterprise either took the form of state-ownership or 
collective-ownership under the traditional centralised planning economy. By 
introducing the shareholding system, the prior concern by the policymakers is how to 
maintain the state-ownership feature in the national economy. Offering pure 
individual shares would entirely change the ownership structure of SOEs. Thus, state- 
owned/legal person shares were designed to prevent the state losing its dominant 
position. Moreover, state-owned/legal person shares are also strictly prohibited from 
being traded in the secondary market in case of state's holding of its assets being 
eroded. 
As common shares, state-owned shares and legal person shares should enjoy the same 
rights and profits, as the individual shares should. However, individual investors lack 
the equal rights compared with state and enterprises holders because of unequal 
purchasing prices. In general, if the state shareholder purchases the shares at their face 
value, say, one yuan per share, the individual investors are supposed to buy their 
shares at the fixed price of at least six times or even more than the stock face value. If 
the government allows the state-owned/legal person shares to enter into the market 
without reasonable compensation for the individual shareholders, it is not only being 
unfair to the latter but also hinders the stock market development. 
3.4.1.3 A-shares and B-shares 
Since China's stock exchanges were established, shares have been initially classified 
as A-shares and B-shares. A-shares are exclusively geared to the domestic market. B- 
shares are denominated in renminbi but traded and purchased in foreign currencies 
65 
(usually in US dollar and HK dollar) strictly by foreign investors' 6. Besides these two 
essentia c asses of shares, H-shares are issued by Chinese companies and traded on 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange. 
A-shares and B-shares are two main classes of shares traded on Chinese stock market5 
which are not mutually convertible. A-shares are for Chinese citizens to buy with 
renminbi, which account for the majority of all issued shares and almost every 
shareholding company issues A-shares. B-shares must be traded in foreign exchange, 
and the companies issuing B-shares should pay the shareholders dividends with 
foreign exchange converted from renminbi profit at the current market exchange rate. 
According to the Company Law, each share of different classes is supposed to have 
the same right and equal share of the profit and property of the company. Therefore, 
B-share holders have the same right and should bear the same obligations as A-share 
holder. 
In fact, the purpose of establishment of B-shares market is to raise foreign capitals, to 
learn operating experiences from mature stock markets as well as promoting 
internationalisation of China's stock market. Initially, both segmentation of investors 
and issuing model was set up artificially in order to prevent foreign speculative capital 
from flowing into A-shares market, resulting in turmoil of China's stock market. The 
segmentation of markets was a double edged sword to protect currently infant China's 
stock market, and was in the interest of supervision of stock markets by authorities. 
On the other hand, segmented markets between A-shares and B-shares constrained the 
stock market development. The non- convertibility of B-shares to A-shares and strict 
segregation between these two classes of shares mean that foreign investors have little 
opportunity control the listed companies because the majority of shares are A-shares. 
Therefore, most large investors lack of interest in investing in the B-shares market. 
Compared to the over- speculative A-share market, the B-share market perfonns more 
inactively and stably: the average price and P/E ratio of B-shares are considerably 
lower than those of A-shares, shown as Table 3.4. 
16 Originally, B-shares are reserved for foreign investor. From February 2001, it was opened up to the 
Chinese national investors. 'Notice on the regulations for the Chinese domestic residence investing in 
B-shares stock market' (Guanyu jingnei jurriin touzi jingnei shangshi waizigu youguan wenti de 
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Table 3.4: Trading price of A-share and B-share in the same company 
(December 30.1996) 
Name of Stock A-share price 
(yuan/per share) 
B-share price 
(US$/per share) 
B-share price 
converted into 
the domestic 
currency* 
Multiplier 
Zhenkong 4.7 0.19 1.58 2.97 
Erfang 4.3 0.17 1.41 3.05 
Dazhong 16.48 0.83 6.88 2.40 
Yongsheng 8.46 0.30 2.49 3.47 
Zhongqian 9.93 0.45 3.73 2.66 
Zhongfang 4.46 0.17 1.41 3.16 
Jiaodai 7.17 0.24 1.99 3.60 
Luj i an 9.44 0.30 2.49 3.80 
Luntai 10.10 0.44 3.65 2.77 
Bingxiang 13.22 0.54 4.48 2.95 
* The figures are calculated based upon the official exchange rate on December 30,1996: 
IUS$=8.31RMB 
Source: Shanghai Securities Newspaper, Dec 31,1996 
3.4.1.4 Performance of listed companies 
In China, most of listed companies were initially state-owned enterpnses. The state- 
owned enterprises transformed their structures according to the requirements of 
shareholding system, but the operation mode and management mechanism of many 
state-owned enterprise are still in line with the planned economy model. Namely, the 
corporate structure and operation mechanism has not been modernised in terms of the 
requirements of company limited by shares or modem enterprise system. These 
companies could not be called shareholding companies in a real sense. 
Since listed companies were set up through administrative procedures under the 
government approval and checking rather than based on the market requirements, they 
are characterised by poorly defined ownership: neither the shareholders' rights can be 
enjoyed nor their obligations have to be undertaken is clearly defined. Although the 
introduction of individual shareholders is through public listing, it has little to do with 
the clear separation of ownership and management due to the existence of the huge 
state shareholders. In these circumstances, various moral hazard problems derive from 
buchong tongzhi), State Administration of Foreign Exchange. Feb. 23 2001. 
http: //www. safe. p, ov. cn/law/law260. htm 
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this equivocal ownership. In many listed companies, the board members are almost 
identical to the members of the executive officers while few outside monitors can 
come into effect. In practice, the managers of the list companies usually make 
decisions that promote their own interest whereas damage the interest of individual 
shareholders and the directors of the board are only responsible for the government 
rather than its shareholders. Furthermore,, the operation of the listed companies is 
subject to extensive administrative control and intervention from various levels of 
government, causing serious incentive problems that reduces the companies' efforts in 
enhancing performance. 
The quality of the listed companies is the real issue. Most of the listed companies are 
more interested in raising funds and making profits through splitting more new stocks 
in the form of premium placement to original shareholders than in improving their 
management and lowering operational cost. They invest the raised funds into the field 
that are not related to their major business without the agreement of shareholders. 
Even some of the better-regarded ones indulge in all sorts of market abuses, such as 
lending money raised on the stock market to the parent company rather than investing 
it, or speculating in the stock market on their own account. CSRC has been criticised 
as being too aware of the shortcomings. It has introduced quarterly audited financial 
statements and a requirement for independent directors on company boards. It has put 
tight restrictions on new listings which has disproportionately hurt the country's 
private companies. The CSRC was purely acting as the country's chief attributor of 
17 equity capital rather than a monitoring authority 
3.4.2 The influence of stock market on economic growth 
In this section, we mainly examine the impact of China's stock market development 
by using a relatively comprehensive dataset of China's listed companies published on- 
line at http: //datainfo. stock. hexun. com. This website is produced by Chinaweb Ltd, in 
association with contributors such as Hexun, a leading provider of financial services 
in China, and the South China Morning Post, Hong Kong-based leading English 
" See Zeigler, D. 'Casino Capital'. Over the past couple of years, the CSRC has been forced to 
abandon plans to plug the state's around RMB900billion- 1,700billion yuan unfunded pension liability 
by selling government-owned shares. In practice, *investors took fright at the prospect of the shares of 
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language news provider. It makes use of available selected data on China's listed 
firms, with the information being sourced from the latest available company annual 
reports and summarised by the original data collector. Another important point needs 
to be highlighted here. The tradable shares in China's stock market have been 
classified into A-share and B-share, which are priced in different currencies and 
represent shareholders' rights differently (see Section 3.4.1.3). For the purpose of 
examining the domestic stock market performance, the data and information 
constituted in the following discussion refer to A-share exclusively (1236 listed 
companies at the end of 2004). 
3.4.2.1 Corporate financing effect 
To consider the corporate financing contribution of stock market, the ideal approach is 
to compare the relative importance of internal financing, external equity financing and 
external debt financing in explaining the growth of the net corporate assets (Singh and 
Weiss, 1998). Unfortunately, the straightforward information on each financing source 
is not available, thus preventing such an analysis from being conducted here. The 
starting point here is to calculate the equity/asset ratio for each listed company, the 
mean value of which was 51 percent. Though this result presents the significance of 
equity financing for listed companies in an absolute sense, it is unable to indicate the 
importance of equity capital relative to other financing sources. 
The liability/asset ratio of listed companies is also useful in measuring the importance 
of equity financing. Liabilities of non-listed SOEs consist almost exclusively of bank 
loans and in recent years have reached extremely high levels. Based on the perception 
that stock market could help to release the burden of debt financing of SOEs, it is 
believed that listed companies would less rely on debts than those non-listed 
companies. There are two ways to testify this hypothesis. First, one would expect a 
negative correlation between the equity/asset ratio and liability/asset ratio. This means, 
those firms which have been permitted greater access to equity financing, should have 
been able to reduce their dependence upon debt to a larger extent. Relevant data 
thousands of companies (the not very good ones being dumped on the market. Consequently, share 
price have slumped. The Economist, February 8 2003. 
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confirm a strong negative correlation between these two ratios, with a correlation 
coefficient of -0.93 in 2003. 
Nevertheless, associated with the analysis on China's capital market structure, it is an 
alarming and worrisome issue that more and more listed companies started switching 
to the credit market to raise investment funds. Some economists believe that listed 
companies in general are operating with a rather low liability/asset ratio, indicating a 
large potential capability of increasing debt financing. They argue that the moderate 
usage of debt financing is a healthy sign for good financial management ability. In 
addition, from the view of banking sector, listed companies are presumably more 
prudential in project selection and implementation based on the consideration of 
efficient supervision from both insiders and outsiders. Thus, increasing bank credits 
allocation to listed companies would reduce the credit risk and improve the quality of 
bank assets. 
However, more concerns have been raised against the abuse of bank credits by listed 
companies. This issue can be illustrated from two aspects. First, the increasing 
proportion of bank credits in total investment funds reflects the development of 
China's stock market has slowed down, particularly in terms of the market scale 
expansion. The public investors' confidence and enthusiasm on stock market have 
been seriously undermined by a number of crucial problems remained unsolved for a 
long time, such as the divergence of share price for different type of shares, majority 
of non-tradable state shares and poor operating performance. Second, since bank 
credit is assigned by banking sector directly to individual firms, unlike issuing shares 
in stock markets, there is no need for listed companies to publicise the purpose and 
use of credits to individual investors. Hence, it is difficult for outside shareholders to 
investigate and monitor the use and performance of bank loans. This phenomenon 
raises the concern about the final destination of these funds. Since 2003, it has been 
seen that there is an increasing number of listed companies seeking some professional 
financial institutions to manage their funds. There is a high probability that these 
companies attempted to invest in stock market with their raised funds chasing for a 
higher return. Undoubtedly, a large amount of these investment funds are bank loans. 
By this means, bank assets eventually enter the stock market pursuing the speculative 
activities under the disguise of project investment loans, despite the state supervision 
70 
and administrative department fin-nly prohibits the bank assets enter stock market 
directly. In these circumstances, it has been argued that the listed companies 
increasing their bank credits would provoke the risk and instability of financial sector, 
particularly of the banking sector, and will trigger the financial crisis in certain 
extreme situation. 
Second, if equity financing has been significant part of overall financing, it could also 
be expected that the listed firms (mainly SOEs) would have a lower liability/asset 
ratio than SOEs taken as a whole. Due to concerns on data availability, this study 
solely focuses on comparing listed companies from the industrial sector with overall 
state-owned industrial firms. Additionally, as the majority of China's listed companies 
are from industrial sector, with a small amount coming from the service sector such as 
real estate development, tourism, transportation and finance, in these circumstances, 
the focus on industrial firms is appropriate. 
Aggregated data for all industrial SOEs in 2003 are available from China Statistic 
Yearbook (2003, p. 433-34), while the data of listed firms are sourced from the online 
database acknowledged earlier. In order to take these data comparable, we first 
removed the non-industrial listed firms from the calculation. According to the 
classification criteria of three economic sectors, industrial sector includes four sub- 
sectors: mining, manufacturing, energy provision and construction. Each of them can 
be further detailed into several market segments. Provided that a number of listed 
companies run business in numerous sectors of the economy simultaneously, whether 
include or exclude a listed firm is not always a clear-cut matter. Nevertheless, the 
listed companies and the corresponding information have been classified clearly into 
each economic sector based on the unified criteria. Therefore, 937 listed companies 
were retained after the filtering. 
According to Laurenceson and Chai (2003), it is necessary to distinguish the 
productive and non-productive assets prior to the analysis of any financial ratios 
derived from or associated with assets. This is because non-listed industrial SOEs 
provide a variety of services to workers and their families such as nurseries, schools 
and hospitals. In the process of listing, these non-productive assets are removed from 
finn's books. In other words, the list companies' assets are counted for productive 
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components; while assets of overall industrial SOEs displayed in statistic yearbook 
include both productive and non-productive components. Consequently, removing the 
non-productive components from overall industrial SOEs assets is a crucial step to 
guarantee the comparability between listed and non-listed firms. However, the 
information on accurate amount for industrial SOEs' non-productive assets is not 
accessible. Hence, several researchers investigated the approximate percentage of the 
non-productive assets. Among them, Jefferson, Rawski and Zhang (1996) estimate the 
percentage of industrial SOEs' assets not used for industrial production was around 18. 
Xu and Wang (1997) state that such non-productive assets account for 25-50 percent 
of the to-be-listed firm's total assets. In this study, the arbitrary figure of 25 percent 
has been used for simplicity. After undertaking the data adjustment steps, the 
estimated average liability/asset ratio of listed industrial firms was 50.4 percent in 
2003, compared with the 78.5 percent for overall industrial SOEs. Therefore, this 
result supports the view that external equity financing has been a significant source of 
funding for listed companies and useful in terms of reducing their reliance on debt 
finance. 
3.4.2.2 Corporate govemance effect 
To gauge the corporate govemance effects of China's stock market, the ideal 
measurement is the listed companies 1) productivity of capital. Due to the unavailability 
of the necessary data, computing the profitability is the most relevant and suitable 
altemate. Considering one of the essential objectives of transforming SOEs into listed 
companies is to make them more responsible for their own profits and losses, we 
calculated the net profit/asset ratio for each industrial listed company. In order to 
make a comparison with the ratio of other companies with different types of 
ownership, we used the information of listed companies compiled at the end of 2002. 
There were 1085 listed companies issuing A-share only, 65 percent of which were 
operating in industrial sector. The average ratio of industrial listed companies' net 
profits/assets was 5.7 percent. In addition, 78 industrial firms, equivalent to 10.6 
percent of the total industrial listed companies, made losses in 2002, yielding a 
negative net profit/assets ratio. The corporate govemance impact of stock market 
appears comparable with that achieved by other industrial fin-ns featuring various 
ownerships. The net profit/asset ratio for all industrial SOEs (including state-owned 
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and state-holding enterprises, non-productive assets have been removed) was 3.9 
percent, 5.6 percent for collective finns, 6.5 percent for foreign funded firms and 5.2 
percent for firms funded from investment sources based Hong Kong, Macao and 
Taiwan'8. 
Unsurprisingly, SOEs still achieved the lowest profitability among the various types 
of ownership enterprises given their poor corporate governance and lack of incentives. 
Xu and Wang (1997) point out that publicly-listed companies represent only a small 
subset of China's enterprises, a perhaps better performed group of enterprises which 
were chosen to be listed on the two stock exchanges. It is a prerequisite condition for a 
firm to attain a qualification of stock market listing that it must have been profitable 
for the previous three years. Based on an earlier survey undertaken on 40,000 state- 
owned industrial enterprises by Ministry of Finance (1999), it has been noticed that 
the financial conditions in nearly half of these enterprises fell short of the regulatory 
requirement for listing. Apart from the strict financial condition for EPOs, regulatory 
guidelines also specify that a listed company must achieve a rate of return on net 
assets of at least 10 percent when they are considering raising additional funds 
through the stock market. From this point of view, the listed companies should have 
been guaranteed with a higher profitability than SOEs. Thus, the net profit/assets ratio 
of listed industrial enterprises is undoubtedly higher than that of all state-owned 
industrial firms. 
However, despite the short history of China's stock markets, the fact that over 10 
percent of listed companies had a negative net profit/asset ratio indicates some serious 
corporate governance problems. In most recent years, more and more newly listed 
companies have been discovered making losses or predicted to be making losses soon 
after they successfully obtained funds from stock markets. In the first eight months of 
2003, there 41 new listed companies successfully realised EPO in both Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. Nevertheless, more than half of these companies 
experienced a dramatic decline in their operating profit. The weighted average earning 
per share of these 41 enterprises was RMBO. 0026, far below the average level of the 
whole market for the same period which was RMBO. 123. In particular, South Airline 
18 Figures are based on author's own computation by using the original data derived from China 
Statistic Yearbook, 2003, pp. 432-434. 
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(Nanfang Hangkong) company announced a loss in its mid-term financial report seven 
days after the company was listed and its shares started being transacted on the stock 
exchange. The similar situation also exists in those listed companies raising additional 
funds through stock market. It is not news to realise that a large amount of raised 
funds from stock markets have been either left unused or misused. The actual 
investment activities of raised funds have been largely found different from the 
specification in prospectus of issuing equities. In these circumstances, due to the 
asymmetric information distribution, investors are the weakest and most vulnerable 
market participants. 
Many scholars have been criticising the unsound supervision mechanism and 
primitive legal and accounting framework. Nonetheless, the fundamental problem in 
the case of China's stock market is that the high ownership concentration actually 
reflects the continuing dominance of state ownership in many listed companies. 
Dominant state ownership means that the traditional incentive problems SOEs facing 
with have not changed. As long as the state continues to be the primary shareholder, 
the corporate governance impact of 'insider' on firm's performance will be 
suboptimal. Furthermore, since the state-controlled shares cannot be legally traded, 
the influence of 'outsiders' is compromised and meaningless. The proportion of 
tradable shares to total outstanding shares can be employed to proxy the degree to 
which outsider influence occurs. By the end of 2004, the average ratio of tradable 
shares to total outstanding shares was 27.7 percent, while less than 8 percent of the 
listed companies whose ratio was greater than 50 percent. Thus, a market for 
corporate control is nonexistent for the overwhelming majority of listed companies. 
Because of the inefficient monitoring framework, managers faced limited threat of 
punishment for poor decision making from either 'insiders' or 'outsiders'. Thereby, 
what managers are most concerned about is to raise as much money as they can from 
individual shareholders; while they did not take enough responsibility on securing the 
investment funds, neither on maximising shareholders' profit. 
3.4.2.3 Allocative efficiency effects 
According to Bonser-Neal and Dewenter (1999), it is useful to estimate in a regression 
the various determinants of savings including stock market parameters against the rate 
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of savings in order to investigate the impact of stock markets on macroeconomic 
channels to growth. However, this approach in case of China cannot be used given 
that only annual data since 1991 are available for many of the required variables. In 
these circumstances, Table 3.5 exhibits the comparison between the saving 
mobilisation perfon-nance of China's stock market and that of financial institutions. 
Given the limited investment channels, saving money in financial institutions used to 
be the unique option for households to handle with their surplus income. Due to the 
establishment of stock market, part of household's savings have been apparently 
attracted by and transferred into stock market. Generally speaking, it is perceived that 
the expansion of stock market in terms of the scale of market would have influenced 
the financial institutions in absorbing household savings negatively. Though China's 
stock market has been growing rapidly, it remains a trivial source of savings 
mobilisation, indicating a marginal contribution to the capital investment, thereby of 
less importance to the economic growth. 
Testing for the informational efficiency of stock prices revolves around examining 
whether stock prices behave in a manner implied by the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
(EMH). The EMH contends that if stock prices are efficient in an informational sense, 
they will rapidly adjust to new information and that current prices will fully absorb 
and reflect all available information (Fama, 1965). Empirical testing of the EMH 
involves testing whether current stock prices and returns can be predicted on the basis 
of past values. If stock prices are efficient then these variables should display a 
random walk process. Otherwise, the stock pricing mechanism can be considered 
inefficient because investors can theoretically achieve profits simply by utilising 
available information such as past prices. 
In China's context, numerous empirical studies on the behaviour of stock prices in 
China have concluded that they do not follow a random walk process (for instance, 
among many others, Song et al., 1998; Mookeýee and Yu, 1999; Ma and Barnes, 
2001; Groenewold et al., 2001; Laurenceson, 2002). In the worldwide research upon 
EMH, by using various sample data, including short-term intervals and long-term 
intervals of different stock markets, the majority statistical results indicated that the 
popular efficient market model does not seem to be supported by the statistical data 
(see, for instance, Geweke, 1980; Melino, 1980; Dybvig and Ingersoll, 1984; Marsh 
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Table 3.5: Saving Mobilisation Performance 
--Stock Market vs. Financial Institutions 
Unite: RMB100 million 
Stock % ofchange Financial % ofchange 
Markets Institutions 
1991 5.0 4066.4 
1992 94.1 5389.0 
1993 276.4 193.7 6159.0 14.3 
1994 99.8 -63.9 10845.5 76.1 
1995 85.5 -14.3 13209.7 21.8 
1996 294.3 244.2 14889.0 12.7 
1997 856.1 190.9 13819.1 -7.2 
1998 889.3 3.9 13307.6 -3.7 
1999 944.3 6.2 13081.0 -1.7 
2000 2103.0 122.7 15025.5 14.9 
2001 1251.9 -40.5 19812.8 31.9 
2002 961.7 -23.2 27300.2 37.8 
2003 1357.7 41.2 37138.2 36.0 
2004 1510.9 11.3 32469.5 -12.6 
Note: The data for stock market refer to the capital raised through A share issues on China's stock 
market. The data for financial institutions refer to the amount of new deposits in China's overall 
financial institutions. They are calculated as the change in outstanding year-end-balances. 
Source: 
1. Data ftom 1991 to 2002: Almanac of China's Finance and Banking, 2003; China Securities and 
Futures Statistical Yearbook, 2003. 
2. Data of 2003 & 2004: China Securities Regulatory Commission, online database, 
hqp: //www. csrc. gov. cn/cn/statinfo/indeM. sp; The People's Bank of China, online database, 
hltp: //www. pbc. gov. cn/diaochatongii/tongjishuju/index2. asp 
and Merton, 1986; Frankel and Stock, 1987; LeRoy and Parke, 1988)19. However, 
some alternative interpretations have been asserted upon the variance between the 
actual prices and forecasted price, which include the influence of information about a 
major disaster, the disturbance of "rational bubbles" and the impact of business cycle 
on discount rates 20 . 
19 Rober J. Shiller (1989) has consolidated the various arguments asserted by these economists in his 
book Market Volatility, Part 11 The Stock Market. 
20 The essential element of rational bubbles (or near-rational bubbles) is that when prices are rising, 
many agents expect them to continue to rise, buy, and prices rise roughly in line with expectations, even 
though in some sense the price is already high. The discussion upon such possibilities is aroused by 
Blanchard and Watson (1983), Diba and Grossman (1988), Quah (1985), West (1987,1988b) and Folld, 
Hodrick and Kaplan (1986). For ftirther details, see Rober J. Shiller (1989), pp. 96. 
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Given the fact that the actual stock price is weakly correlated with the forecasted price, 
a number of studies have used measures of stock price volatility to provide evidence 
against the efficient market models (Shiller, 1978; LeRoy and Porter, 1981). As a 
result, it has been identified that the volatility of stock price is too large to be justified 
in terms of information about future dividend, which is rather to be explained 
alternatively by the large movements of ex-ante real interest rates or the irrational 
market subject to fashions and fads (Shiller, 1989). 
Moreover, Shiller (1989) highlights that the investor interaction (investor psychology) 
is a likely source of stock price volatility, while such argument seems to be beyond the 
statistical results achieved based on econometric techniques. In these circumstances, 
since there is no fundamental psychological principle for people's unpredictable and 
uncontrollable reaction, the stock price volatility seems hardly to disappear despite the 
time passed or research methodology improved (Shiller, 2003). Hence, in his study on 
behavioural finance, Shiller (2003) suggests that instead of keeping the presumption 
of efficient financial market in mind, it is more important for economists to 
understand and include the human foibles and arbitrary feedback relations into their 
analytical models. 
Testing whether stock prices accurately reflect the economic fundamentals underlying 
a firm is conceptually more difficult. Using the degree of stock price volatility, Singh 
(1997) asserts that if stock prices are driven by speculative motives and herding 
behaviour, they will be highly volatile and represent inefficient signals for capital 
flows in the economy. The stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen have been 
highly volatile, while price bubbles are not a rare phenomenon. Before the daily 
oscillation of composite price index and individual share price had been restricted 
within the magnitude of 10 percent, Shanghai's composite price index once 
experienced doubled in a single day in 1994. 
Xu and Wang (1999) also note that the speculative nature of shareholding in China 
amongst individual investors is apparent by the fact that the average period for which 
they held shares was just 1-2 months, which compared with 18 months in U. S. stock 
market. Many researchers have expressed the view that stock prices are excessively 
volatile in the sense that they often reflect speculative activities rather than the 
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Table 3.6: Stock Market Volatility in China: a comparative perspective 
China 
-- 
Brazil India Hungary 
1993 26.2 - 11.1 8.7 31.1 
1994 42.7 31.1 8.5 24.0 
1995 11.9 12.3 5.5 14.9 
1996 
1997 
10.7 
8.6 
6.3 
11.1 
9.78 
4.7 
6.0 
12.2 
17 
10.3 
12.7 
8.3 
7.1 
8.2 
9.0 
8.5 
11.9 
7.5 
12.5 
8.9 
11.9 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
5.6 
6.9 
7.4 
Note: 
1. Volatility is measured by calculating the standard deviation of the monthly percentage change in 
the respective country's share price indices. 
2. The blank space signifies that data were unavailable. 
Source: Data before 2000: Emerging Stock Market Factbook, various issues. Data of China's stock 
market: author's calculation based on online stock market information, hltp: //datainfo. stock. hexun. com 
economic fundamentals of listed firms (Spencer, 1995; Mookeýee and Yu, 1999). A 
number of researchers, such as Spencer (1995), Yao (1998) and Laurenceson and Chai 
(2003), further examine the effect of state-controlled shares on share prices volatility 
and conclude that the non-tradable state-shares worsen the degree of share price 
volatility. When only a small proportion of a company's total shares are available for 
trading, share prices cannot reflect the market's view of the fundamental value of a 
listed firm. 
However, it should be pointed out that this volatility does appear to have declined in 
the most recent years. Table 3.6 shows that the standard deviation in the Shanghai 
composite share price index (calculated on the basis of monthly observations) fell 
from a high of 42.7 in 1994 to 4.7 in 2003. Moreover, it is also informative to 
compare the Chinese experience with other large transitional economies to measure 
the extent of volatility in China's stock market. Therefore, Table 3.6 also exhibits the 
stock market volatility in China, Brazil, India and Hungary. Stock markets in all these 
transitional economies, expect the one in India, experienced a volatility declining 
process in 1990s. Comparatively, China's stock market was initially volatile while this 
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situation has improved since 2001, which mainly attributes to the state government's 
vigorous actions against the speculative activities, including the inspection and 
restriction upon bank loans entering stock market. 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter reviewed China's financial reform process, mainly focusing on the 
banking sector and security market. As far as the banking sector reform is concerned, 
not only the earlier structural change was surveyed, but also the measures undertaken 
to standardise the commercial bank's operation have been highlighted. 
Before undertaking the survey on China's banking sector reform and stock market 
development, we briefly highlighted two major components in China's economic 
reform process - price liberalisation and enterprises corporatisation. Being as a 
market- socialist economy, China has not yet completely lifted control over price 
setting though the Soviet pricing system no longer exists. Meanwhile, state ownership 
remains in large SOEs despite the rapid establishment of small and medium-scale 
private companies, in which circumstances the soft budget constraint is still widely 
applied. 
Despite the rapid expansion of market capitalisation putting it among the ten largest 
stock markets in the world, China's stock market appears to convey more historical 
significance than economic sense over a decade after its official launch. Especially the 
historical problems remained unsolved which substantially offset the benefits of the 
stock market. Following the chronological review of the banking sector reform, the 
last section in this chapter mainly examined the influence of China's stock market in 
descriptive analyses, which have been illustrated from three aspects: corporate 
financing effect, corporate governance effect and allocative efficiency effect. 
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Chapter 4: Methodology and Data description 
4.1 Introduction 
The research question of this thesis is to investigate the financial-growth nexus in the 
context of China, which will be explored from two aspects. The methodological 
approach is to estimate the econometric models by using secondary data. In the first 
estimated model, financial sector, specifically in terms of banking sector, will be taken 
into account as an extra input factor in the conventional production function. This is 
followed by the Granger causality test by using monthly time-serial data from China's 
stock market. 
Section 4.2 illustrates three empirical research technique adopted in this study - error 
correction model, panel data analysis mechanism and Granger-causality test. Section 
4.3 exhibits the data source and different types of data, including the raw/original data, 
manipulating data and derived variables. Section 4.4 mainly discusses the validity and 
reliability of using secondary data, while analysing the shortcomings in China's 
statistical data, which is followed by the concluding section 4.5. 
4.2 Methodology 
4.2.1 Error correction model (ECM) 
In typical economic time series data, 'level' equations estimated with least squares 
frequently have an error structure that is not covariance stationary. A non-stationary 
error structure is generally associated with relationships estimated by using highly 
trended variables. Variables containing a time trend tend to produce very high 
correlations with each other. Relationships among highly trended variables, however, 
are typically meaningless in terms of discovering causal links. A sufficient condition 
for the error structure to be stationary is that all the variables in the equation be 
stationary. 
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The relationship between co-integration and ECK first presented by Granger (1981), 
has been extensively developed by Engle and Granger (1987) on more specific 
estimation procedures and testing. In practice, researchers first use unit root tests to 
determine the order of integration of the raw data series. Second, run the cointegrating 
regression suggested by economic theory. Third, apply an appropriate unit root test to 
the residuals from this regression to test for cointegration. Fourth, if cointegration is 
accepted, use the lagged residuals from the cointegrating regression as an error 
correction term in an ECM. Unfortunately, Monte Carlo studies have shown that 
estimates of the cointegrating regression have considerable small-sample bias, in spite 
of excellent large-sample properties, and have suggests that the fourth step above be 
replaced by estimation of the full ECM equation, i. e. it is better to estimate the long- 
run relationship jointly with the short-run dynamics rather than to estimate it 
separately (Kennedy, 1998, p. 270). 
One well-known method of attempting to deal with non-stationarity is to transfon-n 
each variable from its level to its change form. Rate of changes are much more 
volatile than levels and consequently more difficult to explain using variables that 
have no causal link with the dependent variable (Malley, 1990). 
The innovation of the ECM approach is to employ a specification that uses a 
combination of growth rates and levels while simultaneously attempting not to violate 
the basic set of assumptions in regression analysis. Equations estimated in this manner 
allow the relevant economic theory to enter the formulation of long-run equilibrium in 
levels (captured by one or more error-correction terms) while the short-run dynamics 
of the equation are determined by growth rates. The form of a simple dynamic 
specification in two variables with an ECM is as follows: 
Ay, = cr +, gAxt +, Y(yt -9 -1 x, j) + ct 
where y and x are measured in logarithms; 
A= first difference operator, that is Ayt = y, - y, -,, representing 
the growth rate; 
constant term; 
stochastic disturbance tenn, which is jointly dependent on the distributions of y 
and x. 
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Eq. 4.1 the ECM representation of the original specification; the last terin is the error- 
correction term, interpreted as reflecting disequilibrium responses. The terminology 
can be explained as follows: if Ay, starts to grow at a rate that is inconsistent with its 
long-run steady-state growth path, then the ECM acts to pull it back on track. Ay, 
might deviate from its long-run growth rate, for example, if there were a series of 
extremely large random disturbances or a systematic effect of a missing variable(s) 
not specified in the long-run solution. The ECM has this corrective effect because its 
coefficient is negative ( -I< y<0 for stationarity). For example, as y, _1 
becomes 
larger (smaller), the value taken by the terni (y, (5, become larger (smaller), but 
this value is then multiplied by the negative coefficient (, V), which has the effect of 
lowering (raising) Ay, 
According to Malley (1990), there are two major advantages of the dynamic 
specification with an ECM. First, it allows the researcher to make a distinction 
between short-run dynamics and long-run equilibrium. ECM forms allow the short- 
run dynamics to be determined by the data. In addition, sensible long-run equilibrium 
conditions can be directly imposed on the equation. Second, these specifications tend 
to lead to forecasts that display little tendency systematically to over-predict or under- 
predict the variables of interest. This is because they are estimated in growth rates of 
dependent and some of the independent variables, which is typically sufficient to 
obtain white noise residuals. 
Given its powerful advantages, in this research work (Chapter 5), ECM will be first 
employed to investigate the economic growth pattern in the context of China by using 
the annual aggregated data covering the time period from 1952 to 2003. Particularly, 
the right-hand side terms will be expanded by introducing more explanatory variables 
with their time lags according to the economic theory. 
4.2.2 Panel data analysis mechanism 
4.2.2.1 Benefits and reasons for using provincial-level panel data 
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The financial-economic growth relation has been widely tested by using cross-section 
and time-serials panel data (see, for example, Ram, 1999; Levin and Renelt, 1992; 
Odedokun, 1996; Leahy et al., 2001). Panel data analysis permits the researcher to 
study the dynamics of change with relatively short time series. The combination of 
time series with cross-sections can enhance the quality and quantity of data in ways 
that would be impossible using only one of these two dimensions (Gujarati, 2003, 
p. 638). However, not many research studies have been done within China's context. 
In contrast to most other empirical analyses on the nexus between financial 
development and economic growth, which were carried out in a cross-country setting, 
this study uses provincial-level panel data. 
The main reasons for using cross-province and time-serial data are as follows. 
Compared with the cross-country studies, using provincial data is able to increase the 
probability of homogenous data compilation methodologies (Aziz and Duenwald, 
2002). Undoubtedly, the use of provincial-level data expands the sample size 
considerably. Even if China's annual data collected from 1949 when the nation was 
officially founded, the time-span from 1949 till the most recent year will yield a 54- 
observation study sample. When using provincial-level data, the sample size 
substantially expands by 10 times, yielding over 550 observations given 31 provinces, 
autonomous regions and municipalities ranging from 1984 to 2002. 
The plausibility of applying panel technique in China's context mainly stems from the 
following considerations. First, in such a huge country as China, many provinces are 
even larger than many medium-sized countries in the world in terms of geographical 
and population size. In addition, the provincial economic experiences vary over the 
nation, which has generally been noticed that the coastal area is more prosperous and 
developed than the interior regions while the substantial disparity has tended to widen 
gradually. 
Second, the stability feature of the banking system and labour market provide the 
preconditions for establishing a data sample combined with cross province and time- 
series. Due to the regional residence control system, a worker is restricted to work in 
the province/city where (s)he was bom, which largely constrain the labour force 
mobility. Hence, the growth of regional labour force is relatively steady. China's 
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banking system has been similarly segmented since the credit allocation is also region- 
oriented: companies are not allowed to borrow money across provinces/cities. As 
banks are the major financial intermediaries channelling investments funds to 
enterprises, the segmentation of banking system on provincial level results in a rather 
stable growth of credit allocation. 
Based on the above considerations, this cross-province study in the context of China is 
analogous to a cross-country study of medium-size countries: the nation can be 
regarded as 30 relatively independent provinces, where the individual feature of each 
province has particular influence over its own economic performance. For this reason 
it is reasonable to treat each province as an 'observation' and to explore the links 
between growth and financial development at the provincial level. 
4.2.2.2 Drawbacks of present provincial-level data 
Though in recent years, a number of scholars conducting a series of studies on China 
basis also used provincial and time-specific data (Aziz and Duenwald, 2002; Liu and 
Li, 2001), they didn't establish or update their dataset on all China's provinces. It is 
partly because of the inconsistency and insufficiency of data availability. For instance, 
Liu and Li (2001) excluded five provinces (Shanghai, Fujian, Guangxi, Sichuan and 
Tibet) out of total 30 provinces (actually should be 31)1 from the regression analysis 
because the time series data of investment of these five provinces were insufficient 
(p. 257). As a result, their panel study used the annual data of 25 provinces between 
1985 and 1998 for all provinces estimation only yielding 350 observations in total. 
Similarly, Aziz and Duenwald (2002) used a provincial level dataset first compiled by 
Zhao (1998) and later updated by them. They explained that it was because the 
problem of limited infori-nation on financial variables that they could only conduct an 
analysis with a dataset covering 27 provinces from 1988 to 1997 (270 observations in 
total). Meanwhile, the short time span of the data is another major shortcoming of 
their study. 
By the year when Liu and Li published their paper, there should be 31 administrative regions 'in China, 
including 27 Provinces and four Direct Administrative Municipality (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and 
Chongqing that are under the direct control of State Government). The political status remains the same 
over all these regions. 
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4.2.2.3 Panel analysis model 
Given the different consideration upon the issue whether the unobserved effect is 
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, the panel data models can be identified as 
fixed effect model (FEM) and random effect model (REM). This can be interpreted as 
the following regression function: 
Yit -= Xit, 9 + Ci + Uit , (4.2) 
where xi, can contain observable variables that change across t but not i, variables 
that change across i but not t, and variables that change across t and i. ci is the 
unobserved effect (sometimes called individual effect). The uit are called the 
idiosyncratic disturbances as they change across t as well as across 
In modem econometric applications, the term 'random effect' is synonymous with 
zero correlation between the observed explanatory variables and the unobserved effect: 
cov(x,, ci)=O, t=1,2,..., T; while the terminology 'fixed effect' means that ci is 
allowed to be correlated with xit, 
In REM analysis, ci is put into the error tenn by assuming (a) strict exogeneity of all 
explanatory variables (including unobserved variable): E(uj, I x,,, cj = 0, t=T 
and (b) xi, are always fixed and generally include an intercept term and ci is 
independent of xi,: E(ci J x,, ) = E(ci) = 0. Under these assumptions, the random effects 
ap roach exploits the serial correlation in the compound error, vi, = ci + ui, , 
in a K- p 
generalised least squares (GLS) framework. Eq. 4.2 can be re-written as 
yit ý xit)6 + vit 
where E(vi, I x,, )=0, t=1,2,..., T, vit = ci + uit, 
Based on the assumption that the conditional variances are constant 
(( 2)= 2't = 1,2,..., T ), the conditional covariances are zero ( E(u u,, 
) = 0, all t#s E Uit au it 
and a homoskedasticity assumption on the unobserved effect ci (var(ci I x, ) = var(c, )), 
the implementation of a feasible GLS procedure is valid and reliable to estimate the 
coefficient 8 effectively. 
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In many empirical applications, the whole point of using panel data is to allow for ei 
to be arbitrarily correlated with the xi,. This approach is FEM estimation. However, 
we cannot include time-constant factors in x,,, because there would be no way to 
distinguish the effects of time-constant observables from the time-constant 
unobservable c if c could have been arbitrarily correlated with each element of xi, ii 
(Wooldridge, 2002, p. 266). In these circumstances, the FEM view the ci as 
parameters to be estimated along with P. 
In order to estimate each ci along with 8, one possibility is to define N dummy 
variables for each cross section observation: dni =I if n=I, dni =0 if n#i. Then 
run the OLS regression 
yit on dli5d2i,..., dNi, xi,, t=1,2,..., T; i=1,2,..., N (4.3) 
Then, C^1 is the estimated coefficient on d1i 9 
ý2 is the estimated coefficient on d2i ý 
and so on. The estimator of 8 obtained from estimated system 4.3 is the fixed effect 
estimator. One benefit of using system 4.3 is that it produces the appropriate estimator 
2 
of variance of residuals 07 u 
because it uses N(T - 1) -K as the degree of freedom, 
where K is the number of regressors. 
Since the key consideration in choosing between a random effects and fixed effects 
approach is whether c and x are correlated, it is important to have a method for ri it 
testing this assumption. Hausman (1978) proposed a test based on the difference 
between the random effects and fixed effects estimates. Since FEM is consistent when 
ci and xit are correlated, but REM is inconsistent, a statistically significant difference 
is interpreted as evidence against the random effects assumption E(ci I xi, )= E(c, )=0. 
According to Wooldridge (2002, p. 290), it is often easier to use an F statistic version 
of the Hausman test for testing more than one parameter. Let wi, denote aIxM 
subset of time-varying elements of xi, (excluding time dummies). Then consider the 
extended model 
ýil =+ errori, , (4.4) 
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where ii, and ý, are the quasi-demeaned data', wi, is the time-demeaned version of 
iiý., and ý is aMxI vector. The Hausman test can be implemented by testing 
H,, :ý-0 using standard OLS analysis. The simplest approach is to compute the F 
statistic. The restricted sum of squared residuals (SSR, ) is obtained from the OLS 
regression ýj, on Jýj, that can be used to obtain j8RE ; while the unrestricted sum of 
squared residuals (SSR,,, ) comes from the estimation of regression 4.4. Then the F 
statistic is 
F= 
(SSRr - SSRur) (NT -K- M) 
SSRur M 
a 
Under HO, F can be treated as an Fm, NT-K-m random variable due to M-F _XM2 
3. 
The statistical inference is: if F is smaller than the critical value (say, at the 5 percent 
significant level), indicating there is practically small differences between the random 
effects and fixed effects estimate, it is possible to reject the null hypothesis. In the 
opposite case, the Hausman statistic fails to reject given the seemingly large 
differences between the random effects and fixed effects estimates. In the latter 
situation, it is plausible to conclude that the random effects assumptions hold and to 
focus on the REM estimates. 
These estimated and hypothesis testing procedure will be thoroughly applied to the 
empirical study in this research in Chapter 6 based on a consolidated panel data set 
covering 30 provinces and 18 years in the context of China. 
4.2.3 Granger-causality test 
The financial-economic growth nexus will also be examined by using the Granger- 
causality test in Chapter 7. The essential advantage of this method is to identify the 
direction of financial sector development and economic growth, i. e. the role of 
financial development in economic growth process - supply-leading or demand- 
following. Similarly, in most of the existing empirical researches, the Granger- 
2 Quasi-demeaned data refer to the random effects estimator is obtained by a quasi-time demeaning: 
rather than removing the time average from the explanatory and dependent variables at each time t, 
random effects removes a fraction of the time average (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 287). 
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causality test has been applied to a number of cross-country studies rather than 
focusing on a single country. Moreover, China's financial market development is 
rarely included into such cross-country studies. Therefore, it is worthwhile inspecting 
the direction of financial- economic growth relationship in China's context. 
Causality in the sense defined by Granger (1969) and Sims (1972) is inferred when 
lagged values of a variable, say xt , have explanatory power in a regression of a 
variable y, on lagged values of y, and x,. The vector autoregression (VAR) can be 
used to test the hypothesis. That the unrestricted equations have identical regressors 
means that these tests can be based on the results of simple OLS estimates. The notion 
can be extended in a system of equations to attempt to ascertain if a given variable is 
weakly exogenous to the system. If lagged values of a variable x, have no explanatory 
power for any of the variables in a system, then we would view x as weakly 
exogenous to the system. This specification can be tested with a likelihood ratio test or 
with a form of F test constructed by stacking the equations. 
Tests of the restrictions can be based on simple F tests in the single equations of the 
VAR model. In Sims approach (1972), Granger causality relationship is expressed in 
two pairs of regression equations by simply twisting independent and dependent 
variables as follow: 
k, k2 
Xt = ao +L aiX, +I PjY, + c, (4.5a) 
i=1 i=1 
k3 k4 
Y, 
; V(, + Y, + 9i X, i + V, 
(4.5b) 
Xt = ajX, I +a 2Xt-2+ + aiXt-, +. c, 
(4.5c) 
yt 71 yt-I + 72 yt-2 +***+ 7i Yt-j + Vt (4.5d) 
Equations (4.5a) and (4-5b) are called unrestricted, (4.5c) and (4.5d) restricted. In this 
study, X denotes an indicator of stock market development, Y denotes economic 
growth and the subscripts t and t-i denote the current and lagged values 
respectively. Hsiao (1981) suggests searching over the lag lengths (k, to k4) and 
applying an information criterion to determine the optimal length of the lag structure. 
3 For detailed analysis, please refer to Wooldridge (2002), p. 286-287. 
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We used the two most common choices of information criteria: Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC). 
According to Granger's definition of causal relationships: 
* does not cause X, if A= 182 ...... =fli =0 (4.6) 
* does not cause Y, if (51 = (52 ...... =9i =0 (4.7) 
In order to judge whether these conditions hold, Sims employ the following joint- 
significance test-F-statistic against the selected coefficient restrictions applied to 
Eq. 4.5a and Eq. 4.5b relative to Eq. 4.5c and Eq. 4.5d: 
F=[(R' -R')1mý[(I-R' 
)+-2m-1)] 
UR R UR 
where: 
RUR is the coefficient of determination of unrestricted equation; 
R' is the coefficient of determination of restricted equation; R 
n is the number of observations; 
m is the number of lagged periods. 
With Sims test, the direction of causality is judged as follows: 
The result of F-test I Direction of Causality 
a) (4.6) holds, (4.7) does not hold 
b) (4.6) does not holds, (4.7) holds 
c) Both (4.6) and (4.7) hold 
d) Neither (4.6) nor (4.7) holds 
X causes Y (X Y) 
Y causes X (Y X) 
Feedback between X and Y (X <-> Y) 
X and Y are independent 
For the purpose of generality, it is useful to write the VAR in the multivariate 
regression fonnat, partitioning the two data vectors yt and x, into kt, Yd and 
[XIt 
5 X2t 
II 
where x, is lagged values of y, andX2 
is lagged values of Y2 . The VAR 
with this partitioning would be 
Yi F' '2 it 
FI 
2 [" IXIX'1+1"'I 
Var[ 
Y2 
[]F21 
'ý) 
2 X2 '62 ED 
E21 F'22 
The unrestricted maximum likelihood estimates can still be obtained by least squares 
regressions. For testing Granger causality in the VAR model, the hypothesis F,, =0 Is 
of interest. In these circumstances, the hypothesis can be tested using the likelihood 
ratio statistic. Testing procedure based on a Wald-test rationale starts from computing 
(Greene, 2003, p. 593): 
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SiI= residual covariance matrix when current values of y, are regressed on values of 
both x, andX2 
SI1 (0) = residual covariance matrix when current values of y, are regressed only on 
values of x, 
The log-likelihood ratio statistic is A= T(InIS, I (O)l - InIS, , 
1) 
, where T 
is the sample 
size. The statistic would have a limiting X' distribution with degrees of freedom 
equal to the number of restrictions. 
It is well known that an F test for the null hypothesis that some parameters of a model 
are jointly zero in a stable VAR model is not valid when the variables are integrated. 
Zapata and Rambaldi (1997) argued that, in the presence of one cointegrating vector, 
"the two-step procedure introduced by Engle and Granger (1987) was all that was 
needed to test to no-causality hypothesis". On the other hand, they noted that "the 
dimension of the cointegration space complicates this testing problem considerably" 
(p. 285). Furthermore, Toda (1994) and Ho and Sorensen (1996) suggested limitations 
of the ability of the Johansen and Juselius (1990) likelihood ratio test to detect long- 
run economic relationships. 
To minimise these problems, we use the procedure developed by Toda and Yamamoto 
(1995) that is a modified Wald test of restrictions on the parameters of a VAR(k) 
model. This MWALD test statistic has an asymptotic X' distribution in a 
VAR( k+d. 
ax 
), where d .. ax is the maximal order of integration suspected in the 
system. They argued that the test does not require knowledge of the cointegration 
properties of the system and can be applied when there is no cointegration. Further, it 
can be used when stability and rank conditions are not satisfied provided that the order 
of integration of the process does not exceed the true lag length of the model. 
Ideally, the Granger-causality test technique could be applied to the entire financial 
market, including banking sector and stock market, which will provide a rather 
complete perception on this issue. Given the data limitation of the banking sector 
indicators, Granger- causality test is hardly applied to the whole financial market. 
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Nevertheless, it is still a good attempt to apply the stock market data to Granger- 
causality test in order to identify the role of stock market in China's economic growth. 
4.3 Data description 
In this study, we have tried to compile a 'complete' dataset from every available and 
accessible information sources to avoid the drawbacks of limited number of 
observations. Before we carry out the precise technical operation and analysis, the 
major task is to seek the accurate variables according to our specific requirements. 
However, not every variable for conducting the regression function is available 
immediately. Most of them need to be collected, manipulated and rearranged to meet 
the criteria of the model specification. 
The variables adopted in this empirical work can be sorted into three different 
categories: raw/original data, estimated data based on a certain mechanism and 
technique and derived variables. The base data are mainly abstracted from a number 
of statistical yearbooks published by the National Bureau of Statistics of China 
(NBSC). These statistical yearbooks as data sources are listed in Table 4.1. As the 
data in each yearbook were actually the values of the preceding year, the time range of 
the employed data for the final empirical work stopped at 2003. 
4.3.1 Raw/original data 
The original data taken out from various statistical yearbooks directly include GDP, 
Labour Employment, Bank Loans, Depreciation Rate for Fixed Assets and Investment 
in Fixed Assets. 
4.3.1.1 GDP and Labour Employment 
In Statistical Yearbook of China, GDP and labour employment statistics are compiled 
and published on an annual basis. Therefore, these two items are simply collected 
from the yearbook directly. In particular, GDP and Labour Employment are collected 
on both aggregated level and industrial level, i. e. the Primary Industry, the Secondary 
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Table 4.1: Summary of data source 
Yearbook title Volume series available 4 
Statistical Yearbook of China (Zhongguo Tong 1981-2004 
Ji Nian Jian) 
Statistical Yearbook of individual provinces Available volumes for 
different provinces vary and 
being discontinuous. 
Volumes of 1999-2004 are 
mainly referred. 
China Statistical Yearbook on Investment in 1995-2004 
Fixed Assets (Zhongguo Gu Ding Zi Chan Tou 
Zi Tong Ji Nian Jian) 
Almanac of China's Finance and Banking 1989-2004 
(Zhongguo Jin Rong Nian Jian) 
Almanac of China's Population (Zhongguo Ren 1987-2004 
Kou Tong Ji Nian Jian) 
China securities and futures statistical yearbook 1995-2004 
(Zhongguo Zheng Quan Ji Huo Tong Ji Nian 
Jian) 
Industry and the Tertiary Industry. For simplicity, we label each of these variables as 
GA, GM and GS, LA, LM and LS, representing the GDP and Labour employment of 
each industry respectively. 
4.3.1.2 Three Industrial Sectors in China 
The statistics on the three industrial sectors are complied according to the stipulation 
in the Report on Establishing Statistics of the Tertiary Industry by State Statistical 
Bureau, which was issued by the General Office of the State Council in April 1985. 
The three sectors are shown as follows: 
The primary sector: Agriculture, including forestry, animal husbandry, and 
fishery. 
0 The secondary sector: Industry, including extraction, manufactory, piped 
water, electric power, steam, heat water, and gas 
The tertiary sector: all the industries except for the primary and secondary 
industries above. 
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4.3-1.3 Bank Loans and Bank Deposits 
Bank Loans (BL) and Bank Deposits (BD) are complete and straightforward items 
taken from Almanac of China's Finance and Banking and China's Statistic Yearbook 
for 50 Anniversary (1949-1998), but only for the period 1984-1997 rather than the full 
sample period. Since 1998, the statistic data of BL and BD have been counted on a 
broader level complied in the national statistic yearbook which resulted in a larger 
value of BL and BD consequently. 
According to the definition from People's Bank of China, State Banks (SB) include 
People's Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Agriculture Bank 
of China, Bank of China, Construction Bank of China, National Development Bank, 
Import-Export Bank of China, Agriculture Development Bank of China, 
Communication Bank of China, CITIC Industrial Bank, Saving deposit agencies of 
postal office. China's Overall Financial Institutions (OFI), on the other hand, is a 
broader concept that includes housing saving bank, urban credit cooperative banks, 
rural credit cooperatives, urban credit bank, financial trust investment agencies and 
financial companies apart from State Banks. 
Under the full supervision and administration of State Government, foreign banks and 
financial institutions set up their branches and/or representative offices in a number of 
major cities in China. Nevertheless, they have been strictly excluded from operating 
the domestic-currency-related business in any occasions, neither taking deposits nor 
granting loans5. Following-the-clients motivation is one of their major market-entering 
strategies. Their target customers, thus mainly focus on those multinational enterprises 
from their own countries operating in China. In these circumstances, the impact of 
foreign banks and financial institutions is rather minor or irrelevant to the domestic 
financial sector in terms of the effect on financing the domestic corporations. 
In this empirical study, we aim at investigating the role of domestic financial sector in 
China's economic development process. Correspondingly, we only take the domestic 
4 The available volumes of these yearbooks are those series have been published till the date when the 
data collection work was undertaken and completed. 
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financial institutions into account and do not pay much attention on the performance 
and their influence of foreign banks and financial institutions on the empirical study 
level. 
Generally speaking, approximate 80 percent of the loans in China's financial market 
are generated from State Banks. It will not cause too much difference whether we 
should use the data of SB or of OFI (on the national level) as long as the data 
consistency is ascertained for the sample period. As we mentioned above, BL and BD 
statistic from SB are only available from 1984 to 1997, while the statistic from OR 
did not ever exist during the same period. However, the information on SB ceased 
publishing in Almanac of China'S Finance and Banking in 1998 without any explicit 
reason or explanation, which has been entirely substituted by the statistic of OFI. This 
situation happened not only on the aggregated level, but also on the provincial level. 
Nevertheless, part of the provincial BL and BD data from SB can be found in the local 
statistical yearbook of each individual province. 
Under the consideration of general advantages and disadvantages, BL and BD 
statistics of SB from 1984 to 2003 have been selected. It should be noted that the BL 
and BD figures of the following nine provinces for 1999-2003 are unavailable, which 
has been replaced by BL and BD of OR (on the province level): Liaoning, Jilin, 
Heilongjiang, Zhejiang, Anhui, Guangxi, Sichuan, Guizhou and Tibet. Therefore the 
sample data eventually adopted to conduct the statistic testing are estimated by the 
author. The idea behind this estimation is to average the ratio of BL and BD of SB 
over the one of OR when both of these two items are available. Then this average 
ratio multiplies the BL and BD of OR of those nine provinces and yields the BL and 
BD value of SB. Correspondingly, the concept of 'Banks' in this thesis rather refers to 
the SB except for the interpretation in particular circumstances. 
4.3.1.4 Depreciation rate 
Since the value of capital stock is not an explicit statistical item, the adopted capital 
stock data are derived by the author based on the rationale of dynamic equilibrium of 
5 The operation of RMB-related business with foreign enterprises opened to the foreign financial 
institution in 2002 as trial, but only constrained to those enterprises banking in a small number of cities 
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capital stock that can be interpreted into the equation: K, = K, (5, + I, where g 
is the depreciation rate of fixed assets. 
The annual depreciation rate from 1980 to 1992 was reported in the Chapter of 
General Survey in Statistical Yearbook of China, volume 1993. This rate has been 
applied to the overall nation. Hence, the capital stock since 1980 can be simply 
calculated by adopting the values of depreciation rate and investment for each industry 
of individual province. The depreciation rate has been replaced by the actual 
depreciation value of Fixed Assets for each individual province since 1993. The 
depreciation value needs to be deflated and transformed into the constant price of 
1984 before it is applied to the computation of Capital Stock. 
4.3.1.5 Investment in Fixed Assets 
An essential input factor of production function is the capital stock. Since this item 
could not be found explicitly from any China's statistical sources, neither on 
aggregated level nor on provincial level, the estimation process starts from finding out 
the accurate value of each determinant factor of the calculation of capital stock. It is 
obvious that the investment in fixed assets (IFA) is one of the key issues. In general, 
MA is the amount of work done to build and purchase fixed assets in the monetary 
form during a certain period. It is computed at estimated prices according to the actual 
progress of project. It excludes the values of the building materials that have not yet 
been used in the bodies of project, of the advances for projects, and of the equipment 
that needs installation but has not yet been installed 6. The provincial data of IFA 
compiled and published by NBSC are available ftom China Statistic Yearbook on 
Investment in Fixed Assets, 1950-1995 and annual volume from 1996 to 2004. 
4.3.2 Estimated data 
including Shanghai, Tianjin, Shenzhen and Dalian (Leung, 2001). 
6 The description of investment in fixed assets is derived from the Indicator Specification of the Chapter 
of Investment in Fixed Assets in Statistical Yearbook of China (various volumes). 
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Deflator is the key estimated data in this research, which can not be abstracted from 
the Statistical Yearbook directly, while the estimation was carried out on the basis of 
groups of original data with certain assumption. 
Since GDP value from the yearbook is termed in the price of current year, while the 
labour employment is in real terms by definition. Given the concerns of keeping the 
variables in the same form, the inflation effect should be wiped off from the annual 
GDP value. Hence, GDP value needs to be deflated and transformed into the real term 
by using an appropriate deflator, the same philosophy will be applied to the rest of 
nominal variables. 
The common deflator in most of the econometric empirical work is Investment Price 
Indices in Fixed Assets (IPI). However, annual IPI did not exist as an important 
indicator in China statistical system until 1991, and cannot be tracked back to the first 
year of our sample period 1984. Hence, Retail Price Index (RPI) and Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) are two most appropriate substitutions can be found. Technically, these 
two sets of deflators can be used interchangeably. In China's specific circumstances, 
the calculation base of CPI has been modified since 1991. Prior to 1991, CPI was an 
index reflecting the living expenditure of employees from state-owned and collective- 
owned companies, which obviously neglected the prices paid by rural families. In 
1990 and onwards, CPI has been obtained on the consideration of overall households' 
consumption in the country. RPI, on the other hand, was a consistent indicator over 
the sample period. Therefore, RPI is the preferred deflator. 
Due to the huge difference between the basket of goods in 1984 and that in 2003 due 
to the rapid GDP growth during the past two decades, it is convincing that the constant 
price of 1995 is more plausible than that of 1984 to be used in this research. As the 
data sample covers the period ftom 1984 to 2003, the nominal data is transformed into 
the constant prices with base year 1995. Thus, RPI, on both provincial level and 
aggregated level, has to be recalculated into a series of figures where that of 1995 is 
equivalent to 100. 
4.3.3 Derived Variables 
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This type of data is obtained by doing some simple arithmetic calculation based on the 
values introduced in above two sections. The calculating data include the indicators of 
financial intermediation, the capital stock on both aggregated and industrial level, real 
GDP and real capital stock, weight value of output. 
4.3.3.1 Indicators of Financial Intermediation 
One of the hypotheses in this empirical study is whether the development of financial 
sector stimulates the economic output growth. Banking industry is the major 
component in China's financial sector. On regional level, there are five indicators of 
financial development going to be applied to the hypothesis testing procedure. They 
are all the ratios (indices) computed by using the deposit and loans data of State Banks. 
Considering the material coherence, the description and feasibility of using these five 
measurements will be demonstrated in Chapter 6. 
4.3.3.2 Real Capital Stock 
Based on the information of investment and depreciation rate, we can easily find out 
the annual Capital Stock (CS) value of each province by using the formula as long as 
the initial CS is ascertained. The ideal way to obtain the most accurate data for our 
investigating sample period is to have the real CS value of year 1949 when the nation 
of People's Republic of China was founded. Since we would rather focus on the 
change of CS since 1984, the real CS value would be less important. Moreover, this 
initial information is not available while the total regional investment could only be 
tracked back to year 1980. Therefore, we ought to manipulate the real CS value from 
1980 and onwards for each individual province. The author calculates the initial CS 
estimates in the way adopted by Dhareshwar and Nehru (1993), Benhabib and Spiegel 
(2000) and Fan et al. (2003). That is, prior to 1980, real investment has presumably 
grown at a steady rate (r), which is assumed to be the same as the rate of growth of 
real GDP from 1952 to 1979. Thus, for individual province, in initial CS (i. e., CS at 
1980) is calculated by Kj, ýqý, ) where ri represents provInce i's growth rate rj + 
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and o5 represents the depreciation rate of the CS'. This approach ensured that the 1980 
value of CS is independent of the data used in our analysis. Moreover, given the 
relatively small CS in 1980 and the high level of investment, the estimates for later 
years are not sensitive to the 1980 benchmark value of CS (Fan et aL, 2003). 
4.3.4 The other variables 
The open door policy implemented in 1979 has been treated as the milestone of 
China's economic reform. It is a common perception that 1979 is an outstanding 
structural break in China's economic development. Although the dataset of this 
empirical work did not span the pre- and post-open-policy age, there are many other 
individual factors may affect China's growth pattern. Rather than adding considerable 
group and time serial dummy variables to capture the individual effect of every 
province and every year against the base case, we would prefer to include more 
determinants into the production function. 
For instance, FDI was negligible until well into China's reform period, but has 
accelerated since the early 1990's. The contribution from FDI to Total Investment in 
Fixed Assets (TIFA) is growing rapidly though the proportion is relatively small 
comparing with the other investment fund sources. This phenomenon can be found 
from Table 4.2 where displaying the change of FDI in the past nine years. Within the 
TIFA survey, the contribution from FDI has been included. The rationale of 
investigating the effect of domestic investment upon the economic growth suggests 
subtracting the FDI value from each industry in order to restore the picture of the real 
domestic investment. Nevertheless, there was no record upon industrial FDI before 
1995. Consequently, we would consider the aggregated FDI to TEFA ratio as a 
replacement. 
FDI is usually termed in US dollar while TIFA is termed in RMB, in which 
circumstances the ratio between two variables in different currencies is not valid. 
7 Since no regional depreciation rate of CS existed, the calculation is based on the assumption that the 
national depreciation rate is applied to each province. This is more convincing in the planned economy 
as the economic activities were operated fully under the control of State Government in accordance 
with the pre-set plan. Hence, the pace of economic development was remained the same throughout the 
country. 
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Table 4.2: Foreign Direct Investment as percent of Total Investment in Fixed 
Assets (1995-2003) 
Year FD1 in Fixed Assets: real value Total Contribution to 
(RMB billion) Growth Rate Investment Total (RMB billion) Investment (%) 
1995 2.3 20.02 11.2 
1996 2.75 19.56 22.91 11.8 
1997 2.68 -2.5 24.94 10.7 
1998 2.62 -2.5 28.41 9.2 
1999 2.01 -23.32 29.85 6.7 
2000 1.7 -15.5 32.92 5.2 
2001 1.73 2 37.21 4.6 
2002 2.08 20.5 43.5 4.8 
2003 1 2.6 1 25 1 59.09 1 4.4 
Source: author's calculation based on Total Fixed Assets Investment sorted by Fund Resources, China 
Statistic Yearbook (2004), p. 183-185. 
Therefore, FDI should be transformed into RMB price. Given that the exchange rate 
varied over the last two decades, the procedure of accomplishing this transformation 
includes two steps. In the first step, FDI from 1985 to 2003 is deflated by US RPI 
where 1995 price has been treated as the constant one, which is consistent with the 
deflated domestic price. Secondly, the constant FDI is multiplied by 1995 exchange 
rate, thus obtaining the FDI in RMB price. 
Meanwhile, it has been widely accepted that the education level would generate a 
positive effect towards the labour productivity. Hence, it may also be worth of taking 
the education level into account, for the purpose of investigating to what extent the 
education development may influence the economic output. A number of indicators 
can be adopted to capture the education effect, while the most appropriate one is the 
ratio of enrolment in higher education institutions over the enrolment in secondary 
education schools. The annual population figures have been amended when the census 
occurred thus affecting the data consistence. Therefore, the ratios having population 
data involved are not suitable ones. In addition, the nine-year compulsory educational 
scheme8 is a vital contribution to the sharp reduction of the percentage of illiterate 
workforce. However, the share of workforce achieving higher education remains 
rather small comparing with that in many other developed countries. A general 
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assumption states that better educated workforce is positively correlated to the higher 
labour productivity, consequently resulting in a faster economic output growth. Based 
on such assumption, it would be more appropriate to emphasise on the progress in 
higher education than that in primary education. 
4.4 Data Validity and Reliability 
Data validity and reliability is a crucial determinant for research project commitment. 
Where the research project is conducted on national or regional level, secondary data 
are the most appropriate and unique sources. However, the credibility of China's 
statistical standard and mechanism is always a questionable subject. Both domestic 
and overseas scholars doubt the reality of China's statistical data as they believe the 
official published data are suspicious, either overestimated (such as GDP growth rate) 
or underestimated (such as the volume of Non-performing Loans). Whether the 
statistical data have been consciously concealed is a topic beyond investigation, 
neither is the aim of this research. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to evaluate China's 
statistical data in an objective manner before the research finding being addressed. 
4.4.1 Advantages and disadvantages of using secondary data 
Comparing with limitation of primary data, using secondary data can not only save the 
resources (in particular the time) for collecting data, but also achieve a longer time 
span than what we can obtain from primary data (Ghauri et al., 1995). In addition, 
secondary data are likely to be higher-quality data to some extent, especially for those 
collected by government or institution surveys (Stewart and Kamins, 1993). 
Secondary data generally can be achieved from three main groups: documentary, 
survey and compiled data (Saunders et al. 2003). There are a number of disadvantages 
when using secondary data. One of them is the suitability of the data. Since primary 
data are the new data collected with specific research purpose, they can usually 
answer the research question and/or objectives straight forward. Secondary data, 
8 This educational scheme guarantees each Chinese citizen has the right to receive free education 
service for six-year primary school education and three-year junior high school education. 
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however, have always been organised and collected for some other purposes before 
the individual researcher approaches them. Therefore, they seldom answer the 
research question(s) directly but they still provide useful source for our investigation 
and analysis (Denscombe, 1998). 
As Stewart and Kamins (1993) argue that the researchers should be in advantage when 
they are using secondary data compared with those using primary data due to the data 
existence already. Therefore, what the research needs to do is to evaluate them prior to 
use. The evaluating and investigating the suitability of secondary data are worthwhile 
in these circumstances as this important step will save the time for rejecting the 
unsuitable data in the future, especially when there are several different data sources 
(Saunders et al., 2003). 
Apart from the concern of data suitability, data accessibility and availability is another 
problem worth being bom in mind. It will be difficult and costly to gain access where 
data have been collected for commercial reasons. Moreover, the use of confidentiality 
is another restriction to the accessibility, which is very much so in the context of 
China for those data from the sensitive areas. Another reason for this is the data 
aggregation. For the purpose of meeting the requirement of original research, process 
data have been aggregated in some way but unable to be retrievable to match the 
individual research objective. Banking lending data from China's banking sector is a 
good example for it. In order to testify the contribution of China's banking sector to 
economic growth, it had been ideally designed to obtain the industrial banking lending 
data for each province. Nevertheless, banking lending data on provincial level have 
been summed up into the aggregated figures while there is no way to restore the 
industrial level data. 
Apart from the difference in measuring criteria, the change of administrative structure 
is another obstacle of maintaining the statistic data consistent over the time range. 
During the data sample period, the number of administrative regions in China was 
raised from 29 to 31 given two major adjustments towards a couple of administrative 
regions. The change affected a number of statistic series including the geographical 
size, population, economic output, investment etc. Since we are taking the growth of 
output as the dependent variable, the growth rate obtained by using two figures 
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measured in different criteria/standard may not be appropriate. It would lead to either 
a sudden increase or decline unexpectedly, which will do harm to the data consistency. 
The first administrative adjustment is the Island of Hainan was separated from 
Guangdong Province in 1988 and became an individual administrative unit which was 
equivalent to the Province class. Obviously, the isolation directly caused the 
inconsistency of statistic data before 1987 and 1988 onwards on both Guangdong 
Province and Island of Hainan. The second similar modification took place in 1997 on 
Sichuan Province and Chongqing City. The latter one used to be a city within Sichuan 
Province. In 1997, it was separated from Sichuan and became an individual 
administrative unit, the fourth Municipality Directly under the Central Government, 
being parallel to the other two Municipalities of Shanghai and Tianjin and equivalent 
to the other provinces in terms of political and economic status. Again, the statistical 
data for both Sichuan Province and Chongqing City are inconsistent and incomparable 
before and after 1997. The statistical data of both Hainan and Chongqing during the 
period before their separation from the original province can be obtained from the 
local Statistical Yearbook. 
In the case of Hainan Island, the geographical size remains the same, thus the 
population increases at a steady rate. Correspondingly, the rest of the economic related 
indicators also changed in the same trend as usual. However, the geographical size 
and population of Chongqing City largely increase from what they used to be before 
1997. In addition, the other statistical items such as IFA and economic output GDP 
also differ from those before 1997. It is obvious that there would be a prominent jump 
in those economic indicators of Chongqing while there is a conspicuous drop in the 
case of Sichuan Province. 
However, further detailed information for individual district within Chongqing City 
authority is nowhere to be found. As a result, the statistic data of Chongqing City in 
pre-isolation stage could not be restored to stay in the line with those data after 1997. 
Therefore, a feasible way to eliminate this inconsistency factors is to reject those data 
for both Chongqing City and Sichuan Province, reducing the number of regions from 
31 to 29. For the sake of keeping as much infon-nation as possible, we can retrieve the 
statistical data for Sichuan Province by holding Chongqing City as a part of Sichuan 
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Province (it is so geographically! ). In other words, it means to sum up the figures of 
these two regions into the aggregated item for Sichuan Province exclusively. 
In some other situations, data definitions are modified due to the preference and/or 
intention change of the authority. The industrial survey is one of the typical samples. 
Prior to 1998, the industrial survey was conducted based upon the type of ownership, 
i. e. total industrial enterprises were defined as those beyond township administrative 
level inclusively. The number of total industrial enterprises and their output value 
were two essential items within the survey report. As the complementation of 
economic reform has intensified and accelerated, the state government tended to 
highlight the performance and efficiency of state-owned and state-holding industrial 
enterprises. Consequently, the survey was undertaken in accordance with the output 
scale, i. e. the number of industrial enterprises and their output value has been 
narrowed down to total state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises with 
annual gross output value over RMB5 million exclusively. As a result, the figures 
within the above two survey items appeared to decline substantially from year 1997 to 
1998. 
4.4.2 Drawbacks and Development of China's Statistical Standard and Mechanism 
By reviewing the development of China's statistical system briefly, we have to admit 
the drawbacks within the current statistic data. The People's Republic of China 
founded in 1949. The first official statistical yearbook was not published until 1981, 
indicating the regular statistical system was established since then. The data in 
statistical reports started being updated and published since 1981 on the annual basis. 
Nowadays, the statistical standard applied by NBSC is formulated according to the 
standardised and transparent system with the help and acceptance of IMF. With the 
frequent communication and co-operation with IMF and World Bank during the past 
two decades, NBSC has implemented a serial of reforms against the statistical 
mechanism and procedure for the purpose of staying in line with the international 
standard. Hence, China's statistical pattern is far from mature while it has been 
improved rapidly. However, the contradictory data from local and central statistical 
authority forced the implementation of the further reform. 
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Generally speaking, the state government did not pay too much attention on the 
accuracy of the statistic data, particularly in the stage prior to 1981. A number of 
reasons led to the distortion of China's statistic data. In the earlier stage, breaking 
away from being a poor country was the eager desire in China. The steel output was 
then distortedly demonstrated as the unique indicator of economic development. 
Under the misunderstanding of the economic growth pattern and domestic situation, 
the state authority launched the 'Great Leap Forward' (1958-1960). 
During those insane times, China's economic structure was incredibly destroyed as the 
overall resources had been dedicated to raise the steel output regardless of the other 
economic sector's development. Thousands and thousands pieces of lands were left 
uncultivated since the farmers had been forced to enter the steel factories. As a result, 
the fact that the grain yield dropped rapidly made the authority rather dissatisfied and 
worried. In contrast to finding out the proper solution to save the economic situation, 
the statistical authority on each level, however, decided to fabricate the statistical data, 
intending to draw an excellent picture of rapid and powerful economic growth. 
Consequently, spurious data on grain yield widely appeared all over the country. In 
most extreme cases, the reported figures were four times the actual ones. 
Another prevailing phenomenon can be used to explain the data distortion. The 
statistic data, particularly the GDP figure, have been adopted as the measurement to 
9 
evaluate the achievements in local government in recent years . Moreover, GDP 
figure has been tightly linked with the promotion of individual careers when the 
achievement of high GDP enhances promotion prospects for senior officials. In these 
circumstances, statistic data collecting and compiling is no longer an independent and 
objective work for the purpose of reflecting the real economic performance. 
Consequently, it becomes an irresistible temptation for many provincial governors to 
intervene the data compilation or even magnify the growth figure of GDP given the 
GDP-focused benchmark. For instance, NIBSC published the national GDP increased 
by 9.3 percent in the first half year of 2004. However, it has been noticed that the 
GDP stock value computed on the basis of GDP value reported by provincial bureau 
9 See 'Distortion of GDP Leading to the Statistical Reform Storm,, 
hjjp: //biz. 163. com/2004wl 1/12728/2004wl 1-1099712794258. html, accessed on 6h Nov. 2004. 
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of statistics was 19.8 percent higher than the value achieved by the computation 
conducted by NIBSC individually, resulting in a 4.2 percent difference in GDP growth 
rate between the national-published data and the aggregated provincial data. 
Meanwhile, an officer of NBSC pointed out that there is a high possibility that the 
weight value of the tertiary sector has been underestimated 10. NBSC launched a 
general survey towards the Tertiary Industry in 1993, when the weight value of 
Tertiary Industry was raised to 34 percent from 28 percent. In the recent years, this 
value has been unreasonably reduced to 31 percent where the rapid growth of Tertiary 
Industry in the past decade indicates a higher contribution to the aggregated economic 
growth. In addition, statistical data on a number of servicing sector such as education 
and hygiene are rather rough and less comprehensive because of lacking a proper 
survey scheme. 
Correspondingly, NBSC has been gradually undertaking a number of measures to 
correct the distorted statistical data. Specialised statistic data have been compiled and 
reported in individual publications. China Statistical Yearbook on Investment in Fixed 
Assets 1950-1995, the first official publication on Investment, enables the readers to 
receive the provincial data on investment in fixed assets back to 1981. Almanac of 
China's Finance and Banking, for another example, was first edited and published in 
1989 in order to display the significant policy change or modification, as well as the 
key indicators of China's banking sector. 
Moreover, in order to improve the data effectiveness, NBSC started publishing the 
economic indicators on monthly basis in the statistic bullet points since 2000. 
Meanwhile, the compilation and computation of national level GDP are going to be 
operated by NBSC exclusively. In another words, provincial GDP data reported by 
individual region will not be used as the base data for national GDP computation for 
the purpose of eliminating the linkage of statistic data with career promotion, thus 
wiping off the interventions from provincial authority upon statistic data. 
10 See 'Distortion of GDP Leading to the Statistical Reform Storm% 
hqp: //biz. 163. com/2004w Ij /I 2728/2004w 11- 1 099712794258. html, accessed on 6th Nov. 2004. 
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4.5 Summary 
This chapter outlined the methodology for the research work, followed by the data 
description and evaluation. Due to the specific property of the research objective, 
quantitative research method is the preferable way to be operated throughout the 
empirical study. Methodologies of three econometric techniques adopted in this 
empirical study have been illustrated carefully - Error correction model, panel data 
analysis and Granger-causality analysis. Correspondingly, the data selection and 
compilation is the major task before the hypothesis testing being proceeded. As the 
research question will be testified on the provincial level in China, secondary data 
from various statistical yearbooks appear to be the most plausible sources to cope with 
the quantitative analysis, comparing with the advantages and disadvantages of using 
primary data. 
Though the credibility of China's statistical information has been questioned for a 
long time, this panel dataset is achieved upon the basis of most objective information 
from various statistical yearbooks edited and published by the NIBSC, including three 
types of data termed as original, derived and computed variables. In particular, 
derived variables applied to the estimated model are based on the relevant and 
available original data sources, additionally in accordance with some theoretical 
formulas and mathematical techniques. It can be concluded that these derived 
variables are not the products gained from absolutely arbitrary ways, thus should be 
trustworthy. 
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Chapter 5: The national economic growth - ECM analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we conduct an investigation on the basis of aggregate level data. The 
material in this chapter is organised in the following structure: Section 5.2 will 
generally review the aggregate economic perfon-nance during the past half century, 
followed by the statistical result obtained by using error correction model (ECM) in 
Section 5.3. The analysis of economic gTowth resource is illustrated in Section 5.4, 
including capital stock growth and labour force growth. Section 5.5 mainly considers 
the efficiency of the investment efficiency. A brief summary of this chapter is 
presented in Section 5.6. 
5.2 The aggregate economic performance 
From Chart 5.1, China's economic growth pattern can be characterised as the 
investment-driven style: the economic growth heavily relied on the capital 
accumulation. For most of the time, the growth of investment was much higher than 
the growth of GDP, with a rising capital-output ratio. Meanwhile, during the sample 
period on aggregate level data (1952-2002), the growth of fixed assets investment 
experienced several large fluctuations, particularly in the pre-economic-reform stage. 
From late 1950s to mid 1960s, investment in fixed assets in China suffered the first 
major fluctuation, resulting in a severe recession. In the late 1950s, after achieving the 
victory against the imperialism and winning the national liberation, how to break 
away from the poverty and become a prosperous and powerful country is the 
nationwide strong wish. Under the belief and guidance of surpassing UK in 10 years 
while catching up with US in 15 years, the authorities launched the 'Great Leap 
Forward' (GLF) in 1957 when they drew up the second five-year plan of China's 
economic development. The speed of developing industry, particularly heavy industry, 
was insanely driven up regardless the actual capability of development. For instance 
107 
4-0 
rw 
Qi 
W. m 
CD 
;. 0 
O= 
C. ý 
R A 
o l 
ý 
Fe - 
I ': , .I jýA 0, I e 
0 0 
A T 
A 
Ft 
e S' 
ae 000 
96ueL40 jo % 
, --ý ;Z Z 
ý2 
L- e 
ZZ 
ý2 cý ;Z Z 
;Z (-ý I'll (Z 
03 
u 
-0 
>ý ., Z 
-0 0 
(v-c 
, Z: cu 
4 
4- 
,m 
r_ Z 
cz ;Z 
;34, - 
108 
with a population of 650 million and labour force of 266 million in 1957, over 90 
million people devoted their efforts into the steel production regardless of lack of the 
necessary raw materials and inadequate capital equipment for people employed to 
work in steel production'. Every available resource had been dedicated to the steel 
production while leaving thousands and thousands of agricultural land uncultivated. 
However, the inferior techniques in steel making resulted in the poor quality of steel 
products; consequently, million and million tons of steel was abandoned. The huge 
waste and misallocation of both human and capital resources led to the massively 
distorted economic structure, which eventually paid off by the upcoming three-year 
natural calamity since 1959. 
The State Authority learnt lessons from the GLF in 1962 and adjusted the emphasis of 
future economic development. However, when the state economy appeared to have 
recovered from the damage caused by GLF and natural calamities, the well-known 
Cultural Revolution commenced in 1966 dragged the whole nation back to a chaos. 
The economic construction apparently again collapsed into turmoil during the ten-year 
Revolution event, where China's economic development suffered for a second time. 
The re-evaluation of Mao's ideology that prevailed in the Cultural Revolution in 1976 
signalled the end of the ten-year man-made disaster. Soon after that, the emphasis of 
China's future development had been placed on the economic growth followed by 
China's economic reform starting in 1979. By adopting the 'opening up' policy, China 
has been successfully attracting large stream of foreign investment funds, know-how 
and management skills during the process of implementing its own economic reform, 
which was a substantial contribution to China's continuous and rapid economic 
growth for over two decades. Due to the effects of the Tiananmen Square Event, the 
social stability in China appeared to be under threat and not sustainable, while the 
investment environment was likely to be unfavourable. In this instance, the investment 
in fixed assets shrank considerably, leading to a negative economic growth on a third 
occasion during the last half century. 
The proportion of investment in GDP has been sustained at a high level for a long 
time in China. Its percentage in GDP has never been lower than 30 during the last 
1 Figures are abstracted from Statistical Yearbook of China 1984, Chapter of Population and Labour 
Force. 
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decade. It reached 37.7 percent in 1993 and declined to 33.5 percent in 1997, then 
resurged to the peak of 41.5 percent in 2002. The investment-led development model 
could be attributed as the main engine behind China's economic take-off since it 
embarked on reform and the opening-up track more than two decades ago. Although 
such a growth pattern does have its advantages-it could quickly accumulate immense 
capital by tapping into the cheap land and labour resources to produce a fast growing 
economy-it also has serious consequences. Under the investment-led development 
model, the national economy is more likely to witness huge swings. Because the 
economic growth is mainly propelled by the investment, and when the investment 
soars, it is likely to drive up prices. Under such circumstances, in order to stop the 
price rising, the government will be forced to take macroeconomic measures to tighten 
the credit, which in turn could choke the economy and thus create a vicious circle. 
Chart 5.2 shows the annual inflation rate since 1990, measured by the annual change 
of consumer price index (CPI). Meanwhile, the growth rate of real investment in fixed 
assets in the same period has been illustrated in the same graph. China's economy 
experienced boom and bust in earlier years of 1990s. The fixed assets investment 
climbed up rapidly from 1989 to 1993, particularly in the period of 1991-1993, the 
growth rate of investment remained at over 20 percent annually. In 1993, the 
investment growth rate reached its peak at 43 percent. Various construction projects 
were carried out at the same time all over the country. There was a construction 
competition among the provinces and cities: a nationwide 'economic development 
zone fever' and 'real estate fever' appearing in 1992, where the real estate price rose 
sharply and the speculation widespread. For instance, in the most famous beach city of 
Hainan province, Sanya, there were over 2 million square metres of real estate unsold 
when the bubble busted, more than half of which was unfinished building. The over- 
heated investment led to the price rise of both raw material and energy, which was 
known as the cost driven inflation. As a result, China's economy suffered a serious 
inflation from 1993 to 1995. 
Aiming at cooling down the overheated economy, the state government launched the 
retrenchment programme in July 1993 and the programme lasted till 1997. The 
economic growth rate began a gradual slowdown in 1995 but investment has been 
maintained at a relatively high level. The investment growth rate was brought down to 
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Chart 5.2: China Annual Change of CPI in Last Decade (%) 
50.00% - ------- 
45.00% CPI 
40.00% 
Growth of Real 35.00% 
Investment 
30.00% 
25.00% 
20.00% 
'a 15.00% 
10.00% 
5.00% 
0.00% 
_91 --195Q 
03,. 7 199$,., 1999 20002001 20,02,20 
-5.00% 
1990 19 1993 1994 1995 
Year 
Source: Statistic Yearbook of China, 2003, pp. 313. The latest figure of 2003 is abstracted from 
http: //www. worldindex. com on China's deflation data, accessed on 18/01/2005. 
7.1 percent in 1994 and further down to around 3 percent in 1995, while remaining at 
less than 10 percent in the following two years. Nevertheless, the economic growth 
rate had maintained at over 8 percent annually since 1995. In such circumstance, it is 
believed that the goal of a 'soft-landing' was achieved. 
Since late 1997, the state government switched the policy orientation, deciding to 
stimulate the economic growth. Consequently, the state government has implemented 
the proactive fiscal policy, mainly by issuing treasury bonds to finance the 
infrastructure construction, the large-scale development of the western region and 
technical renovation. Meanwhile, the expansion of consumption has been regarded as 
an important component of the implementation of the proactive fiscal policy. Apart 
from the fiscal policies, the Chinese government had reduced interest rate twice in 
1996, and five times more since 1997. After the People's Bank of China (PBC) 
abolished the credit rationing of state-owned commercial banks and implement risk 
management, the PBC replaced the instructional loan planning scheme by quarterly 
indicative loan planning scheme since 1998. As a result, the commercial banks have 
had more autonomy over new loans. Furthermore, the Central Bank had changed the 
deposit reserve system in March 1998. The 7 percent payment preparation 
requirement was abolished and the deposit reserve requirement was lowered from 13 
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percent down to 8 percent, which led to a 60 percent reduction in the legally required 
deposit reserve ratio. Unlike the previous boom and bust cycles, the efforts the 
government exerted through all these channels did not yield the expected effects. In 
particular, the economy has undergone a period of falling prices (deflation) since 1998 
despite of the rapid increase of investment. Among the variety of debates aroused 
upon the reasons for this deflation, some economists (see, for instance, Lin, 1999, 
2004) argue that it was the excess supply resulting from the excess capacity of 
productivity that dragged China into the deflation. 
However, since early 2003, China's economy has been warned of the appearance of 
inflation signal, and actions should be taken against it before the situation becomes 
more severe and out of control. With real GDP growth of 9.7 percent in first quarter 
2004 and continued fast expansion, China's year-over-year CPI inflation rate rose to 
3.8 percent in April, even exceeded the 5 percent red-line set by the central bank. In 
July, the index surged by 5.3 percent, the highest monthly growth since February 1997. 
For an economy that has been haunted by years of deflation, rising prices is viewed in 
a positive manner. However, if the prices rally is too strong, it will exert a negative 
impact on people's life and the economic competitiveness of the country. For example, 
given the inflation rate of 3 percent in the first quarter of 2004, the nominal annual 
interest rate on demand deposits was 1.98 percent, yielding a significantly negative 
real interest rate. The situation is even more severe than in 1993: where the nominal 
interest rate was II percent while a soaring inflation rate up to 24 percent. The 
negative interest rates have led to a sharp decline of bank deposits in banks of 
Wenzhou (a famous commercialised city in Zhejiang Province). Similar phenomena 
also existed in many other cities. 
The PBC's lax monetary policy has, until very recently, contributed to a rapid credit 
expansion. In addition, shortages in energy and raw materials pushed up prices. 
China's extraordinary growth has pushed up raw material prices. In 2004, China's 
crude steel production was up about 17 percent from 2003 and accounted for 25.8 
percent of global output 2. Moreover, China also consumes 37.5 percent of the world's 
cement production. Its energy consumption is about 10 percent of the world total and 
2 Figures are derived from online statistics resources, including 'China's steel production may cause 
oversupply' hiip: //www. manufacturingialk. com/news/msi/msi232. htm1; 'China's crude steel output to 
top 300 mIn tons' h! ip: //enalish. people. com. cn/200508/01/eng2OO5O8Ol 199569. html. 
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is increasing at an annual rate of II percent. The impact of the price rally of industrial 
products has already been transmitted to the consumption sector. Taking housing 
loans for example, they increased by nearly RMB600 billion (USD72.5 billion) in the 
first six months of the year 2004. And commercial housing prices witnessed double- 
digit growth. It has been argued that if housing prices had been taken into 
consideration, then the CPI growth might be much higher (China Business Weekly, 
September 13,2004). To cool the economy, the PBC has raised the official reserve 
ratio three times since August 2003. In early 2004, under the instruction and guidance 
of PBC, all commercial banks started to restrain the credit allocation and strengthen 
the supervision towards a number of overheated industries, such as cement, real estate, 
steel and vehicle. In October 2004, PBC increased the interest rates for the first time 
since the past nine years, while the further rise of interest rate is convincing and 
predictable. 
During the sample period, the growth of labour employment at the aggregate level was 
rather smooth compared with the fluctuation of economic growth except two 
abnormal outliers appeared in year 1958 and 1990 (Chart 5.1). Before 1958, the 
average ratio of labour force to the population was approximately 36.5 percent. In 
1958, there was an increase in the participation rate by 3.5 percent of the population 
(rising from 36.8 percent to 40.3 percent), indicating a growth of more than 23 million 
people. The sudden shift-up is again the result of the Great Leap Forward. In 
particular, employment in Secondary Industry more than tripled from 21 million to 71 
million in one year of 1958. However, the dramatic rise in industrial workers involves 
a large reduction in employment in the Primary Industry where the labour force 
contracted from 193 million to 155 million 3. 
5.3 Statistical result on aggregated level data 
5.3.1 Model specification and data description 
The production function (based on the Cobb-Douglas model) is applied in China's 
context by using time-series data from 1952 to 2003 for the purpose of investigating 
113 
the productivity of two main input factors, human and physical capital. The main 
adopted valuables are economic output, labour force input and capital stock input, 
termed in 1995 constant price and transferred into logarithm form, denoted as Y, L, K, 
respectively. 
The economic output, represented by GDP, and labour force input are derived from 
annual statistical yearbook. Physical capital stock, on the other hand, was computed 
by using depreciation rate and fixed assets investment data, where the calculation 
approach has been thoroughly demonstrated in the Data Description chapter (Chapter 
4). However, since the national investment information before 1980 is not available, 
the statistic of investment on Infrastructure Construction and Innovation has been used 
as the substitute, where the sum of these two categories of investment was apparently 
lower than the overall investment volume. Consequently it generated a structural 
break between 1979 and 1980, affecting the continuity of capital stock series. Hence, 
the dummy variable DUM80 has been introduced to capture this structural break, 
where it took the value one for 1980 and onwards while zero for the years before 1979. 
Additionally, the dummy variable POP described previously has been adopted to 
reflect the two outliers in labour force. As a consequence of Great Leap Forward 
Movement (1958-1959), China suffered a three-year Great Famine till 1962. From 
Chart 6.1, the growth rate of investments in fixed assets sharply dropped from over 80 
percent in year 1958 to -70 percent in 1961; correspondingly, real GDP growth 
declined from 20 percent to -28 percent. In order to capture the unusual economic 
property in this abnormal stage, we create another dummy variable GLF, which equals 
one for 1958-1961 and zero for the rest of the years. 
In 1990, labour force increased by more than 15 percent that was much higher than the 
average level of 3.5 percent annually, and indicates that it comes from a change in the 
data collection rather than a genuine rise in the labour force. This jump in the figure 
which in a sense is artificial due to the adjustment made according to the population 
census undertaken in 2000. Generally speaking, the population related information 
would be more accurate and almost identical to the true situation in the census year, as 
in the rest of the time; the published population was complied based upon the sample 
3 Figures are derived from Statistical I earbook of Labour in China, 1993, pp. 13. 
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survey. There were five official population censuses carried out since the foundation 
of the country, in year 1953,1964,1982,1990 and 2000 respectively. According to 
the record in accessible data sources, it is the common practice that when a most 
current census was made, the prior data would be adjusted based on actual information 
collected from the census. For instance, the employment figures of 1990 were 
compiled directly from the Fourth Census accomplished in that year. The figures after 
1990 were calculated on the basis of 1990 Census till the fifth census was made, while 
those before 1990 had been modified correspondingly. However, when the fifth 
population census was carried out in 2000, the adjustment has only been made from 
1990 and onwards based on the actual information collected from year 2000. This is 
the main reason for the rapid increase of labour force in 1990. Thus, the plausible way 
to capture this information is to introduce a dummy variable, denoted as POP, whose 
value equals 0 for the time period 1952-1989, while I for the years from 1990 
onwards. 
5.3.2 Estimated result analysis 
Bearing the autoregressive property of time-series data in mind, stationarity issue of 
each variable should be first identified before the regression relationship can be 
estimated amongst these variables. Since three variables are moving with an upward 
trend (see Chart 5.3), the statistic result derived from Dickey-Fuller regressions with 
an intercept and a linear trend provides a reliable analysis. Both Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) suggested that the order is 
likely to be 1 or 2, where Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) statistics are both (in 
absolute value) lower than their (asymptotic) 95 percent critical value (-3.5025). It is 
therefore not possible to reject the null of unit root in the three variables at the 5 
percent significant level. The summary of unit root test result was listed on Table 5.1 
from which we can draw the conclusion that none of the three time-series variables are 
stationary. 
Dickey and Fuller (1979) pointed out that the regressions involving time series can 
falsely imply the existence of a meaningful economic relationship if a variable is non- 
stationary, unless it combines with other non-stationary series to form a stationary 
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Chart 5.3: GDP, Capital Stock and Labour Force (in logarithm form) 
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Table 5.1: Unit root test for GDP, Capital Stock and Labour Force (in logarithm 
form) 
original value vs. first difference value 
Variable ADF Statistics Result 95% critical value 
AIC SBC 
GDP -2.9511 -2.9511 -3.5025 
Capital -3.0077 -3.2325 -3.5025 
Labour -1.9639 -1.9639 -3.5025 
AGDP -5.7164 -5.7164 -2.9228 
ACapital -5.0091 -5.0091 -2.9228 
ALabour -6.5612 -6.5612 -2.9228 
Note: AIC = Akaike Infori-nation Criterion; SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
cointegration relationship. Therefore, Engle and Granger (1987) propose the residual- 
based unit root test (EGDF) for cointegration. To perforin a cointegration test, it is 
necessary that the order of integration of all the variables should be the same (Enders, 
1995, p. 219). The order of integration can be defined as the number of times a series 
variable should be differenced to become stationary. By taking the first difference of 
each variable, ADF test indicated that all variables are stationary (see the second half 
of Table 1). In other words, these three variables are integrated of order one I(]). 
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However, since the rationale of EGDF implies that non-I(]) variables have to be taken 
out from the regression function before using cointegration techniques, criticism 
mainly concerns that this arbitrary elimination would cause the serious model 
misspecification while the static OLS regression does not deal with the short-run 
dynamics. Meanwhile, the power of the residual-based test is rather low in small 
sample and less reliable, which inevitably introducing a further degree of uncertainty 
into the analysis of long-run relationship. 
Based on the error correction mechanism interpreted in Chapter 4 (Section 4.2.1), 
ECM in this research is taking the following form: dY, =f (dL,, dK, )+ A(ý,, )+c,. It 
describes the variation of economic output in terms of the variation of exogenous 
factors (Labour and Physical Capital) and the error correction component ( ý, -, 
); 
where dY, dL and dK are the first difference form of GDP, Labour and Capital stock 
respectively, representing the growth rate of these three variables. ý, _, 
is the 
equilibrium error in the model of cointegration, representing the catch-up effect. It is 
measured by the difference between the actual output and the estimated output in their 
t -I period, denoted as Y- Y* . Hence, the coefficient of 
ý, 
t-I -, ,A 
(subject to 
-I <A<0), will be estimated to measure the speed of dynamic adjustment has been 
made towards equilibrium every period. 
In empirical applications, the explanatory variable may influence the dependent 
variable with a time lag . This often necessitates the 
inclusion of lags of the 
explanatory variable in the regression. Meanwhile, given to the consideration that the 
dependent variable may be correlated with lags of itself, the lags of dependent variable 
should be included in the regression as well. These considerations motivate the 
commonly used Autoregressive Distributed Lag of order p and q (ARDL(P, q)), where 
the specification shares the same meaning of ECM but taking the advantage of using 
OLS estimators to present the sign and dimension of long-run parameters. 
Recently, Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) propose a new approach - bounded testing 
approach - to testify the existence of a long-run level relationship. Based on their idea, 
in this empirical study, the estimated function can be interpreted as the following: 
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dY, , ao + alt + OY, -, + 
Oý K, 
-, + 
02Lt-, +D UMMY + 2: dY 
., -j 
+ 2ý dK, -j + 
2ý dL, 
-j + c, j=I j=O j=O 
(5.1) 
where 1) ao is the intercept term and a, is the coefficient of time trend; 
2) 0 is equivalent to A, the error correction coefficient in ECM; 
3) the long-run coefficients of capital stock and labour force input are computed 
as: 9, =-8, =- 
02 
respectively; 00 
4) given to the annual data adopted in this study, k equals one. 
5) parameter DUMMY includes three dummy variables GLF, POP and DUM80, 
which have been defined previously. 
In these circumstances, before computing the long-run coefficients of each variable, it 
is necessary to identify the existence of long-run relationship, i. e. the null hypothesis 
of no levels long-run relationship is HO :0=0, = 0, = 0, and this can be tested using 
the F-test. The distribution of this F-statistic is non-standard but rather includes two 
set of critical value-the upper bound (assuming that all the underlying regressors are 
1(0)) and the lower bound (assuming that all the underlying regressors are I(l)). In this 
case where all the regressors are I(l), this test reduces to the no cointegration test (Ho). 
Given that the number of stochastic regressors is 2, the F-statistic value is 6.1754, 
higher than the upper bound of critical value at 95 percent significant level 5.85, 
indicating that the null hypothesis can be rejected. 
Meanwhile, in long term, the effects of those structural breaks (measured by dummy 
variables POP and DUM80), are believed to be temporary given that the inconsistency 
of data compiling is the major reason for that. The impact of the economic fluctuation 
because of Great Leap Forward event (measured by dummy variable GLF) is also 
assumed to vanish gradually in the long-run dynamic process. Hence, a strong 
evidence of a stable long-run equilibrium can be written as: 
Y-3.3 81 + 0.03 5 3TREND + 0.694 IK + 0.1716L 
The coefficients of K and L (A and 8, ) are calculated by using the formula 
01 
=_ 
02 
where 0 =-0.405 1,01 =0.2812 and 02 =0.0695, obtained from 0 ý)62 05 
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the OLS estimated result based on Eq. 5-1 (they are all significant at 5 percent critical 
level). 
The short-run dynamic stemmed from the error correction mechanism can be written 
as: 
dY = 2.3717 + 0.0352TREND + 0.3129dK + 0.8366dL + 0.0056DUM80 
(0.5874) (0.0083) (0.1258) (0-1905) (0.0276) 
+ 0.0398POP - 0.0892GLF - 0.3332 ý, -, 
(0.041) (0.045) (0.0574) 
where dY, dK and dL denote the growth of output, growth of capital stock and growth 
of labour force respectively; ý,, represents the difference between the actual output 
(LY, ) and the estimated output (LY, *, ) in their t-I period; the coefficient of ý, -, 
is 
the estimated error correction coefficient A. Only GLF dummy variable has been 
discovered with a significant impact upon the short-run dynamic growth process, 
while the structural break caused by inconsistent data compiling has not been found 
correlated with the output growth. 
Combining the long-run equilibrium relationship with short-run dynamic (presented as 
ECM), the estimated result indicates that China's economic output experiences the 
decreasing return to scale as the sum of elasticity of capital stock and labour force 
(A+ 8, ) is less than one. At the same time, it also provides the evidence that in 
China's context, the growth of fixed capital plays a vital role in economic growth 
(lower estimated coefficient of dK), while the contribution from labour force was less 
important (higher estimated coefficient of dL). 
Given that the incredibly fast growing of capital stock is associated with the relatively 
smooth rise of employment, this estimated result seems plausible. However, it has 
been argued that the low estimation for China's labour force is particularly stemmed 
from the bias in the measurement of labour growth in terms of both the quantity of 
labour input as well as the quality improvement, which will be further discussed in the 
following section. Apart from the two key input factors in production process, the 
time trend, representing the technical progress also has a positive and reasonable 
effect on the economic growth, contributing around 3.5 percent rise in the output per 
annum. 
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The error correction coefficient, A, is 0.33 and statistically significant. This 
coefficient presents the extent of 'catch-up' between actual inputs and what could be 
potentially produced, and what is actually produced. More precisely, when the input 
factors are observed increasing faster than output growth, the coefficient equivalent to 
0.33 reflects the input factors have not been fully utilised and the actual output level is 
33 percent lower than what it should be. It is also true when interpreted in the opposite 
way: the economic growth does not drop as much as the input growth slows down. In 
summary, this coefficient reflects that output does not immediately adjust to changes 
in inputs, especially capital inputs; while it may also reflect that inputs do not adjust to 
the variations in demand through which output fluctuates. 
5.4 Sources of GDP Growth 
The estimated parameters displayed in error correction mechanism show the 
coherence with our expectations based on raw data analysis: the major contribution to 
GDP growth derives from the growth of capital stock while the contribution of labour 
force growth was relatively small. To better understand the growth process, it is worth 
looking further into the causes of the growth of capital stock and labour force 
respectively. 
5.4.1 Capital Stock Growth 
As we stated earlier, capital stock growth depends mainly on investment. In the past 
two decades, China has consistently allocated a large share of GDP to investment as 
many other developing countries have done. According to Yeh (2001), the investment 
performance in China has two distinctive aspects. First, China sustains a high level of 
investment rate (in terms of percentage of GDP) though its per capita income is far 
4 below many other Southeast Asian countries in 2004 . 
Second, China's investment 
rate has remained quite stable over time since the implementation of open-door policy 
4 The investment rate of China in 2004 ranked 4 in the world (those countries with no information 
available excluded), while its per capita income ranked 122. Information derived from World Factbook, 
online version, htlp: //www. cia. pov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2185rank. html 
h! tp: //www. lexas. us/worldfactbook/economy. asp? countEy=Chin , accessed on IP March, 2005, 
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in 1978, despite its economic system underwent dramatic reforms and its neighbour 
countries has been hit by a rigorous and contagious financial criSIS5 
Two investment sources have been particularly important in sustaining a high and 
stable investment rate in China: the high household savings and the increasing volume 
of foreign capital inflows mainly in terms of FDI. In the post-reform period, domestic 
savings, which can be divided into household bank savings and legal entity deposits 
(the latter one includes registered companies, enterprises, societies and government 
organizations), raised from RMB113.54 billion in 1979 to RMB1080.62 trillion in 
2002. In particular, it is worth noticing that the household saving has a rapidly rising 
share of total domestic deposits. From Chart 5.4, it is clear that the share of household 
savings accounts for less than 20 percent of total domestic savings in 1979; by 2002, 
the share increased to nearly 60 percent. 
The rapid growth of household savings can be attributed to the growth of personal 
income resulting from economic reform. In 1979, the total personal income was 
RMB228.5 billion; per capital personal disposable income was just RMB237.4. Up to 
2002, the per capita personal disposable income was thirty times up to RMB7703.8 6. 
Consequently, the individual saving deposits in bank as percentage of GDP rose from 
16.9 in 1986 to 76.9 in 2002. A number of factors can explain this high household 
savings rate. Apart from Chinese people's traditional character of being frugal, the 
present motivation of individual to save money is to set aside resources for children's 
education, medical service expenses and retirement. Meanwhile, since consumer 
credit scheme is either unavailable or fragile, Chinese people would rather accumulate 
money for large lump-sum expenditure such as purchases of houses, cars and other 
consumer durables. Nonetheless, it is quite natural for the households to save more for 
various purposes based on the precaution against uncertainties. 
Regarding the foreign capital inflows, there has been a sharp increase since 1985, 
particularly in the case of direct investments (see Table 5-2). The total amount of 
foreign capital flow increased considerably within the five-year period from 1990 to 
5 Despite the significant contraction of investment growth rate in 1989 due to the Tianam-nen Square 
Event, the investment rate did not experience much fluctuation since 1978. See Chart 6.1. 
6 Figures achieved from China's Marketisation Reform Achievement (Zhongguo Shichanghua Gaige de 
Jixiao), online accessed www. jixi-com. cn/news detail. jsp? keyjjo=553 8. 
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Chart 5.4: Structural Change of Gross Saving 
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Note: Total domestic savings refer to the sum of household savings and legal entities (including 
enterprises and government) savings in State Banks. 
Source: Processed on the basis of dataftom Almanac of China's Finance and Banking, various issues. 
Table 5.2: Foreign Capital Inflow in Major Forms, 1985-2002 (Billion US$) 
1985 1990 1995 2002 
Total 4.65 10.29 48.13 55.01 
Loans 2.69 6.54 10.33 0 
Direct Investments 1.66 3.49 37.52 52.74 
Others 0.3 0.27 0.28 2.27 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China, volumes of 1986,1991,1996,2003. 
1995, with an annual increase rate up to 36 percent. Within the three forms of inflow, 
not only the real amount of FDI increased dramatically, 50 times up from 1985 
(USDI. 7 billion) to 2002 (USD52.7 billion), but also the FDI share of total capital 
inflow climbed up from 36 percent in 1985 to 78 percent in 1995, then even further up 
to 96 percent in 2002; at the same time, foreign loans as a popular form of capital 
inflow has vanished since 2001. These figures indicate a perceived and important fact 
that direct investments are less volatile than foreign loans provided to China's less 
sophisticated financial system. China has been able to exert a pull on large volumes of 
FDI for several reasons. The first is the attractiveness of China's large potential 
market given to a population of 1.3 billion. Then, taking the advantages of the 
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relatively low labour and land costs becomes the next reason for many manufacturers 
have been moving their facilities from overseas into mainland China. Furthermore, the 
state government adopted various measures to encourage foreign investment such as 
tax reduction or exemption for certain period. 
5.4.2 Labour Force Growth 
As Chart 5.1 and the estimated coefficient of labour force growth show, the 
contribution of labour input to GDP growth is relatively modest. However, Yeh (2001) 
argues that the low estimation for China's labour force is particularly stemmed from 
the downward bias in the measurement of labour growth. In addition, the changes in 
the quality of labour and the intensity of work have been treated as another possibility 
to the underestimated contribution from the labour force input. 
In the present data, labour input is measured in terms of the number of persons 
employed rather than person-hours worked due to the lack of information. There is a 
strong likelihood that the actual average hours worked per worker have increased in 
the post-reform stage despite the low growth rate of number of worker employed. In 
the past two decades, as a result of diversification of ownership and fast expansion of 
non-state sector (particularly the township and village enterprises), employment in the 
non-state sector has been growing faster than in the state sector. For instance, within 
about a decade (1994-2003), the urban employment in state-owned units dropped 
nearly 35 percent; while only 3.9 percent of urban workforce was assigned in 
collective-owned units compared with nearly 20 percent in 1994. The urban 
employment in other enterprises with all the other types of ownerships has increased 
by more than 45 percent in last decade, much faster than the growth in the previous 
decade (20 percent rise from 1985 to 1994, see Table 5.3). 
In addition, it is perceived that the working hour and working intensity in non-state 
sector are generally much longer and tougher than those in state sectors. China's 
Labour Law explicitly stipulate that employees should work no more than eight hours 
per day or 40 hours per week; no authorised prolonging of hours worked may be made 
by any employer. If in any circumstance extension of hours has to be pursued, wage 
payments to labourers should be no less than 150 percent of their contract wages. 
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Table 5.3: Urban Employment and Composition by Ownership of Economic 
Entities since Economic Reform (%, Total=100) 
Number of State-owned Collective- Others* 
Employee owned 
(million) 
1978 95.1 78.3 21.5 0.2 
1985 128.1 70.2 25.9 3.9 
1994 186.5 60.1 17.6 22.3 
2003 256.4 26.8 3.9 69.3 
* Other ownership includes private enterprises, self-employed individuals, joint-ownership, share 
holding corporations and foreign funded units. 
Source: Processed on the bases of datafrom Statistical Yearbook of China, 2004, pp. 120-12 1. 
However, according to a most recent survey conducted in Beijing (June, 2004)7, the 
average days worked each week in Beijing is 5.9; additionally, more than 44 percent 
of the labourers work seven days a week and over 10 hours a day, which hugely 
exceeds the statutory hours of work. Nevertheless, the average wage of these labourers 
is even lower than the local average wage level. The survey also discovers that the 
prolonging of hours worked is extremely serious in such sectors as construction, 
wholesale and retail and restaurants, where private-owned enterprises are the major 
operators and more than 60 percent of the labourers work over 10 hours a day and 
seven days a week. The similar phenomenon has been widely found all over the 
country, particularly in the south and east coastal areas where the economic growth is 
overwhelmingly rapid. Along with the increasingly high unemployment pressure, the 
labour market remains as a demand-side market where the bargaining power of 
labourers is rather weak. 
Furthermore, underestimated growth accounting figures may also suggest that the 
indirect contribution of the large labour supply to GDP growth has been substantial. 
For the purpose of retaining China's comparative advantage in international market, 
the real wages has been kept low for a long time. Meanwhile, since we have neither 
distinguished employment by economic sector/industry nor considered the migration 
phenomenon, we neglected the effect from economic structural change and labour 
mobility on national aggregated level. Apparently, the rapid development and growth 
of Tertiary Industry increasingly require more labour force input. Partly due to the 
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agricultural reform, extensive amount of labour force has been set free from the land 
and rushed into urban area. Its contribution is significantly found in the growth of 
construction industry and many other labour-intense sectors. Similarly, as the growth 
disparity between coastal region and interior area has been enlarged considerably, the 
surplus labour that migrated to the coastal areas could have displaced the better- 
qualified workers that the latter could move to more productive jobs. 
5.5 Investment Efficiency 
When evaluating investment efficiency in macroeconomic ternis, two measurements 
can serve as the vital criteria. The first one is the 'coefficient of investment in fixed 
assets (CIFA)' which is obtained the dividing of annul increment of GDP with 
investment. This is rather a straightforward index to represent the investment 
efficiency and officially computed and published by NBSC. In the past decade, the 
efficiency index kept decreasing dramatically from 0.70 in 1993 to 0.125 in 1999 
while the ratio slightly increased to 0.172 in 2002, which means every 100 Yuan value 
of investment produced the increment of GDP by 70 yuan in 1993, however the same 
amount of investment would only bring about 17.2 yuan increment of GDP in 2002 
(see Table 5.4). According to Dr. Weitang Fan, the Director of the Research Centre of 
Energy Resource, the consumption of energy resources in China is intensely higher 
than that in developed countries and the average level of the world: it is 3 times as 
much as in US while 7.2 times higher than in Japan 8. 
The second measurement is the 'incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR)' (see, for 
example, Prinsloo and Smith, 1996; Easterly, 1997; Hanmer and Naschold, 2000; 
Kwan, 2004). It is computed by the dividing the ratio of investment to GDP with real 
economic growth. This ratio gives an indication of the amount of capital utilised per 
unit of output and the smaller it is, the more efficient the investment. Because China 
invested 40.5 percent of its GDP and achieved 8 percent growth on average between 
7 See Liang, S. T. 'The Awkward Labour Law of China (Laodong Fa de Ganga yu Bei'ai)', editorial on 
China's HR Web, I November 2004, hltp: //www. hr. com. cn/law/law04O8 1 0/detail. php? id= 17516, 
accessed on 21 March 2005. 
8 Further details can be referred to the 'The Fierce Waste of China's Energy Resource (Guo nei neng 
yuan hangfei yan zhong)', World Business Comments, 26hMarch, 2004. 
hl! p: //energy. icxo. com/htmlnews/2004/03/26/136525. htm. 
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Table 5.4: Coefficient of Investment in Fixed Assets, 1981-2002 
Year GDP 
increment 
of GDP 
(a) 
investment in 
Fixed Assets 
(b) 
Coefficient of 
investment in 
Fixed Assets 
(a/b) 
1981 4862.4 344.6 961 0.359 
1982 5294.7 432.3 1230.4 0.351 
1983 5934.5 639.8 1430.1 0.447 
1984 7171 1236.5 1832.87 0.675 
1985 8964.4 1793.4 2543.2 0.705 
1986 10202.2 1237.8 3120.6 0.397 
1987 11962.5 1760.3 3791.7 0.464 
1988 14928.3 2965.8 4753.8 0.624 
1989 16909.2 1980.9 4410.4 0.449 
1990 18547.9 1638.7 4517 0.363 
1991 21617.8 3069.9 5594.5 0.549 
1992 26638.1 5020.3 8080.1 0.621 
1993 34634.4 7996.3 13072.3 0.612 
1994 46759.4 12125 17042.1 0.711 
1995 58478.1 11718.7 20019.3 0.585 
1996 67884.6 9406.5 22913.5 0.411 
1997 74462.6 6578 24941.1 0.264 
1998 78345.2 3882.6 28406.2 0.137 
1999 82067.5 3722.3 29854.7 0.125 
2000 89468.1 7400.6 32917.7 0.225 
2001 97314.8 7846.7 37213.5 0.211 
2002 104790.6 7475.8 43499.91 0.172 
Note: Both GDP and investment value are termed in current prices, 100 million. 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Investment in Fixed Assets, 1950-1995 &2003. 
Table 5.5: China's Incremental Capital-Output Ratio 
- Comparison with Japan, Korea and Taiwan during their High-Growth Periods 
Investment/GDP GDP growth ICOR 
N rate (%) 
a b a/b 
91-95 39.6 11.6 3.4 
China 96-00 37.6 8.4 4.5 
01-03 40.5 8.0 5.1 
1991-2003 39.1 9.5 4.1 
Japan 32.6 10.2 3.2 (1961-70) 
South Korea 29.6 9.2 3.2 (1981-90) 
Taiwan 21.9 8.0 2 7 (1981-90) . 
Source: Based on the official statistics of each country derived from International Financial 
Statistics, the IMF online statistic database. 
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2001 and 2003, the capital coefficient came to 5.1 (see Table 5.5). In other words, in 
order to boost growth by one percentage point, the equivalent of 5.1 percent of GDP 
had to be newly invested. China's ICOR has been on an upward trend since the 1990s, 
indicating a decline in investment efficiency. Furthermore, China's average ICOR for 
the years 1991 to 2003 was 4.1, which was comparatively higher than that for Japan, 
South Korea and Taiwan when they were experiencing high economic growth. 
Despite the fact that Japan's growth during the 1960s was 10.2 percent, higher than 
that of present-day China, the ratio of investment to GDP was 32.6 percent, yielding a 
low ICOR of 3.2. ICORs for South Korea and Taiwan in the 1980s were 3.2 and 2.7, 
respectively, much lower than that for China since the 1990s. 
The conclusion can be drawn that the investment in China is severely underutilised 
and generating a huge waste on resources. It thus becomes the main reason for the 
lower productivity of input factors. Though the economic growth in China has 
maintained at over 8 percent per annum, it is built up on the cost of successively 
inefficient investment. 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the economic growth performance on national level during the 
past half century, including the general analysis on the role of financial sector, in 
particular the banking industry, in the process of China's economic development. The 
growth pattern in China has been identified as an investment-led development model. 
By exploring the benefit of ECM, both short-term dynamic and long-term equilibrium 
of economic growth in China have been thoroughly demonstrated. The statistical 
result strongly supported that China's economic growth is driven by the quickly 
accumulated capital stock attributed to the rapid increase of fixed assets investment. In 
order to capture the influence of certain structural breaks, three dummy variables were 
introduced into the estimated function. However, none of them was observed 
significant impact upon the long-run economic growth. 
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The contribution to the national economic growth has been illustrated in three aspects, 
including the capital stock accumulation and labour force improvement. It has been 
asserted that the dramatic increase of savings and FDI are two major investment 
sources. The contribution of labour input to GDP growth is statistically modest. It has 
been argued that this result is underestimated which is stemmed from the bias in 
measurement of labour growth on one hand. On the other hand, the changes in the 
quality of labour and the intensity of work have been treated as another possibility to 
the underestimated contribution from the labour force input. 
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Chapter 6: Economic growth pattern and banking 
contribution to economic growth in China - panel data analysis 
6.1 Introduction 
sector 
As discussed in Methodology and Data Description chapter (Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2), 
purely cross-section analysis techniques were widely used in the early stage of 
research on the relationship between financial development and economic growth (see, 
for instance, Jao, 1976; Gelb, 1989; Odedokun, 1996 etc. ). With the developments in 
econometric techniques, panel data analysis is apparently the more sophisticated and 
powerful technique which can be utilised in the investigations of this issue. As 
mentioned earlier, cross-country data of developed countries, of developing countries, 
across developed and less-developed countries, have been thoroughly examined and 
illustrated. However, not many attempts have been made to conduct the study over a 
consolidated data sample with cross section (province) and time-series. 
This study is the first one to use panel technique to analyse the financial 
intermediaries and growth relationship based on the following considerations. China is 
a huge country with 31 provinces. The stability feature of the banking system and 
labour market provide the preconditions for establishing a data sample combined with 
cross province and time-series 1. In these circumstances, the nation can be regarded as 
31 relatively independent provinces, where the individual feature of each province has 
particular influence over its own economic performance. For this reason it is 
reasonable to treat each province as an 'observation' and to explore the links between 
growth and financial development at the provincial level. Hence the panel analysis 
technique is applicable. Given to the advantages of panel data technique, we will 
develop a three-sector production function with the application of China's 
cross-provincial data. 
The rest of the material will be organised as follows. Section 6.2 specifies the 
estimated framework of the empirical study. This will be followed by a discussion 
1 For details, see Section 4.2.2.1 in Chapter 4. 
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over financial inten-nediation (mainly banking sector) indicators in Section 6.3. 
Section 6.4 - 6.6 demonstrate the statistical result based on using the panel analysis 
technique from three aspects: the economic growth pattern in China (Section 6.4), the 
impact of banking sector development on economic growth (Section 6.5) and the 
impact of direct and indirect financing on economic growth (Section 6.6). Section 6.7 
provides the summary. 
6.2 Model Specification and Classification of Economic Zones 
6.2.1 Model Specification 
Economic growth is believed to be influenced by financial development indicators 
along with many others, and there is no standard framework which has been used. 
Generally, economic growth is designed to be a function of a set of financial 
development indicators (F), while adding a set of other variables (X) into the 
estimated equation. This can be expressed in the following form: 
Economic Growth =f (F, X). 
The set of control variables has been expanded to include various information such as 
fiscal surplus (Aziz and Duenwld, 2002), human capital (Benhabib and Spiegel, 2000), 
FDI (Aziz and Duenwld, 2002; Boyreau-Debray, 2003), export (Odedokun, 1996; 
Ram, 1999), private sector productivity (Chen and Feng, 2000; Boyreau-Debray, 2003) 
and many others depending on individual research purpose. Moreover, another 
instructive development is to construct the framework on the basis of neoclassical 
production function (see, for instance, Bencivenga and Smith, 1991; Benhabib and 
Spiegel, 2000; Li and Liu, 2001; Fan et al., 2003; etc. ). 
National output grew at average 9.8 percent per annum. from 1984 to 2002, and the 
economy has also undergone dramatic and continuing structural changes. The share of 
agriculture has declined as the manufacturing and services sectors have grown much 
faster. Therefore, we are interested in evaluating the impact of structural change on 
economic growth and whether there are differences between sectors over, for example, 
rate of technical change. 
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Based on the works done by Odedokun (1996) and repeated by many other 
researchers (such as Ram, 1999; Aziz and Duenwald, 2000), economIc growth is 
developed as a function of a series of input factors, which has a general form 
presented as: 
f (Xt 
ý F, Z, C, ) (6.1) 
where k is the growth variable, measured by GDP growth on province level. X is 
the set of standard neoclassical growth factors, including the growth of labour force 
and capital stock. Both k and X are defined in log-differences. F is the financial 
intermediation variable of interest which will be measured by several banking 
indicators (details on this aspect will be furthered illustrated in Section 6.3.1). Z is a 
set of other control variables, including FDI, Education, and industrial ratios 
representing the effect of industrial structural shift on economic growth. Apart from 
the sign and dimension of the coefficient of financial development variable, our 
interest also lies on the performance of other variables included in the estimated 
equation, i. e. the set of neoclassical growth factors and control variables. 
It needs to be borne in mind that total investment fund include both domestic funds 
and foreign funds. Since the implementation of open-door policy, foreign capital turns 
out to be a vital resource of the domestic investment funds. China has become the 
world's top recipient of foreign direct investments (FDI) among the developing 
countries. FDI is investment undertaken by foreign investors in the form of. i) 
acquiring substantial shares in domestic companies; ii) entering into partnerships with 
domestic companies through joint ventures; or iii) establishing the solely 
foreign-owned enterprises in China. Nevertheless, the contribution of foreign funds 
varies over time and provinces (see Table 6.1). Generally speaking, foreign funds 
investment increased dramatically since mid-1990s while contracted gradually 
afterwards. The coastal regions (such as Fujian and Shanghai) have been regarded as 
the more desirable area to attract foreign capital than interior regions (such as 
Liaoning and Qinghai). 
In order to identify the influence of domestic investment on economic growth, it is 
necessary to exclude the impact of foreign funds. A plausible way to capture the effect 
of foreign funds is to introduce the ratio of FDI to total fixed assets investment as the 
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Table 6.1: Contribution of Foreign Funds to the Total Investment in Fixed Assets 
(%) - nation and selected provinces/municipal (1995 -2003) 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Nation 11.20 11.80 10.60 9.10 6.70 5.10 4.60 4.60 4.40 
Fujian 22.73 25.29 24.50 22.84 23.05 24.23 24.14 25.61 22.63 
Shanghai 9.71 14.37 13.29 12.87 13.99 7.23 5.66 4.15 4.18 
Liaoning 12.70 10.60 14.00 9.00 6.40 5.80 3.80 4.50 2.80 
Qinghai 0.65 3.13 2.39 3.00 0.77 1.40 1.08 1.00 1.48 
Source: China Statistic Yearbook, 2004 (electronic version), statistical yearbook of individual 
province - Fujian, Shanghai, Liaoning and Qinghai, 2004. 
control variable into the estimated model (Eq. 6.1). However, given that these two 
variables are compiled in different currencies, annual FDI needs to be transformed 
into domestic currency on a constant price basis. The transfon-nation technique has 
been demonstrated in Section 4.3.4. 
It has been widely accepted that the quality of labour force would have a vital impact 
upon the productivity of labour input, consequently having a significant contribution 
to real sector performance. Hence, it is also worth controlling the quality of labour 
force where the Education variable is the proxy used in this empirical study. Although 
a few other possibilities can be adopted as the proxy of the education variable, it is 
appropriately measured as the annual growth rate of the ratio of enrolment in higher 
education institutions over the enrolment in secondary education schools. The 
selection of education proxy has also been demonstrated in Section 4.3.4. 
A panel regression equation for estimating Eq. 6.1 can be written as the following: 
Yit =a+ ßXit + Ivfit + 
bZi, + ci. + eit (6.2) 
Y, t =a+, 
OXi, +, vFi, + bZi, + d., + ei, (6.3) 
Y, 
t =a+ 
ßX, 
t +, vFit + 
gZit + ci. + d»t + ei, (6.4) 
There are two additional coefficients ci and dt to be estimated. The estimates of 
ci represent the mean differences across different provinces; the estimates of 
d, represents the mean differences in different time periods. Therefore, provincial 
fixed effects are considered in Eq. 6.2, time-specific fixed effects are concerned in 
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Eq. 6.3, and both provincial and time-specific fixed effects are taken into Eq. 6.4. The 
concept of using fixed effects is similar to the inclusion of dummy variables. 
In contrast to fixed effects, a model with random effects for panel data is: 
Y =a+ +, vFi, + &i, +uj. + v., +e (6.5) it 
fixit 
it 
The random error ui is the randomness related to province i but not related to time, 
while random error v, has the reverse condition. Three kinds of randomness, ui, v,, 
and ej, are integrated in the regression and the variances of these random errors are 
estimated. In addition to Eq. 6.5, we can also examine the random effects ui or v, 
separately. 
Eq. 6.2 - 6.5 are mainly estimated using the statistic software package Limdep. Given 
to its powerful property, both one-way and two-way fixed-effect and random-effect 
estimation is undertaken using Limdep. The rationale of panel data analysis has been 
thoroughly illustrated in Section 4.2.2. Hausman test will provide the evidence of 
model selection - FEM or REM. Next, we aim to test two hypotheses. First, whether 
the structural shift affects the economic output growth. Second, whether the financial 
sector generates a significant contribution to the output growth will be testified on 
both national level and the provincial level. 
6.2.2 Classification of economic zones 
Moreover, the rapidly increasing disparity between the coastal regions and interior 
provinces stimulates the concerns on the growth pattern in different regions in China; 
whether the local financial development has a same impact on the economic growth in 
an individual region. In order to inspect the growth pattern in different regions, we 
need to make a classification of economic regions in China first. 
Initially, when we consider the regional economy-related issues, 27 provinces and 4 
municipalities were either dichotomised into a coastal region (eight provinces + three 
municipalities) and an interior region (19 provinces + one municipality), or 
alternatively separated into three economic zones, i. e. East, Middle and West. This 
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type of classification roughly indicated the economic development level throughout 
the nation: rich in the East, poor in the West, moderate In the Middle. However, the 
relevance of this standard classification has been criticised as it did not take the 
differences in various aspects into account, such of those as natural resources 
distribution, initial economic endowments, economic structure, industrialisation level, 
residential consumption price index and etc. Thus, it would result in the 
misunderstanding of the real variation between regions and consequently lead to the 
misguidance in policy formulation. 
Currently, a more scientific and applicable approach has been exerted based not only 
on the integrated comprehension of the natural and economic features and advantages 
of individual province but also the interaction and correlation among the neighbouring 
provinces, by which means 30 provinces in China can be separated into eight 
economic regionS2 . Hence, 
based on this new classification scheme, we duplicate the 
estimated equation for eight regional data separately and provide a thorough 
comparison analysis among them. Those regions and provinces contained are: 
" South Coastal Region (SCR): Guangdong, Fujian, Hainan 
" East Coastal Region (ECR): Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang 
" North Coastal Region (NCR): Shangdong, Hebei, Beijing, Tianjin 
" Northeast Zone (NEZ): Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang 
" Southwest Zone (SWZ): Guangxi, Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan+Chongqing 
" Northwest Zone (NWZ): Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Tibet, Xijiang 
Middle Reaches of Yangtze River (YZR): Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, Anhui 
Middle Reaches of Yellow River (YR): Shanxi, Shaanxi, Henan, Inner Mongolia 
6.3 Indicators of financial intermediation 
6.3.1 The existing banking indicators 
A number of researchers having attempted to inspect the impact of financial 
2 This rationale is first provoked by Shangtong Li (2004), the Master of Research Centre of 
Development Strategy and Regional Economy which is subordinated to State Council. This 
classification standard is regarded as the basis for the formulation of the Eleventh Five-year Plan which 
largely emphasises on the regional economic development and lessening the disparity between regions. 
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intermediaries on economic growth, and three indicators of banking sector 
development are traditionally used in their cross-country studies which are defined as 
follows (see, for example, Levine, 1997; Levine et al., 1999; Demirguc-Kunt, 2000). 
The first indicator, usually termed as 'financial depth', is measured by the ratio of 
liquid liabilities to GDP, including currency and demand deposits of banks and 
non-bank financial institutions (M2). The essential assumption is that the size of the 
financial sector is positively influencing the quantity and extent of financial services. 
The second indicator measures the importance of commercial banks with respect to 
central bank in allocating savings by computing the ratio of commercial bank assets to 
commercial banks and central bank assets. It implicitly assumes that the commercial 
banks should perfon-n better than the central bank in allocating financial resources. 
Central bank has been assigned the authority as the monetary policy maker and 
instructor and the supervisor of financial market rather than a profit-oriented business 
entity. Therefore, central bank does not allocate financial resources directly. Its 
general task is to maintain the stability of domestic financial market and smooth 
functioning of the financial and banking system. According to Levine (1996), 
commercial banks are more likely to be good at mobilising the savings and facilitating 
the trading, hedging, diversifying and pooling the risks than central bank. 
The last indicator of financial intermediation is the ratio of credit granted by 
commercial banks to the private sector to GDP. The underlying assumption is that 
financial systems that allocate more credit to private firms are more engaged in 
researching firms, exerting control, providing risk management services, mobilising 
savings, and facilitating transactions than financial systems that simply funnel credit 
to the government or state-owned enterprises (SOEs). It is argued that the banks will 
lose their awareness against financial and managerial risk due to the implicit bailout 
support from governments upon the credit assigned to the governmental institutions 
and SOEs. In these circumstances, it is believed that the higher proportion of private 
credits will enhance caution in risk prevention and risk monitoring and control. 
Consequently, it will help to enhance the quality of bank credits thereby supporting 
the economic growth. 
6.3.1 Five alternative banking indicators 
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More analysis on the application on these three indicators will be illustrated further in 
the following chapter, where we will study the impact of entire financial system on 
economic growth in China, including the performance of banking sector and securities 
market. Our concerns here, however, rather concentrate on whether these three 
indicators are suitable and applicable to our particular cross-provincial hypothesis 
testing. Based on a careful research on the data sources, none of the three banking 
development indicators is available on the provincial level. Therefore, we have to 
build up our own indicators corresponding as closely as possible to the ones used in 
cross-country analysis. Provided to the available information, the following five 
indicators are likely to be the most appropriate. 
6.3.1.1 SIZE and CENTRAL 
Since we could not find specific data on M2 for each province, we use the ratio of 
total deposits of the banking system (at the provincial level) to GDP (in the 
corresponding province) as our first indicator to measure the size of the local banking 
sector (SIZE). Moreover, given that the focus in the empirical study concentrates on 
the banking sector first, the ratio of bank deposits to GDP is more plausible measure 
the size of banking sector on provincial level since M2 includes cash and notes as well 
as bank deposits. Similarly, central bank credit is not available at the province level 
either. Hence, we use the ratio of loans to deposits of the State Banks as a proxy for 
central bank lending to the provinces (CENTRAL)3 . The 
idea of using CENTRAL is 
to gauge the ratio of reserves to deposits, where the reserves of the commercial banks 
come from the central bank. In China, it has been found that the volume of deposit is 
determined by economic activity, while the volume of loans was largely affected by 
policy objectives through the credit plan and quota. The national quota of credit 
volume had been set by the headquarter of each commercial bank, and thereby being 
assigned to their corresponding provincial branches based on the volume allotted in 
previous years. According to the research findings of Nicolas Lardy in 1998, some fast 
growing provinces could have a low credit quota and be constrained in their lending 
relative to the rapid growth of their deposits. Meanwhile, banks in slower growing 
regions could be allotted high quotas with insufficient local deposits to finance their 
3 The idea here comes from the study of Lardy (1998), Dayal-Gulati and Hussain (2002), 
Boyreau-Debray (2003). 
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lending under the support of additional funds from central bank. Hence, the ratio of 
loans to deposits can be interpreted as a measure of interregional fund allocation, as 
the State Banks are assigned with greater flexibility to use within bank transfers to 
adjust regional needs (Boyreau-Debray, 2003). 
6.3.1.2 LGDP 
The third indicator of financial intennediation is the ratio of bank loans to GDP 
(LGDP). The loans here prominently refer to the credits granted by the Overall 
Financial Institutions 4. Ideally, this indicator should be measured by the ratio of credit 
to state (or non-state) enterprises to GDP. However, Chinese statistics did not provide 
any information on credit allocation between state-owned and non-state-owned 
enterprises in the early years of the sample. Though the information on bank credits 
has been specified more explicitly since 2000, the statistical standard is not unified in 
all provinces, resulting in the unbalanced dataset for every province. Thus, we are 
more interested in evaluating the primary function of banking sector in channelling 
investment funds first. 
6.3.1.3 CONCENTRATION 
The fourth indicator is introduced to evaluate the intensity of competition in China's 
banking sector. We are interested in assessing whether the change of the structure of 
banking sector as a result of competition affects the local economic growth in China. 
When the People's Bank of China was granted the authority of a central bank in 1984, 
its commercial operations were transferred to four specialised banks and each of them 
was authorised in a particular area: the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) for the rural 
sector, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) for the industrial sector, 
the People's Construction Bank of China (PCBC) for long-term investment and the 
Bank of China (BOC) for foreign exchange. Step by step, these four initially 
specialised banks were allowed to compete for deposits and loans in each other's 
previously monopolised market. Enterprises are also allowed to open more than one 
account in different banks. Despite the existing evidence indicates that the four 
4 Overall Financial Institution is the broadest concept in China's banking sector, including state-owned 
and state-held banks as well as non-bank financial institutions, which has been fully explained and 
defined in the Data Description chapter. 
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state-owned banks largely maintained their operation in the originally specialised 
areas, the development of new financial institutions, including rural and urban credit 
cooperatives, non-state-owned commercial banks (such as Merchant Bank of China, 
Everbright Bank of China etc. ), regional commercial banks and non-banking financial 
institutions, has severely enhanced the native competition for deposits. 
Moreover, after China's WTO entrance, the restrictions over foreign banks and 
financial institutions operations on domestic currency will be gradually removed. 
Consequently, increasing competition for domestic deposits and credit market shares 
may also come from foreign large and sophisticated financial institutions. Since the 
late 1980s, qualified foreign banks and financial institutions commenced setting up 
their branches and/or representative offices in a number of major cities in China. 
Under the full supervision and administration of state government, they have been 
strictly excluded from operating the renminbi business in any occasions, neither 
absorbing the deposit nor assigning credits. 2005 will be seen as the milestone for 
foreign financial institutions as restrictions will be eventually abolished in this year 
and foreign banks will be entitled to national treatment. The general consensus was 
that these foreign financial institutions would rapidly increase their market share 
depending on their diversified product options and higher quality of service, thus 
generating competitive pressure to native banking sector. 
The concentration of banking sector may contribute either a negative or a positive 
effect upon economic growth. On the one hand, a high degree of concentration 
introduces inefficiency that would harm firms accessing to credit, thus hampering 
economic growth (Pagano, 1993). On the other hand, empirical evidence suggest that 
the banks with monopoly power would have greater incentive to establish and 
maintain a close lending relationship with their credit clients, which in turn promotes 
enterprises' access to investment funds (Peterson and Rajan, 1995). By using a 
cross-country dataset over the period 1989-1996, Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) find 
that bank concentration has a negative effect on industrial growth, while the 
relationship appeared to be weakly negative when a dataset of 66 countries with a time 
range of 15 years (1980-1995) was observed by Levin (2000). Following these 
arguments, there two main outcomes derive from the weakening the monopolistic 
position of China's state-owned banking sector. First, increased banking sector 
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competition provides greater incentive for state banks to improve the efficiency of 
financial resources allocation and credit monitoring, in which circumstance the private 
sector is believed to benefit most from, thereby promoting the economic growth. 
Second, increased competition from non-state banks may also lead to a drop of saving 
deposits in the state banks, consequently threatening their ability to channel funds to 
state-owned sectors. 
We introduce a Herfindahl index of banking sector (CONCENTRATION) to represent 
the banking market structure in the provinces concentration (Boyreau-Debray, 2003). 
The index is computed as the following equation: 
2 
H Dj, Dj, i't =I i't 
j=l j=l 
n 
where D_,.,,., t represents the 
deposits for bank J in province i at time t Dj, i, t 
is 
j=1 
the total amount of deposits for n banks equivalent to the total deposits for local 
branches of State Banks at the same time. It is obvious that the index equals one in 
case of pure monopoly and l/n where shares of deposits distribute evenly among the 
n banks. The available data allows us to distinguish seven banks (financial 
institutions): the four state-owned banks (ABC, ICBC, PCBC and BOC), the Bank of 
Communication, the Saving Deposit Agencies of Postal Office (SDAPO) and the 
"other financial institutions', 5. Unlike the experiment done by Boyreau-Debray (2003), 
we identify the seven categories of banks (financial institutions) within the concept of 
State Banks, thereby excluding rural credit cooperatives but distinguish an important 
component, the SDAPO. SDAPO is authorised to conduct the deposit business 
exclusively. Consequently, it gathers substantial investment credits that cannot be 
distributed by SDAPO but transferred among the state-owned banks via the central 
bank adjustment and instruction. Using the deposits of each financial institution, we 
compute concentration index for each of 29 regions 6. 
6.3.1.4 S OB 
5 The "other financial institutions" include three policy banks, i. e. Import-Export Bank of China, 
Agriculture Development Bank of China and National Development Bank, and CITIC Industrial Bank. 
The establishment time of these banks differed from each other. Not enough data for each of them 
started from the sample period. Thus, they were combined together and regarded as the eighth category 
in State Banks. 
6 Due to the insufficient data for Tibet, this region has been taken out from the computation of index. 
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The fifth and last indicator helps us to inspect the performance of the four state-owned 
banks respect to the Overall Financial Institutions, which is defined as the credits from 
four state-owned banks to the credits from total local financial institutions, denoted as 
SOB. The application of the last indicator is likely to be a complement to the third 
indicator, while has a similar implication as using the fourth one. State Banks and the 
Overall Financial Institutions have been distinguished in Section 4.3.1.3: State Banks 
consist of the four state-owned banks, policy banks and state-held banks. SOB not 
only measures the level of concentration of the local financial market, but also 
evaluates the efficiency of state-owned banks' operation. By investigating the banking 
sector as an individual industry, there is likelihood that the higher market share the 
state-owned banks take, the lower efficiency the banking industry makes. In other 
words, it is the 'soft-budget constraint' phenomenon existing in financial market that 
the discussion will be further provided in the following section. 
We believe that the state-owned banks lack of incentive to improve their management 
skills and risk prevention and controlling because of the certainty that central bank 
will bailout the state-owned banks whenever they get into trouble, which is a similar 
mechanism working in the operation of SOEs. The primary function of state banks 
was to channel savings to SOEs. For instance, over 80 percent of the total amount of 
loans from state banks was extended to SOEs in the late 1990s (Lardy, 1998). Even 
though the recent rapid reform in state banking sector concentrates on the profit 
maximisation and strengthening manager's obligation, the state banks still prefer 
SOEs being their customer mainly due to the higher confidence achieved 
governments' more or less explicit bailout scheme towards SOEs. By contrast, credits 
to non-state-owned enterprises are perceived as more risky because of higher 
information cost and moral hazard. The higher ratio of SOB implies more reliance the 
local banking sector places upon the central bank support and the less efficient role it 
plays. As the state-owned banks are forced or more willing to serve SOE-clients, 
consequently, the economic growth of a province is supposed to be dragged back due 
to a poor functioning market of both financial sector and real production sector. 
6.4 Statistic analysis - economic growth pattern in China 
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For an empirical application of Eq-6-1 to China's output growth, the estimation is 
conducted on the basis of a panel dataset across 27 provinces and three municipalities 
from 1985 to 2002. The dependent variable in these regressions is the annual output 
growth for each province in different years (GY). The independent variables include 
the growth of labour force growth (GL), the growth of capital stock (GK), FDI and 
Education indicators and the proxy of structural shift. 
Table 6.2 shows the regression result under different assumptions of fixed and random 
effects. The column labelled (a) refers the estimated results including the industrial 
weight values, where (b) column displays the estimated results without weight values. 
Given the different types of fixed and random effects used in the regressions, Table 
6.2 shows the regression results under different assumption of fixed and random 
effects. Before we inspect the perfonnance of each estimator, it is necessary to 
identify which model is the most appropriate for our estimation. Hence, we use both 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) Test and Hausman Test, where the former is used to 
distinguish the common ordinary least square model and panel model, the latter is 
applied to testify the selection between Fixed-effect (FE) Model and Random-effect 
(RE) Model. 
Given to the low mobility of labour and capital in China, the structural change in 
terms of the input factors allocated between three industries in each province is more 
likely to influence the provincial economic growth. Thus, the provincial fixed effect 
should be taken into account. Meanwhile, though the dataset employed in this study 
tended to contain as much information as possible, the provincial data on an annual 
basis are only available for 18 years. Because of the relatively short time period, RE 
model is presumably not appropriate in these circumstances, while this assumption 
have been proven by Hausman test result later on in the empirical estimation process 
(Table 6.2). When we applied the hypothesis testing upon the one-way model (FE/RE 
with provinces OR time) and two-way model (FE/RE with provinces AND time), the 
p-value of LM test reject the hypothesis of using one-way FE/RE model. Furthermore, 
the p-value of Hausman test indicates the application two-way FE model is preferred 
to the two-way RE model. Associated with these statistical outcomes and the nature 
and restriction of our data sample, the hypothesis testing result supports the view that 
141 
W-0 
0-q 
.M 
ý. -0 
-0 
u 
in *c 
l= 
cw 
4ý 
r-4 
0-, u 
-a 
U 
E 
-0 C 
03 
a4 
rI 
0 
. 5: C 
= JD 
cu ce Z. c 
CU 
ce 
P, 0 
kf) C) 0 110 C> 0 (01ý .0 2>> 
1 CL kf) 
vt 
( 4 
N 6 0 CJ Rzt C> m C> C> "Tt C) 
- -C3 4ý CIO 
0 
gz 
ad 
/--l clq kf) /1-1 W-) let 
,,, tri If -C 
k4r) VI) . -A 
11 C) 
C14 
1-4 
C) 
C) 
C> krl 
C) 
Iq C) kr) kn 
00 _-4 C71\ 
00 
r-- - r- C) 
C) 
.a<, 
v 'A 
02E 
C) N r- (01ý 
m 
r- -. 
4 
C) 
t-- 
CN 
1%0 
clq (6 
4> 
-- . 2i -u r. U00 t 
(=> It 
m C) 
> +. .- 
(D 0 a) - 
7ý8 
11-N, 
9 
., 
1 0 >0 V4 
C) rl Cý a, \ 
C) C> 
C> 
m 6 -15 
00 I 
C> kr) 
cc UU -0 -Sg p. -c cil CJ q) ý- SO 
tl- 
C) C) 
6 5 
m 00 \-O k, r) C) _--o - 0. f. ) g.., = u V) Cd . - 
C> C) 6 ýý r- --a ýn 0* 21 Uý -,:; 
-ý Eý -0 5 
? 1-11 -0 vg 
m clq r- C) ýlc 
00 
m W) 0--C, 
Cý 0 
CD 
00 
C) 1. 0 00 00 C) It C) 8 1ý :8- - r- 1 m qzt 1ý It C) j; = tz - Cý, C> 0 IC 0 
C> Tt 6 C> 
o IOU 
cl 4) 
.-c-> 
7: 1 =s gao =$ w ct -ý Z 
142 
the regression with both provincial and time-specific fixed effects gives the best 
results for our panel data (column c) 
There are a number of options to capture the effect of structural shift: the weight of 
industrial output, the weight of industrial fixed assets investment and the weight of 
labour force. In our estimated model, the growth of GDP has been chosen to be the 
independent variable while all the explanatory variables are exogenous to the growth 
model. The inclusion of the weight of industrial output as the proxy of structural shift 
effect may create endogenous bias to the estimated result. Meanwhile, as we pointed 
out in data specification chapter, the statistics upon industrial fixed assets investment 
has been pursued until 1995. Consequently, industrial level data before 1995 should 
only be achieved by self calculation based on certain assumption. In these 
circumstances, using the weight of industrial investment as the proxy for structural 
shift effect may not be appropriate. In order to avoid the multicollinearity problem, 
only two out of three ratios have been included to the estimated equation. In particular, 
the weight of manufactory labour force (denoted as WLM) and servicing sector labour 
force (denoted as WLS) are selected to present our concern over the structural shift 
effect upon these two industrial sectors given the rapid growth in these two sectors 
over the sample period. 
The estimated result presented in Table 6.2, column c indicated that all estimated 
coefficients are positive and significant except labour force growth and weight of 
manufactory labour force. This result implies that the major contribution to the 
national economic growth is the substantial capital stock accumulation, while less 
commitment comes from the growth of labour force. During the economic and 
financial reform period, production factors have significantly shifted from lower 
productivity sector (such as agricultural sector) to the higher one (such as manufactory 
and servicing sectors). Nevertheless, it seems it is the servicing sector that mostly 
benefits from such shift given that the positive and highly significant estimated 
coefficient of the control variable - WLS. 
The growth of labour force is statistically insignificant correlated to the national 
economic growth. Comparing with the substantial annual increase of physical capital 
stock, the year-to-year variability of labour force is rather moderate (see Chart 5.1). 
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Hence, it is understandable that there is no correlation observed between the growth of 
labour force and the growth of output. Furthermore, the accuracy of labour input 
measurement is questionable. As we pointed out previously in Chapter 5, there is a 
strong likelihood that the actual average hours worked per worker have increased in 
the post-reform stage despite the low growth rate of number of worker employed, 
which have been taken into account into the present labour force input statistics 
system. In addition, it is perceived that the working hour and working intensity in 
non-state sector are generally much longer and tougher than those in state sectors. 
However, this effect hasn't been taken into consideration either. Therefore, it is 
believed that the insignificant estimation for labour force growth is particularly 
stemmed from the downward bias in the measurement of labour growth. 
Thirdly, when we decompose the contribution of each production factor with an 
accountancy approach, it is noticed that the growth of labour force input only accounts 
for a very small proportion. During the sample period (1985-2002), average growth 
rates of national economic output (GY), capital stock market (GK) and labour force 
(GL) are 8.6,9.97 and 1.63 percent, respectively. Given the estimated coefficients of 
GK and GL (presented in Table 6.2), it is straightforward to achieve the proportional 
contribution of GK and GL are 0.0456 and 0.00197 , which account 
53 and 2.2 percent 
of the overall national economic growth. Meanwhile, technical progress, captured by 
the constant term (0.0267) which is also statistically significant, has been found 
generating around 30 percent of the contribution to the national economic growth. 
About 15 percent of the national economic output growth derives from the structural 
change effect. This finding is consistent with various existing studies: Fan, Zhang and 
Robinson (2003) find that the structural change accounts for 17.5 percent of total GDP 
growth; similarly, World Bank (1996) attributed 11 percent of GDP growth in 
1985-1994 to employment reallocation, while Sachs and Woo (1996) estimated this 
contribution up to 13 percent of GDP growth when they extended the data sample to 
1979-1994. From this accountancy view, the statistically insignificant effect of labour 
force growth is convincing due to its trivial contribution to the economic growth. 
7 This computation results are simply obtained by using the average factor growth rate times their 
corresponding estimated coefficient. 
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Table 6.3: Composition of Labour Force by Educational level, 1982 and 19998 
(in percentage) 
Educational level 1982 1999 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Illiterate or semi-illiterate 28.2 11 
Primary School 34.4 33.3 
Junior high school 26.0 39.9 
Senior high school 10.5 11.9 
College and above 0.9 3.8 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China, 1986, pp. 114-115; 2000, pp. 17 1. 
The estimated coefficients of both FDI and Education are also significant at 5 percent 
and 10 percent significant level respectively This result supports the hypothesis that 
the open door policy aiming at attracting more foreign investment funds to finance the 
domestic economic development is a constructive and successful strategy It is also 
consistent with substantial empirical studies regarding the considerable contribution of 
FDI to economic growth in China. 
The vital contribution of educational level enhancement indicates the improvement in 
the quality of human capital is another essential resource attributed to the productivity 
increase. The change of educational level in work force is a useful indicator to 
measure the improvement in human capital as the general presumption states that the 
higher level of education employers achieve, the more skilful they would be and 
consequently enhancing the labour productivity. Table 6.3 shows the share of labour 
force with different level of education in 1982 and 1999. Obviously, the most vital 
change is the sharp reduction of the percentage of illiterate (or semi-illiterate) 
workforce associated with a large increase share of junior high school graduates, 
which is essentially the attribution of implementing the nine-year compulsory 
educational scheme (six-year primary school plus three-year junior high school). 
Although the share of workforce achieving higher education degree remains rather 
small, we have to notice that the growth rate of this share is prominent (from 2.8 
percent in 1995 to 3.8 percent in 1999). 
6.5 Statistic analysis - financial intermediation and economic growth 
8 Due to the data unavailability from 2000 and onwards, the latest figures (say 2002 or 2003) of this 
subject are not obtainable. 
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6.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6.4 exhibits the average value of the real GDP growth rate and the five banking 
indicators, where we can observe considerable variation across provinces. Figure 
6. l. a-e explicitly reveals the relationship on the basis of averaged banking indicators. 
Due to the data insufficiency, Tibet has been excluded from the calculation for Figure 
8.1(d), where the time range spans from 1987-2002 to maintain seven categories of 
financial institutions for the computation of concentration index of local banking 
sector. Since the credit information from the Overall Financial Institutions has not 
been compiled until 1990 on provincial level, the introduction of the third and last 
indicator - LGDP and SOB reduced the time series from 18 years (1985-2002) to 13 
years (1990-2002) for each of 29 provinces (Tibet excluded). Regarding the average 
level, banking indicators are all negatively related to the real GDP growth, though the 
relationship appears to be relatively weak in terms of using central bank lending to 
province (CENTRAL) as the proxy of banking sector development. 
SIZE ranges from 43.7 percent of GDP in Hunan to 242.2 percent to GDP in Beijing. 
The LGDP ratio is as high as 137.6 percent in Beijing but only of 53.7 percent of GDP 
in Zhejiang. The pattern of central bank credit to the provinces is also uneven. In the 
state bank in Jilin, credit is 1.73 times higher than deposits, while in Beijing, Zhejiang, 
Fujian, Guandong, Tibet and Xinjiang, credit outstanding does not even match 
deposits provided that the indicator of CENTRAL in these provinces is less than 1. 
Given that a benchmark of equal shares among the seven financial institutions is 0.14, 
none of the provinces has the index value less than 0.2, which indicates that the 
banking sector in China is likely to be highly concentrated. The provinces associated 
with the lowest degree of concentration are Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian and Hainan 
(0.24). Beijing has the highest concentration (0.34), and Sichuan (+Chongqing), Inner 
Mongolia, Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Shaanxi and Gansu have an index value over 
0.3. Additionally, it is worthwhile to point out that the Herfindahl index can be given a 
'numbers equivalent' interpretation: an index X indicates equivalent to I/X equally 
sized banks. From this point of view, the local banking market ;, s highly concentrated. 
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Figure 6.1: GDP growth and Five Banking Indicators (1985-2002, average value) 
a. GDP growth vs. SIZE 
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c. GDP growth vs. LGDP 
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e. GDP growth vs. SOB (1990-2002, Tibet excluded) 
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For instance, those four provinces with the lowest index 0.24 presents there should no 
more than 4 banks with even size in each of these provinces. In those extreme cases 
whose indices are over 0.3, on the other hand, the optimal number of banking firms is 
3. 
However, due to each state-owned bank operational speciality in different industrial 
sector authorised by the central bank, the branches of four state-owned banks had been 
launched in each province in order to serve the clients operating in corresponding 
sectors on the real side of economy. The other commercial banks, on the other hand, 
launched their branches almost in every province gradually without being restricted in 
their operations. In these circumstances, there are at least five to six unequal sized 
banks operating in each local financial market, where in most of the cases ICBC is the 
largest bank by attracting over 35 percent of total deposits and granting over 30 
percent of total credits. Finally, we observe that there are nearly 80 percent of the bank 
credits assigned by the four state-owned banks in Yunnan province, compared with 
less than 60 percent in Guangdong. 
As far as the overall size of the local banking sector is concerned, the municipalities of 
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Beijing and Shanghai have the highest levels of deposits to GDP ratio, followed by 
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Inner Mongolia and Hainan, whose SIZE ratios are 110.3 percent and 102.8 percent, 
respectively. Their economic growth rates, however, appear to be slightly below the 
national average level except the one of Beijing (5.94 percent, the second lowest 
growth rate). Simultaneously, the fast growing economies in Fujian, Zhejiang and 
Shandong are associated with relatively smaller size of banking sectors. Thus, it has 
been found a negative relationship emerges between the size of banking sector and 
GDP growth (also see Figure 6.1 (a)). 
Generally speaking, central bank lending seems to be assigned to provinces with 
lower economic growth rate (Figure 6.1(b)). Intuitively, this relationship is rather 
weak both in terms of 'goodness of fit' and in terms of slope of the line. There is a 
negative correlation between the ratio of bank loans to GDP and the real GDP growth 
rate (Figure 6.1(c)). Associated with Table 6.4, we can see provinces of Jilin (1.73), 
Yunnan (1.67), Hubei (1.47) and Anhui (1.38) are the top four which benefit the most 
from central bank lending, but their economic growth rates are neither the highest nor 
the lowest. In the extreme case, provinces such as Zhejiang, Guangdong and Fujian, 
whose economic growth rates exceeded 10 percent annually, they received relatively 
little credit from central bank (CENTRAL<I). Given to the lowest ratio of CENTRAL 
(0.58), Beijing's deposits exceed by far its corresponding value of credit, thus 
suggesting that the capital city is a net contributor to the central bank resources. 
A negative relationship between CONCENTRATION and the growth of economic 
output has been observed through the descriptive statistics. It suggests that a banking 
sector where dominated by several large state-owned banks/financial institutions is 
less efficient than a banking sector full with competition. Middle-growth provinces of 
Inner Mongolia, Jilin, Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Shaanxi, Sichuan and Gansu have a 
more concentrated banking market than the relatively developed provinces of 
Zhejiang, Jiangsu or Fujian. 
Table 6.5 reports the correlations between the output growth and the banking 
indicators: a negative relationship is confirmed by measuring the banking sector 
development with the proxies of CENTRAL, LGDP, CONCENTRATION and SOB, 
while a weak but positive relationship has been identified between SIZE and growth. 
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Table 6.5: Descriptive statistics of five banking indicators: Correlations 
Size Central LGDP Concentration SOB 
GroWth rate of 
GDP 
Size 
Central 
LGDP 
Concentration 
0.0168 -0.3959 
-0.379 
-0.6028 
0.7524 
-0.0357 
-0.5251 
0.3688 
0.0372 
0.5923 
-0.2701 
-0.1168 
0.7168 
0.2258 
0.073 
Meanwhile, we also discover a few interesting relations among the banking indicators. 
For instance, it is not surprising to find a strong and positive relationship between 
SIZE and LGDP, since the bank loans allocation simply depends on how large the 
credit resource is as measured by deposits. Moreover, the strong and positive 
relationship between SOB and CENTRAL provides the evidence that a higher degree 
of four- state-owned-bank concentration requires a stronger central-bank backup. 
Similarly, a relatively high rate of LGDP also indicates a high degree of concentration 
of the banking sector. 
This statistical description suggests several preliminary results. First, the size of 
provincial financial intermediation does not necessarily have a firm relationship with 
the level of economic development, since the statistic correlation on averaged 
provincial data and panel data draws contradictory conclusion on this issue. Second, 
provinces with a lower rate of economic growth receive larger credit flows from the 
central government. Third, higher market concentration is associated with lower 
growth performance and a similar situation also applies to the degree of four 
state-owned banks credits. Fourth, given the largest size of banking sector and highest 
level of bank credits to GDP ratio while least reliance on credit subsidy from central 
government, Beijing, the capital city of China, has achieved a rather low growth rate, 
exhibiting a contradictory scenario to the general correlation between financial 
intermediaries and economic growth found in the rest of the provinces in China. 
However, one has to keep in mind that these descriptive correlations cannot be 
interpreted as the hypotheses testing on the relationship between financial 
development and growth, between the state banking overall performance, the impact 
of the central government lending and the effect of bank concentration on provincial 
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real economic growth. In next section, we propose our research framework and derive 
our estimated equation, followed by the result interpretation and analysis. 
6.5.2 Indicative Result 
To get a sense of the role played by financial development in China's economic 
growth, provinces were grouped according to certain economic characteristics. Three 
groupings were made: into those with above average and below average growth, those 
with above average and below average levels of financial intermediation (as measured 
by the bank loan-to-GDP ratio) and those with above average and below average 
levels of SOE concentration. For the first grouping, the level of financial 
intermediation in the high growth group was compared with that in the low growth 
group, while similar exercises were conducted for the second grouping. This exercise 
produces the following results: 
Those provinces with above average GDP growth had bank loan-to-GDP ratios 
that were statistically lower (by up to 33 percent of GDP, and on average 19.6 
percent of GDP) than below average growth provinces (Figure 6.2). 
Correspondingly, provinces with above average levels of financial intermediation 
experienced lower growth than those provinces with below average levels of 
financial intermediation. But this situation only remained until 1995, while since 
1996 onwards, the growth difference between these two groups seemed to have 
narrowed down rapidly, which may indicate that the financial intermediation 
making a significant contribution to the regional economic growth (Figure 6.3). 
Provinces with above average concentrations of SOEs had higher bank 
loan-to-GDP ratios than those provinces with below average concentration of 
SOEs. This result indicates the pervasive phenomenon in China that bank loans are 
usually granted to the less productive SOEs due to the political reasons (Figure 
6.4). 
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Figure 6.3: Growth and Financial Intermediation (1984-2002) 
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6.5.3 Empirical results - provincial panel analysis 
Table 6.6 reports the estimates of Eq. 6.4, using five banking indicators as the financial 
development variable individually (column la to 5a, respectively). In the last column 
6a, we also exercise the hypothesis testing by including both LGDP and SOB, for the 
purpose of detecting the robustness of the effect of state-owned-bank credits. Due to 
the variations in data availability and accessibility when different banking indicator is 
deployed, the estimation procedure is conducted on various size of dataset, which is 
reported as the number of observations correspondingly in the final line of the table. 
Nevertheless, all results displayed in Table 6.6 firmly support the idea that the banking 
sector performance is not positively related to the local economic growth. More 
precisely, banking sector in China does not act the leading role in the financial- growth 
nexus in China's present context. 
Apart from the estimation of banking indicators, industrial labour force and capital 
stock are also evaluated in each case where the estimated coefficients are exhibited in 
Table 6.6 synchronically. Prior to the analyses on the influence of banking sector, it is 
worthwhile to observe the estimated results on labour force and capital stock, as well 
as on those control variables. First of all, the dimension of capital stock growth are 
approximately remains the same. Secondly, in most cases, FDI and Education proxies 
are significantly and positively related to the national economic growth. Nevertheless, 
after including the banking indicators into the regression function, it is hard to find 
any correlation between structural change (measured by the weight of sectoral labour 
force) and output growth. 
The liquidity indicator (SIZE) has no impact on economic growth, which is 
contradictory to the general cross-country estimated result of a positive relationship 
between the size of the financial sector and economic growth (Table 6.6, column I a). 
As mentioned before, financial deepening during the reform period has been 
impressive at the national level, although not accompanied by an improvement in the 
allocation of savings; at the regional level, inferior provinces with a relatively lower 
growth performance are associated with a high ratio of deposits to GDP. Therefore, the 
implicit assumption that the size of the financial sector is positively correlated to the 
quality of financial services is questionable in the case of China. A high level of this 
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Table 6.6: Banking sector development and Economic Growth: All Provinces 
(Two-way Fixed Effect Model) 
Independent Dependent variable: economic growth (net change of GDP) 
variables Ia2a3a 4a 5a 6a 
GL 0.0077 0.0192 0.0155 0.009 0.0162 0.0138 
(0.0598) (0.059) (0.0589) (0.0598) (0.0581) (0.058) 
GK 0.5083 0.5117 0.5085 0.5054 0.5212 *** 0.5044 
(0.0626) (0-055) (0-0547) (0.0628) (0.0525) (0.0528) 
FDI 0.0132 * 0.0022 * 0.0022 * 0.0241 ** 0.0017 0.0027 * 
(0-0079) (0.0013) (0-0012) (0-0093) (0.0014) (0.0149) 
EDU 0.0226 ** 0.0273 0.0882 ** 0.0369 * 0.0105 * 0.0667 * 
(0-0081) (0.1028) (0.0494) (0.021) (0-0074) (0.0456) 
WLM 0.0291 0.0024 0.0477 -0.0215 0.0247 0.0625 
(0.0799) (0.0524) (0.0528) (0-0796) (0.048) (0.0501) 
WLS 0.0484 -0.0164 -0.036 -0.0598 -0-0151 -0.0372 
(0.0696) (0.0261) (0.027) (0.0692) (0.0237) (0.0253) 
SIZE 0.0165 
(0.0103) 
CENTRAL -0-0135** 
(0.0063) 
LGDP -0.0204* -0.0229** 
CONCENTR 
(0-0112) 
-0.0006 
(0.0115) 
ATION (0-0003) 
SOB -0.0079 -0.0806 (0.002) (0.0195) 
Provinces 30 30 30 29 29 29 
Observations 540 540 540 493 377 377 
Note: 
I. All dependent and independent variables are calculated in log-differences. Independent 
variables are growth of labour force (GL), growth of capital stock (GK). Control variables 
include FDI (volume of FDI over total fixed assets investment) and Education (the annual 
growth rate of the ratio of enrolment in higher education institutions over the enrolment in 
secondary education schools) proxies; the weight of manufactory and servicing labour input 
over total labour force respectively (WLM & WLS). 
2. SIZE - the size of the local banking sector; CENTRAL - central bank lending to the provinces; 
LGDP - the ratio of bank loans to GDP; CONCENTRATION - the Herfindahl index of 
banking sector to represent the banking market structure in the provinces; SOB - the 
performance of four state-owned banks with respect to the overall financial institutions; FDI - 
the percentage of FDI over total investment in fixed assets; Education - the ratio of higher 
education enrolment over secondary education enrolment. 
3. The asterisk * (**) (***) represents the significance at 10% (5%) (1%) level, respectively. 
4. When the fourth banking indicator CONCENTRATION is included, the number of 
observations reduces to 493 due to the exclusion of observations from Tibet and of year 1985 
where this indicator cannot be calculated. The fifth banking indicator SOB is applied to all 
provinces except Tibet and with time span from 1990 to 2002. 
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indicator may not predict a high level of financial intermediation development. Park 
and Sehrt (2001) reach a similar conclusion: they find an inverse relationship between 
the rate of financial intermediation and the level of economic growth among Chinese 
provinces, suggesting political factors other than economic ones play an important 
role in lending decisions. 
The ratio of bank credit to GDP (LGDP) has negative impact on local economic 
growth, supporting the hypothesis that the banking sector does not allocate savings 
efficiently and that provinces with a more developed financial sector may not benefit 
from more efficient resource allocation. Nevertheless, the higher proportion of the 
loans assigned by state-owned banks (SOB) would further decrease the efficiency of 
the banking sector, thus worsening local economic performance. This result remains 
robust when the indicators of LGDP and SOB are adopted simultaneously (column 3a, 
5a and 6a, respectively). 
Theoretically, it is widely accepted that investment has a major and positive 
contribution to the economic growth. Based on the perception that most of the external 
investment funds are channelled by bank loans, it is believed that the increasing bank 
credits will undoubtedly lead to a faster economic growth. In other words, the bank 
credit allocation should have a positive impact on economic growth. However, the 
suspicion arouse that the above statement does not take the alternative investment 
resources into account, but rather concentrate on bank credits exclusively. Within the 
four major categories of investment fund sources in China, domestic bank credit is the 
second biggest fund source, while the first one is internal funds which take a share of 
over 60 percent of total funds. In the Chinese context, internal funds refer to 
extra-budgetary funds for investment received from central government ministries, 
local governments, enterprises and institutions, including their self retained profits. 
Meanwhile, this type of investment funds also includes capital raised through issuing 
bonds or equities by enterprises or financial institutions, funds raised through 
donations, and funds transferred from other units. In these circumstances, it can be 
argued that the more successful the enterprises are the more profits they earn. 
Consequently, the larger amount of retained profits will be contributed to the 
investment projects, resulting in the less reliance on the other fund sources including 
bank credits. By contrast, when a region is dominated by the weak performing 
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enterprises, they hardly raise investment funds by themselves, thus relying on bank 
loans heavily. Additionally, the launch of stock market in 1992 provided another 
significant channel for investment fund raising, which should dilute the importance of 
bank credit in raising investment funds. 
Furthermore, the negative relationship may also be explained by the increasing 
proportion of Non-performing Loans (NPLs) with the successive expansion of bank 
credit. According to the state government, NPLs from four state-owned banks account 
for 20 to 25 percent of the banks' total lending; international observers estimate that 
the ratio actually exceeds 40 percent (Lardy, 1998,2000). It is generally believed that 
the extensive amount of NPLs is the result of the directed credit lending (policy 
lending) granted under the pressure from both central and provincial authorities to 
favoured sectors and enterprise. Although the Commercial Bank Law assign 
commercial banks operational independence and freedom of choice in their lending 
decisions, the majority of the domestic banks lack the autonomy to choose their 
customers. Before 1998, the central government influenced the lending decisions of 
state-owned banks through its credit control plan. The plan not only set up a credit 
ceiling for the banks but also specified how funds should be used. The influence of 
this control plan had been passed onto the local branches when the specified quota 
was allocated from the headquarters. Directed lending is not unique in China's 
state-owned banks. Joint-equity commercial banks and city commercial banks are not 
immune from state interference as long as their major shareholders are local 
governments and state institutions. Banks with a close relationship with central and 
local governments tend to be more susceptible to political pressures in their lending 
decisions. Particularly city commercial banks, most of their predecessors were local 
city credit-cooperatives whose mission had been established as servicing local 
government and SOEs. According to an official survey, at the end of 2003,17 city 
banks out of total 112 in the country had an average NPLs ratio of 43.9 percent. 
Nevertheless, the impact of directed lending in China has been diminishing since the 
abolition of the credit plan in 1998. Moreover, four Asset Management Enterprises 
(AMEs) were established in 1999 and the NPLs with total face-value of RMB1400 
billion were transferred from four state-owned banks and taken over by the four 
AMEs. In recent years, the central bank encouraged domestic bank to offer consumer 
159 
credit and to expand credit to private enterprises. All these efforts aimed at alleviating 
the commercial banks' burden, granting more freedom to commercial banks and 
stimulating them to act more cautiously on the market bases. However, these efforts 
have been hampered by the lack of credit-tracking tools, a national accounting 
standard and a sound legal framework including collateral and bankruptcy legislation. 
Wong and Wong (2001) pointed out that these instruments are essential for banks 
when they start to act as market entities while they were actually of little use when 
most bank credits are directed to SOEs. 
Owing to the poor national accounting standard and the lack of credit history records, 
it is very difficult for domestic banks in China to obtain a fair and objective 
assessment on loan applications. Domestic banks do not have sufficient information to 
select trustworthy clients and to monitor their behaviour. The deficiencies of collateral 
and bankruptcy legislation further increase credit risks, which can explain why the 
banks that have been relatively free from policy lending still have been accumulating 
high NPL ratios. For instance, China Minsheng Bank had a low SOEs or policy 
lending: more than 85 percent of its credits went to the private sector in 1998 (Xiao, 
1999). However, the bank's NPL ratio increased from 2 percent in 1997 to 10.9 
percent in 1999 (China Merchants Bank, 1999). Consequently, the high credit risks 
resulted in the lower incentive to extend loans to privatised and new start-up 
enterprises, neither to individual consumer. Therefore, though the volume of bank 
credits expands rapidly, the poor quality of such credits and inefficient credit 
management impede the primary function of bank credit in channelling investment 
funds. 
Similarly, the more credit a province receives from the central bank, the lower its 
growth performs (column 2a). Associated with the specific conditions in China, this 
phenomenon can be interpreted by the theory of soft-budget constraint which is a 
major problem in China. According to Kornai (1980), an organisation is said to have a 
soft budget constraint when it expects to be bailed out in case of financial trouble. In 
addition, the organisation raising funds depends on political connections and lobbying 
rather than success in terms of selling output and productive efficiency. The banking 
sector dominated by state-owned banks has been used as a quasi-fiscal instrument of 
government to bailout the unprofitable SOEs via delivering special policy loans 
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without concern about efficiency. The result has been a growing accumulation of 
NPLs. In compensation for their lack of autonomy, the SOEs were implicitly 
guaranteed bailouts by local government. Given the easy access to central-bank 
refinancing and the govenunent's commitment to support the state sector, the budget 
constraint of the state banks is likely to be soft. Thus, the finding of a negative impact 
of central bank lending on local economic growth can be interpreted as a lack of 
incentives for the state banks to improve their management or base their lending 
decisions on efficiency criteria, as they expect the central bank to cover their losses. 
Furthermore, this result supports the idea argued by Park and Sehrt (2001) that the 
efficiency in state-owned bank management has not improved in the recent years and 
"that financial reforms in the mid- I 990s have not reversed a worsening trend" (p. 62 8). 
Higher bank concentration is significantly associated with lower economic growth 
(column 4a). This result supports the idea that banking competition is likely to 
improve economic performance as found by Cetorelli and Gamberra (2001) using a 
cross-country sample. It may also imply that greater entry into the banking sector 
improves bank performance, which in turn improves resource allocation in the 
province and leads to higher local economic growth. 
Meanwhile, we need to point out that these five banking indicators are closely 
interrelated as shown earlier in Table 6.5. One may argue that a high degree of 
concentration in banking sector implies that the provincial banking market is still 
largely dominated by the four state-owned commercial banks. The proportion of credit 
from four state-owned banks gives a more straightforward explanation on this point. 
Thus, as the state-owned banks mainly serve SOEs, it could be explained that a high 
level of state-owned bank credit is the sequence of the dominance of SOEs on the real 
side of the local economy. Correspondingly, the negative impact of the credit on 
growth can be explained by the poor performance of their clients. A high level of 
state-owned bank credit is also likely to be translated into a higher dependence on 
central bank lending to cover the balance between loans and deposits. 
6.5.4 Empirical results - regional panel analysis 
6.5.4.1 Descriptive Analysis 
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When we turn to the analysis on the relationship between economic growth and 
financial development within eight economic regions respectively, we first highlight 
the performance of banking sector in these sub-nations by exhibiting the computed 
ratio and rank of five financial indicators in Table 6.7. In general, the figures in Table 
6.7 imply a fast growing region is usually associated with less reliance on central bank 
lending, lower level of banking sector concentration within a relatively large size of 
banking market. 
The economic growth rates of three coastal areas, SCR, ECR and NCR, are taking the 
top three positions among eight regions, supporting the common perception that the 
coastal regions are richer and more developed than the interior provinces in China. 
The most striking result is that the ratio of loans from financial institutions to GDP is 
not always negatively associated with GDP growth. Given to the highest growth rate 
in SCR (nearly 10.5 percent annually), LGDP appears to be unexpectedly high (74.12 
percent) over the sample period (1984-2002), staying on the fourth place. However, 
achieving the second highest GDP growth rate, ECR has the lowest LGDP ratio. 
Meanwhile, though the more competitive banking market should have higher 
contribution to the regional economic growth, the descriptive statistics shows that 
there is an extraordinary high level of banking sector concentration in NCR, with the 
index value of 0.272 and taking the third place. Nevertheless, these three regions all 
have a low proportion of state-owned-bank credits, and correspondingly, the banking 
sector operations are relying less on the central bank lending. 
The GDP growth rate in NEZ has been the lowest in the country. The bank loans are 
equivalent to 90 percent of GDP in such highly concentrated banking market whose 
degree of concentration is the highest one (0.295). Meanwhile, credit is 1.39 times 
higher than deposits in the state banks. These indicators provide the evidence that the 
operation of banking sector in this region is unsatisfactory and consequently affecting 
the economic growth negatively. The three provinces in NEZ, Liaoning, Jilin and 
Heilongjiang, are the heavy-industry base of China. According to a recent survey, by 
the end of 2001, the economic output of SOEs in these three provinces accounts for 
78.2 percent, 86.2 percent and 87.2 percent, respectively. The proportion of 
non-perfon-ning loans (NPLs) in NEZ is much higher than the national average level 
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by 12 percentage points. Therefore, another implication from this result is that a 
SOEs-dominated region is apparently associated with a high level of state-owned bank 
credits. Central bank lending, in these circumstances, needs to sustain at a high level 
in order to backup the state-owned bank granting loans. Undoubtedly, in such an 
extreme situation, a high ratio of state-owned-bank credit to GDP also indicates a high 
degree of concentration in banking sector. 
Another prominent result is that as the second slowest growing region, NWZ has the 
biggest size of banking market, where the ratio of total deposits from state banks to 
GDP is nearly 90 percent. Theoretically, the bigger size the banking market has, the 
more fund resources are available to channel the investment, consequently leading to a 
higher economic growth. However, NWZ is likely to be the lowest growth region in 
China where the annual growth rate of real GDP per capita was 5.4 percent on average. 
Given a lower household income, the higher SIZE implies the investment channel in 
NWZ is more restricted than the other regions, where saving money as bank deposit is 
the unique channel for households and enterprises to deal with their surplus without 
any other efficient alternatives. 
Accompanied with a moderate expansion rate in SWZ, the five banking sector 
indicators present medium ratio correspondingly Regarding to the regions on the 
middle reaches of Yangtze River and Yellow River respectively, the proxy of financial 
deepening measured by bank deposits to GDP is the lowest (SIZE). In the loan market 
of YZR, the four state-owned banks take the second highest proportion in the credit 
assigning though the size of loan market is rather small. A similar but reverse 
phenomenon has also been found from the SCR and NWZ. After all, we may point out 
again that the statistical description strongly supports the idea that the concentration of 
state-owned banks in credit allocation is perfectly correlated with the central bank 
behaviour. 
6.5.4.2 Econometric Estimation 
Recalling the key assumption underlying the use of ratio of deposits to GDP as an 
indicator of financial development, the size of financial intermediary should be 
positively correlated to the provision and quality of financial services, given that the 
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primary function of financial intermediary is mobilising savings and allocating 
financial resources. Financial deepening in China does not raise growth rate, which 
has been shown from provincial panel data. Consequently, we could draw the 
conclusion that it is mainly due to the inefficient allocating resources. 
Based on a set of more accurate criteria, those provinces sharing a close or similar 
natural resources and industrialisation level have been grouped into one economic 
region, by which means the differences between regions are more clearly stressed. 
Hence, bearing the variation between economic regions in mind, one may question 
that not only the growth pattern on the real economy side differentiate from each other, 
but also the financial intermediary development may vary considerably. Therefore, it 
is worth investigating whether these differences in financial intermediary sector will 
lead to different impact on regional economic growth performance. 
Table 6.8 highlights the estimates of five banking indicators by applying Eq. 6.4 to 
eight economic regions, exhibiting considerable variation across regions. Unlike the 
significant and robust estimation obtained on the provincial panel, the hypothesis 
testing on regional panel presents diversified results. It is interesting to find that unlike 
the lack of correlation observed from the provincial panel, the size of regional banking 
sector is positively correlated to the economic growth only in coastal regions (ECR, 
NCR and SCR), whose economic growth rates are the highest accompanied with 
largest pool of state bank deposits. Meanwhile, the loan to GDP ratio is identified to 
be positively related to the economic growth in ECR only, while the strongly negative 
correlation exists in NEZ, the zone with lowest growth rate. 
In SCR and YR, the central bank lending is negatively related to GDP growth. 
However, the ratio of CENTRAL of SCR is not the lowest one. Within the three 
coastal regions, NCR has a highest bank concentration ratio. The statistic estimation 
shows a monopolistic banking market has a significant and negative impact upon 
economic growth (negative coefficient of CONCENTRATION). The last proxy of 
financial development, the proportion of state-owned bank credits, has been identified 
to have negative impact on output growth only in NCR and SCR. As we found out 
from Table 6.8, given to a medium size of financial intermediary sector, the rest of 
banking indicators drew an extreme picture for this region: the heaviest loans to GDP 
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ratio where the highest proportion comes from the state-owned banks sector; state 
bank credit is nearly 1.4 time higher than deposits; not too many financial institutions 
operate in this financial market because of either the intense risk or weak profitability 
of banks. None of these highest or strongest financial indicators have significant effect 
on economic growth, where the economic growth in this region remains the lowest. 
It would be interesting to make a comparison between three most developed regions 
and the least developed one. Here, we emphasise the funding sources of the regional 
investment in fixed assets. As we analysed in an earlier chapter, China's economic 
growth is largely driven by high levels of investment. How these investments are 
funded and whether such funding is efficient or not are two crucial questions. 
According to the national bureau of statistic identification, there are five major 
resources to finance the investment projects on both aggregated national level and 
individual provincial level: state appropriation, domestic loans, self-raised funds, 
foreign direct investments (FDI) and the others, where the last one refer to the fund 
raised from other financial market such as issuing corporate bond/treasury or shares. 
In Table 6.9, we abstract the fund resources information of 1995 with the comparison 
of most recent three years, 2000-2002. Concerning the data consistency, the total 
investment fixed assets (TIFA) here is not the one referring to the overall amount of 
investment but rather the sum of investment in capital construction and innovation. 
For the consideration of simplicity, we combine the self-raising funds with the other 
fund resources. 
Obviously, the major part of investments in each region has been derived from the 
retained profits and other non-fiscal transfers. Apart from that, the second significant 
contribution to the investment fund comes fTom domestic loans. The structure of 
investment fund resources generally remained the same. However, when we 
concentrate on the tendency of the change of each fund resource, we identify that the 
weight of reliance on different fund resource varies over time. For instance, 
self-raising funds play a more and more important role in NCR than in the other 
regions. Though the contribution from FDI declined since 1995 in all regions, the 
increasing trend appears in SCR in most recent years. 
More attention will be paid on the structure of investment fund resource in NEZ. 
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Table 6.9: Total investment in fixed assets in four selected regions 
- East Coast Region (ECR), North Coastal Region (NCR), South Coastal Region (SCR) 
and Northeast Zone (NEZ) 
Year 
TIFA (1) 
(RMB 100 
million) 
State 
Appropria 
tion as % 
of (1) 
Domestic 
Loan as % 
of (1) 
FDI as% of 
(1) 
Self-raising 
Funds and 
others as % 
of (1) 
ECR 
1995 1875.68 2.25 17.58 12.06 68.11 
2000 3002.55 5.48 24.22 8.51 61.79 
2001 3629.11 3.65 24.28 8.32 62.11 
2002 4295.06 3.37 25.34 8.25 63.04 
NCR 
1995 1737.33 6.39 19.94 14.25 59.42 
2000 3031.07 7.37 24.17 5.69 62.78 
2001 3268.62 8.26 18.06 6.17 67.50 
2002 3922.05 6.10 18.01 4.36 71.54 
SCR 
1995 1482.52 2.19 17.18 21.60 59.04 
2000 2160.31 5.17 18.65 12.44 59.49 
2001 2298.24 4.28 20.65 12.77 62.30 
2002 2389.39 4.32 22.26 13.09 64.59 
NEZ 
1995 1022.49 5.29 22.71 15.15 58.49 
2000 1686.39 7.90 22.20 5.50 64.40 
2001 1868.38 9.16 20.26 4.25 64.93 
2002 2085.22 11-86 19.98 3.95 65.61 
Source: Calculation results on the basis of Statistical Yearbook of China, issue 1996,2001,2002 
and 2003. All data are termed in nominal terms 
During the last decade, the proportions of both FDI and domestic loans in TIFA have 
kept decreasing. Contrast to the declining percentage of state appropriation in three 
coastal regions, there is the likelihood that the fixed-assets investment in NEZ relies 
more on the fiscal budgetary appropriation from the state government. Thus, to a 
certain extent, when the estimated results associated with the structural change in 
investment fund components, it is not very surprising to find no effect from the 
banking sector upon the regional economic growth, although the proxies of bank 
market performance in NEZ had a highest value. More interestingly, attention should 
be drawn upon the prosperous 'underground financial market' (UFM, the illegal 
financial market) in NEZ which can be interpreted another reason for the 
underperforming banking sector. 
Since the People's Bank of China has strictly controlled interest rates for different 
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kinds of deposits, all banks and non-bank financial institutions operating in the 
financial market have no right to set their own competitive interest rate to attract 
customers. In China's deposit market, price competition has been ruled out. Though 
there are several banks operating all over the country simultaneously, people cannot 
benefit from a non-price competition market as they are facing with the exactly same 
offer. The relatively better option for them is to put their money into a bank with more 
explicit bailout protection by which means they feel more secure. However, as real 
interest rate keeps decreasing and eventually appears to be negative, saving money in 
the public financial institution is indeed wealth losing. In these circumstances, the 
negative interest rate becomes the incentive for households to withdraw their deposits 
from the banking sector and hunt for the profitable alternatives. Associated with the 
limited investment channels in China, it eventually stimulates the UFM. 
UFM is not a brand-new market sector in China. It first appeared in the rural area of 
richer and developed coastal regions, including Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong. 
Since it operates in 'darkness', it is rather beyond the reach of central bank's 
supervision, neither is it constrained by legal rules and regulations. As it has been 
generally characterised as more risky, it usually attracts the deposits by offering 
interest rates much higher than the official ones. Meanwhile, most of their credit 
clients are those small- and medium-size firms that are not qualified to be served by 
big and more prudential banks and non-bank financial institutions. Hence, UFM in the 
earlier stage actually utilised the surplus financial funds and facilitated the local 
economic growth in a more or less positive way. However, as the UFM expanded 
rapidly and broadly, it undoubtedly threatened the security and stability of the official 
financial system and aggravated the overheating economic growth at the same time. 
According to a City Bank's survey (2005), there about RMB 900 billion domestic 
household deposits flew away from domestic banks from May to October in 2004, 
where the major part was estimated to have been transferred into the UFM. Since the 
domestic economic statistic scheme is not able to cover the size and effect of UFM, 
the real picture of China's UFM is unknown. In early 2004, a nationwide quantitative 
research undertaken by Central University of Finance and Economics provided an 
interesting and remarkable insight of China's UFM. As a result, it has been identified 
for the first time that the scale of China's underground credit ranges from RMB740 to 
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830 billion, equivalent to 28.7 percent of the official credit market. Nevertheless, it is 
argued that the above figures are likely to be much underestimated. According to some 
previous local research and estimation, the underground credit volume in Guangdong 
province was approximately RMB500 billion, while in Wenzhou city, the most 
developed metropolitan in Zhejiang, the underground credit volume exceeded 
RMB 15 0 billion. Furthermore, Lu Lei, the senior analyst from China Merchants Bank, 
pointed out that the internal funds of enterprises, particularly of those non-SOEs, 
could have been neglected where the main proportion is believed to be channelled 
from UFM9. 
A number of interesting findings have been drawn from this survey. Among of many, 
the most striking one is that the largest size of UFM is not in coastal developed 
provinces such as Fujian and Zhejiang, but rather appears in NEZ. In particular, the 
UFM in Heilongjiang is equivalent to over 50 percent of the official financial market, 
the biggest one in China, while the second biggest locates in Liaoning with a size over 
40 percent. Unlike the UFM in east and south regions substantially facilitating the 
development of private-owned enterprises, the existence of UFM in NEZ is largely 
associated with the 'underground economy' (firms or enterprises running illegal 
business) in local province. Currently, transferring credits among enterprises is 
prevalent in NEZ. Partly due to the long-term relationship with banks and/or 
benefiting from government's implicit bailout, the well-known and sophisticated 
SOEs have no difficulty in obtaining credits from banks. The other types of 
enterprises, especially the underground economic entities, however, have been strictly 
ruled out of the credit market. In these circumstances, the large SOEs established a 
certain transferring credit club where they can re-assign their bank credits to those 
club members who are unable to gain loans from banks by receiving a certain amount 
of guarantee fees, usually as much as 10 percent of the loans. In fact, it is believed that 
the large enterprises were absorbing credits from official credit markets on behalf of 
the unqualified credit by charging high and illegal commission from the latter one. It 
is obvious that whenever the financial chain breaks, both SOEs and the banks 
allocating credits to those SOEs will suffer while the state economy is the ultimate 
victim and the local government has to take the responsibility to pay back all the 
9 Wang, Chenbo, 'China's underground financial market nearly RMB 1000 billion', China News 
Weekly, published on website www. sinc-com. cn, financial news colurim, 20, h January 2005, 
http: //news. sina. com. cn/c/2005-01-20/11254893676s. shtmi 
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senous consequences 
According to the analysis report on this survey, the impact of UFM varies over the 
regions. In Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Fujiang and Guangdong, where private-owned 
enterprises have been playing a more and more important role, UFM operates in a 
mature market mechanism, characterised as well disciplined, more standardised and 
having higher reputation than official banking sector. Thus, the local economic growth 
is attributed to the development of UFM by over 20 percent. By contrast, in NEZ, 
particularly in Liaoning province, UFM has been found severely harming the local 
economic growth by nearly 30 percent. 
Therefore, the descriptive analysis on NEZ (presented in Table 6.7 and 6.9) and the 
estimated result in Table 6.8 are not difficult to interpret. Both LGDP and SOB stay at 
the highest level in NEZ, while the importance of domestic loans in TIFA declined 
gradually. Based on the finding from the UFM survey, it can be explained that the 
large SOEs in NEZ increasingly achieved credit allocation from banks, mainly from 
state-owned banks. Instead of using the credits to fund the investment projects or 
expands the production operation, more and more bank credits have flowed into risky 
and gamble UFM in forms of transferring credit club. Since UFM and underground 
economy is rather clandestine and out of the monitor of the authority, their activities 
and effects are hardly taken in account. Obviously, it is unsurprising to find no 
contribution from the banking sector expansion, but rather deterioration, towards 
economic growth in NEZ. Moreover, if the UFM could have been thoroughly 
identified and taken into the national economic statistics scheme, the negative impact 
of banking sector development would be distinguished in NEZ. 
6.6 Statistic analysis - direct financing and indirect financing 
Various studies (see Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1996 for a review) have shown that 
as economies develop, investment financing tends to evolve from internal self-finance 
(retained profit), to external finance including intermediated debt finance and finally 
to direct capital markets for debt and equity. In general, internal self-finance remains 
the dominant financing source in most companies in most countries. Nevertheless, 
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external finance also plays a virtual role in funding the enterprises investments project. 
In recent years, China's equity market has developed. The emergence of bond market 
and stock market marks that the financial transaction activities begin to operate 
according to the market rules, and show enormous market vitality and its development 
level becomes the important standard measuring the marketisation of capital in a 
country. 
Raising funds through issuing corporate bonds developed significantly during the 
period of 1980s. The market for corporate bonds no longer limited to those small 
enterprises and rural ones: SOEs, collective enterprises with good economic returns, 
as well as Sino-foreign joint ventures also entered the bond market. In 1990s, within 
the two major financing measures in China's capital market, Chinese companies are 
keener to raise investment fund through equity financing rather than through debt 
financing. In most of the mature capital market, enterprises prefer to raise funds by 
internal financing first, than borrowing outside alternatively; while issuing stock 
should be the ultimate choice when the former two alternatives are not applicablelo. 
By contrast to this common law of the order of financing decision, Chinese enterprises 
prefer the opposite way (Zhang, 2002). Going public is the most favourite choice of 
Chinese companies when they consider of financing. Non-listed companies are 
struggling with going public to raise funds while those listed companies enjoy 
splitting more and more new shares. Indicated in Table 6.10, the development of 
China's corporate bond market is sluggish and even shrinking. 
The rapid development of the stock market is also reflected in the changing ratio 
between funds raised through stock sale and added volumes of bank loans. This ratio 
in fact indicates the financing structure in the whole capital market and the financing 
situations in the securities market, and also indirectly reflects the effects that different 
means of financing may bring about in the field of enterprise ownership structure, 
operation achievements, and restraints on operator's behaviour. There is a steady 
growth both in the ratio between funds raised in China's stock market and added 
volumes of credits, and in the ratio between funds raised in stock market and added 
volumes of state-owned bank loans, which indicates that the proportion of direct 
financing is increasing, funds raised through stock sale is playing more and more 
" See Myers and MsJluf, 1984. 
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Table 6.10: Corporate bond financing and domestic equity financing, 1991-2002. 
Unit: R-MB 100 million 
Year Corporate Bond Financing Domestic Equity Financing 
1991 249.9 5 
1992 683.71 50 
1993 235.84 276.41 
1994 161.75 99.78 
1995 300.8 85-51 
1996 268.92 294.34 
1997 255.23 856.06 
1998 147.89 778.02 
1999 158 896.83 
2000 83 1540.86 
2001 147 1182.15 
2002 325 779.75 
Source: China's Security and Future Statistic Yearbook, 2003, p. 17,19. 
Figure 6.5: Ratio of Domestic Raised Capital in Stock Market to Added Volumes 
of Bank Loans (%) 
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important role in the capital formation, and the free flow and efficient allocation of 
capital are upgrading (Figure 6.5). A mechanism of "voting with one's feet" is 
gradually strengthened, and the capital market is becoming more and more active. 
Before we carry out the causality test between stock market development and 
economic growth, we attempt to examine the impact of the stock market upon the 
regional economic growth. The current available stock market information on 
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provincia level is the regional raised capital of A-shares from Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchanges, which can be retrieved back to 1991 1 '. Instead of using the raised 
capital as the indicator of stock market development, we propose to interpret the 
original research hypothesis as the impact of direct financing from provincial capital 
market financial on economic growth. The distinction between direct and indirect 
financing in China's capital market has been made in earlier section. Direct financing 
includes capital raised by issuing both shares in stock market and corporate bonds in 
bond market; while indirect financing refers to bank credit allocation exclusively. The 
main idea behind this is to investigate the development of direct financing (stock 
market and corporate bond market) in respect to the expansion of bank credit market. 
The hypothesis testing will be accomplished by using the estimated model (Eq-6-4) 
illustrated in the previous chapter, where concerning the impact of banking sector on 
economic growth. Unlike the financial intermediary indicator, Zi, , being measured by 
five banking sector indicators in previous section, it has been substituted by the 
relative importance of direct financing. To gauge the significance of direct financing, 
we derive the ratio of direct financing to indirect financing as the proxy. Before 
applying the data into the hypothesis testing process, additional explanation on this 
ratio calculation needs to be further addressed. Unlike the accumulated data of bank 
credit allocation, the information of direct financing is the annual amount of 
investment funds raised from stock market and bond market. Thus, bank credit data 
should be re-arranged as the annual increment simply by taking the difference of the 
annual accumulated value between two successive years. Moreover, data of capital 
raised from stock market are available since 1991 on provincial basis, while the 
time-span of data of funds collected from corporate bond issuing only covered 12 
years from 1987 to 1998. Hence, data for provincial direct financing has been 
compiled from 1987 to 1998, which includes corporate-bond funds only before 1990 
while stock market capital has been taken into consideration from 1991 to 1998. In 
order to utilise the available data source thoroughly, we define direct financing into 
two ways: the first one include funds raised from both corporate bonds and stock 
market from 1987 to 1998, denoted as CBS; while the second one refers to the capital 
raised from stock market from 1991 to 2002, denoted as STK. Correspondingly, we 
11 The capital raised from stock market includes funds raised via both IPO and non-first issuing (share 
rights issued). 
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Table 6.11: Stock Market Development and Economic Growth: All Provinces 
(Two-way Fixed Effect Model) 
Independent Dependent variable: economic growth (net cha nge 
. 
of GD 
, 
Pý ) 
- ------------- --- -. - ---I --- - -- ---- ------- ---- ----- -- -- --- --------------- ---l- ........... ------ ----------- - variables Ia (1987-1998) 2a (1991-2002) 
GL 0.0107 (0.0526) 0.0093 (0.058) 
GK 0.5693*** (0.0551) 
FDI 0.0066 (0.0103) 
Education 0.0619* (0.0372) 
WLM 0.0442 (0.0721) 
WLS 0.0611** (0.0273) 
CBSBL 0.0197 (0.0126) 
STKBL 
Constant 0.0355** (0.0149) 
Hausman Test 0.013 
(p-value) 
Provinces 30 
Observations 360 
0.6008*** (0.0658) 
0.0118** (0.0053) 
0.1731 (0.2128) 
0.0319 (0.0848) 
0.0524*** (0.0091) 
0.0077 (0.0065) 
0.0387** (0.0175) 
0.08 
30 
360 
Note: 
L The asterisk represents the significance at 5% (1%) level respectively. 
2. All dependent and independent variables are calculated in log-differences. Independent variables 
are growth of labour force (GL), growth of capital stock (GK). Control variables include FDI and 
Education proxy, the weight of manufactory and servicing labour input over total labour force 
respectively (WLM & WLS). 
3. CBSBL is the ratio of capital raised from both stock market and bond market to bank credit 
allocation. STKBL is the ratio of capital raised from stock market only to bank credit allocation. 
obtain two proxies of direct financing, named CBSBL and STKBL respectively, which 
are defined as the ratios of CBS over Bank Loans (BL) and STK over BL. 
The empirical result has been derived based on two-way fixed effect model and was 
reported in Table 6.11, using two stock market development indicators - CBSBL and 
STKBL, respectively (column la and 2a). Neither of these two indicators is 
significantly correlated with the economic growth, indicating that it is hard to find any 
influence from direct financing on economic growth. Given that the bank credit 
market remains as the major financial source, direct financing market appears to be 
shrinking in most recent year, which further enhances the burden of banking sector. In 
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these circumstances, it is undoubted to find that direct financing in tenns of the 
development of stock market (with bond market as well) did not contribute to the 
economic development in respect to the rapid rise of bank credit allocation. 
6.7 Summary 
This chapter mainly investigated the economic growth pattern in China by using panel 
data technique - the combination of cross section and time serial data. The empirical 
framework was established on a classical economic growth model, which contains the 
growth input factor, financial factors and other control variables. The weight of 
sectoral labour force (manufactory and servicing sector) has also been taken into 
account in order to capture the impact of the structural change on economic growth. 
This result indicated that the major contribution to the national economic growth is the 
substantial capital stock accumulation, while less commitment comes from the growth 
of labour force. During the economic and financial reform period, production factors 
have significantly shifted from lower productivity sector (such as agricultural sector) 
to the higher one (such as manufactory and servicing sectors). Nevertheless, it seems 
it is the servicing sector that mostly benefits from such structural change. Meanwhile, 
the empirical finding that there is significant and positive effect of FDI on national 
economic growth is consistent with most existing empirical studies. In addition, the 
vital contribution of educational level enhancement indicates the improvement in the 
quality of human capital is another essential resource attributed to the productivity 
increase. 
The role of financial sector in form of banking industry in economic growth process 
has been carefully illustrated in both provincial panel and regional panel. We first 
introduced five alternative indicators corresponding as closely as possible to the ones 
used in cross-country analysis: (1) SIZE - the ratio of total deposits (of Overall 
Financial Institutions) over GDP, (2) CENTRAL - the ratio of loans to deposits of the 
State Banks, (3) LGDP - the ratio of loans to GDP, (4) CONCENTRATION -a 
Herfindahl index of banking sector to present the provincial banking market structure 
and competition intensity and (5) SOB - the credits from four state-owned banks to 
the credits from total local financial institutions. 
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Then we illustrated the relationship between real GDP growth and each financial 
intermediation indicator by statistical description. The statistical result showed that 
these five indicators were all negatively related to GDP growth, despite the rather 
weak relationship discovered between CENTRAL and economic growth. Meanwhile, 
we also discover a few interesting relations among the banking indicators, such as the 
strong and positive relationship between SIZE and LGDP, SOB and CENTRAL, 
LGDP and CONCENTRATION. This statistical description suggests several 
preliminary results. First, the size of provincial financial intermediation does not 
necessarily have a firm relationship with the level of economic development, since the 
statistic correlation on averaged provincial data and panel data draws contradictory 
conclusion on this issue. Second, provinces with a lower rate of economic growth 
receive larger credit flows from the central government. Third, higher market 
concentration is associated with lower growth performance and a similar situation also 
applies to the degree of four state-owned banks credits. 
Unlike the common findings obtained from the cross-country analysis supporting the 
positive correlation between financial inten-nediaries' development and economic 
growth, this empirical study discovered that none of these five banking indicators was 
positively correlated with the economic growth, indicating that China's banking sector 
has not statistically generated any contribution to the economic development. 
Particularly, it is unusual to find that the increasing bank credit volume has no impact 
upon the GDP growth whilst the other four banking indicators are negatively 
correlated to the economic growth. The result firmly provided the evidence that, 
associated with the worsening credit quality in terms of the increasing volume of 
non-performing loans, the over concentration of credit resource distribution in such a 
state-owned-bank-dominated banking sector obviously hampered the efficiency of 
credit allocation hence impeding the economic growth. 
In regional panel, the positive relationship has been found between the size of banking 
sector measured by deposit over GDP and the regional economic growth in South 
Coastal, North Coastal and East Coastal regions. It has also been noticed that the loan 
to GDP ratio is positively related to the economic growth in ECR only; while it is 
highly negatively related to the economic growth in the least developed region - 
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Northeast Zone, though the proportion of bank credits over GDP (LGDP) Is the 
highest one within these eight regions. Furthermore, the survey undertaken on the 
scale and function of UFM found out that the dramatic expansion of UFM in NEZ has 
produced seriously negative impact on the stability of official financial system and 
regional economic growth. 
Finally, it is hard to find any influence from direct financing (measured by the ratio of 
stock market and corporate bond marketing financing over the credit market financing) 
on economic growth. Given that the bank credit market remains as the ma or financial 
source, direct financing market appears to be shrinking in most recent year, which 
further enhances the burden of banking sector. In these circumstances, it is undoubted 
to find that direct financing in terms of the development of stock market (with bond 
market as well) did not contribute to the economic development in respect to the rapid 
rise of bank credit allocation. 
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Chapter 7: Financial Market Development and Economic Growth in 
China - Granger-causality tests 
7.1 Introduction 
The preceding discussion has concentrated on the effect from banking sector upon 
economic growth using panel data technique. However, given the rapid development 
of China's stock market, the analysis of the financial- growth nexus in China would be 
incomplete without paying attention to China's stock market. Meanwhile,, the 
controversy concerning the direction of causality between financial market and 
economic growth is far from settled (for details, see the relevant literature survey in 
Section 2.4.2.2). 
As far as stock market is concerned, Levine (1991) and Benchivenga, Smith and Starr 
(1996) emphasise the positive role of liquidity provided by stock exchanges on 
enhancing the productivity growth via facilitating investment in longer-run and 
higher-retum projects. Share prices determined in exchanges and other publicly 
available information help investors make better investment decisions. Better 
investment decisions by investors mean better allocation of funds among corporations 
and as a result, a higher rate of economic growth. The promotion of stock market in 
China has received considerable support from many economists based on two reasons. 
First, the stock market is treated as a means of complementing the effects of China's 
credit markets by providing alternative channel of raising investments funds for firms 
who could not access to the credit markets (Cho, 1986; Li, 1994). Second, the 
development of stock market is also seen as an essential means of reforming China's 
large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (Xiang, 1998). It is believed that the 
transforming SOEs into shareholding companies can reduce their dependence on debt 
finance and improve the corporate governance. 
However, other economists have criticised the promotion of China's stock market (see, 
for instance, Singh, 1990; He, 1994). They point out that the successful bank-based 
development experiences in countries such as Germany and Japan provides good 
counter examples to the idea that development requires a stock market. On such basis, 
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they argue that stock market is unnecessary institution for achieving high level of 
economic growth; China could be better off by concentrating on reforming the 
existing banking system exclusively. Meanwhile, several economists (see, Singh, 1993 
and 1995; Singh and Hamid, 1992) argue that relatively small amounts of funds for 
investment are raised through the stock market even in countries such as UK and USA. 
The stock market serves to allow those who have established successful firms to sell 
part of their company and release wealth for themselves. Furthermore, they believe 
that the intrinsic problems of stock market, such as the high degree of volatility and 
speculative feature, would negatively influence the stability of economic development 
and increase the vulnerability. 
China's stock market did not exist until 1990 when the Shanghai Stock Exchange was 
established. During the development lasting for a decade and a half, China's stock 
market expanded rapidly and overwhelmingly. However, most studies conducted on 
Chinese stock market either make the comparison with western developed stock 
market, or focus on analysing its functions theoretically. Empirical work relating to 
China on the nexus of stock market-economy development is seldom undertaken. It is 
rare to find the studies on either the comparison between stock market and banking 
sector or their joint-contribution on economic growth. The most current available 
empirical work has been undertaken on the basis of cross-country estimation. 
In this chapter, we present further evidence concerning the debate over whether 
financial development leads economic growth in a Granger-causality test by using 
VAR model technique. Particularly, our interest not only focuses on banking sector, 
but also extends to the performance of stock market in the process of China's 
economic development. We first undertake the hypothesis test against the causality 
nexus between banking sector development and national economic growth by using 
annual aggregated data (1952-2003) in Section 7.2. Followed by a descriptive analysis 
over three types of stock market development indicator (size, liquidity and volatility) 
in Section 7.3, Section 7.4 examines the causality direction between the economic 
growth, measured by the industrial value-added (IVA), and each stock market 
development indicator. The same technique will be applied to the whole financial 
market combining both stock market and banking sector in Section 7.5. Section 7.6 
summarises the key empirical findings. 
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7.2 The role of banking sector development in economic growth - annual 
aggregated data 
Since Schumpeter made the first statement about how financial transactions take 
central stage in economic growth in 1911, various studies, including both theoretical 
and empirical ones, have been worked on the correlation between economic growth 
and financial intermediaries during the past half century. Though it is unlikely to find 
a unique conclusion on the cause-effect relationship between these two elements, the 
important role of financial intermediaries has often been illustrated and widely 
accepted. 
In general, the fundamental frictions that give rise to financial intermediaries are 
either of a technological or an incentive nature: the former prevents individuals from 
having access to economics of scale, while the latter occurs because information is 
costly and asymmetrically distributed across agents. Hence, financial intermediaries 
are able to relax these frictions given their primary functions (see Section 2.3.3). It is 
clear that rapid increasing investment is the engine behind China's current economic 
boom. 
How these investment activities have been effectively fuelled is an interesting issue 
associated with the performance of financial intermediaries which is worth 
investigating. Ideally, the combination of both banking sector and stock market will 
provide a more complete picture in respect to the study on the role of entire financial 
intermediaries. However, since China's stock market did not exist until 1992, it will be 
an essential limitation of having few observations (using aggregate annual data in this 
section) when the econometric technique is applied. In these circumstances, this 
section only presents a brief concern on the state aggregated credit market (banking 
sector) given the sufficient observations. 
7.2.1 Descriptive analysis 
During the sample period (1952 - 2003), the growth of ratio of Outstanding Bank 
Loan over GDP and growth of GDP moved on a different path (see Chart 7.1). 
However, the conclusion could not be drawn that the financial development negatively 
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Chart 7.1: Growth of Real GDP vs. Growth of Loan to Nominal GDP ratio 
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various issues. 
influenced the economic growth. One of the reasons is the different growth rate of 
GDP and Bank Loans. The raw data indicates that the growth of GDP is faster than the 
growth of Bank Loan granted. Hence, in those years where real GDP grew in a high 
speed, the growth of financial ratio actually declined. Since mid-1990s, China's 
economic growth has been driven by the domestic demand expansion which is a result 
of investment from both government sector and corporate sector. 
The Government sector investment apparently takes the major portion of the total 
investment amount, in particular those large infrastructure construction projects. In the 
corporate sector, the sources of total investments in fixed assets (TIFA) include state 
budgetary appropriation, domestic loans, foreign investments and self-raising funds, 
where the last category has always been the biggest source (over 60 percent) of TIFA, 
including retained profits, funds raised from issuing equities and other sources. 
Although domestic loans is the second biggest source, its growth rate maintained 
higher than that of self-raising funds in most years during the past two decades (see 
Chart 7.2). The main exception arose in 1995-1997, when China's stock markets 
experienced a rapid expansion: overall 554 companies successfully realised IPO in 
these three years; the annual growth rate of capital raised via share issuing was 110 
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Chart 7.2: Growth of Domestic Loans vs. Growth of Self-raising Funds 
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percent, 244 percent and 190 percent, respectively 1. The rise of stock market 
capitalisation indicates that the stock markets have provided an important channel for 
domestic enterprises. Consequently, the success in IPO reduced the companies' 
reliance on domestic bank loans immediately for their investment funds while the 
self-raising funds increased dramatically. 
Given China's particular background, financial sector development is more likely to 
support the economic growth rather than taking the leading position. We will further 
examine this statement by undertaking some statistical analysis with econometric 
techniques. Due to the primitive nature of China's capital market, the limited channel 
of raising investment funds restricts the majority of funds are stemmed from bank 
loans, especially from big four stated-owned commercial banks. Therefore, we use 
bank credit (BC) to roughly proxy the financial development and define it as the 
growth of the ratio of bank loans granted by overall national banks to GDP (in 
logarithm), where the definition of National Banks was provided in the Data 
Description section (Section 4.3-1.3, Chapter 4). 
1 Figures are obtained by author's calculation based on the official statistic derived from the China Securities and 
Futures Statistical Yearbook, 2003, p. 36 & 156. 
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7.2.2 Statistic analysis 
Granger non-causality test based on VAR model is a widely used approach to fulfill 
this task, which has been done by a number of scholars (see, for instance, Levine, 
1997; Arestis and Demetriades, 1997; Levine and Zervos, 1998; Ahmed, 1998; etc. ). 
We examine the impact of financial development on economic growth by Granger 
causality test applied to the quavariate VAR in output growth (DLY), capital stock 
growth (DLK), labour force growth (DLL) and bank credits (BC), mainly using the 
technique illustrated in Section 4.2.3, Chapter 4. 
As these four variables are termed in growth form, they are all stationary and subject 
to 1(0). Therefore, it is not necessary to test the cointegration rank among them. 
Nevertheless, we need to determine the optimal order for this VAR model. According 
to the lag selection statistic result, we find that both Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) and Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) select order 1, which has been further 
confirmed by Likelihood Ratio statiStiCS2. In order to identify the Granger causality 
relationship between financial development and economic growth, we are interested in 
carrying out the following two sets of null hypothesis test: 
Hypothesis One (H,, ): Finance development does not Granger-cause economic growth, 
including two sub-hypotheses - bank credit expansion (BQ does not Granger cause 
capital stock growth (DLK) and BC does not Granger cause output growth (GLY); 
Hypothesis Two ( Hý ): Economic growth does not Granger-cause financial 
development, including two sub-hypotheses - GLK does not Granger-cause BC and 
GLY does not cause BC. 
Capital stock growth is the major contribution to the national GDP growth (see ECM 
analysis in Chapter 5), which is mainly derived from the rapid expansion of fixed 
assets investment. Most of these investment projects are funded by bank loans. Thus, 
we not only concern about the cause-effect nexus between bank loans expansion and 
GDP growth, but also consider the causality direction between bank credits and capital 
stock growth. The test result has been summarised in Table 7.1. 
For simplicity, the statistics result for order selection procedure is not reported in detail here. 
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Table 7.1: Gran ger-cau sality Result and Direction of Causality - annual 
aggregated data 
LR statistic 
(VAR(l)) 
Reject null hypothesis 
(Ho) 
H': Financial development does not Granger-cause economic growth 0 
BC respect to DLK 1.5929 No 
BC respect to DLY 4.2114 No 
H02 : Economic growth d oes not Granger-cause financial development 
DLK respect to BC 12.3544** Yes 
DLY respect to BC 8.6578* Yes 
Note: BC = Bank Credits; DLK = Capital Stock Growth; DLY = Output Growth. * indicates 
significant at the 5 percent level and ** at the I percent level. 
Testing H' is equivalent to imposing the condition that the coefficient of the lagged 0 
values of BC in the block of equations explaining the variable DLK or DLY is zero. 
The log-likelihood ratio (LR) statistic, which has an asymptotical X' distribution, is 
1.5929 when testing for the non-causality of the bank credit expansion in the growth 
of capital stock. We obtain LR statistic of 4.2114 when testing for the non-causality of 
the bank credit expansion in output growth. Neither of them is significant at 5 percent 
critical value, indicating H' cannot be rejected. 0 
A similar exercise is carried out towards HO - the economic growth does not cause 
financial development. LR statistic is 12.3544 (significant at 5 percent level) when 
testing for the non-causality of the capital stock growth in bank credit expansion; and 
the LR statistic is 8.6578 (significant at I percent level) when testing for the 
non-causality of the output growth in bank credit expansion. Therefore, H02 that 
economic growth does not Granger-cause financial development has been fully 
rej ected. 
Summing up the result from the above Granger causality testing, there is evidence that 
financial development is unlikely to be the leading factor to the economic growth, 
while the 'demand- following' is the actual feature of financial development termed by 
Patrick (1966). The empirical findings are well explained by the performance of 
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China's financial sector. The financial market in China, dominated by banking 
industry, is still far away from being mature and sophisticated. Prior to the 
implementation of financial reform, China's banking sector is the pure subordinate 
institution of the state authority rather than a profit-oriented entity. The bank was 
forced to play the role as a cashier of the Ministry of Finance: collecting the profits 
from enterprises and allocating the state funds to each individual industry and 
enterprises in accordance with the very specific plan. Though the establishment of a 
two-tier banking system was the major progress achieved in the earlier stage of 
financial reform, banking sector remained functioning with characteristics of 
plan-oriented economy. Hence, there is a strong likelihood that the banking sector in 
China is supporting the economic growth by political or administrative means. 
Expanding the analysis on this point, the data sample has been separated into two 
sub-samples, 1952-1978 and 1979-2003, to testify the consistency of 
Granger-causality relationship across the financial reform period. The statistic result is 
displayed in Table 7.2 where we can find the financial development kept playing the 
'demand- following' role in economic growth in pre- and post-refonn era. However, 
something slightly different from the findings based on the whole sample is that in 
post-reform stage, it is unlikely to find any cause-effect nexus between financial 
development and capital stock growth in either pre- or post-refonn period. It indicates 
that in the post-reforni stage, the bank loans is not the device stimulating investment, 
meanwhile, the increase of investment does not necessarily enhance the demand for 
bank loans. This result can be partly explained by the innovation and diversification of 
financial market in China, particularly the introduction of stock market provides 
another important channel for enterprises raise investment funds. 
7.3 Economic growth and Stock market development indicators 
7.3.1 Economic growth indicator 
Economic growth indicator used in this research is LAV, which is a level value 
computed on monthly basis. The most ideal one, however, is the monthly GDP value 
while this type of statistics has not been available until 2000. Nevertheless, adopting 
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Table 7.2: Gran ger-cau s ality Result and Direction of Causality on two separated 
period: 1952-1978,1979-2003 
1952-1978 1979-2003 
LR statistic Reject null LR statistic Reject null 
(VAR(l)) hypothesis (VAR(l)) hypothesis 
(HO) (Ho) 
H': Financial development does not Granger-cause economic growth 0 
BC respect to DLY 1.5598 No 1.9963 No 
BC respect to DLK 1.1965 No 1.3915 No 
H2 Economic growth does not Granger-cause financial development 0 
DLY respect to BC 11.0723** Yes 6.4584* Yes 
DLK respect to BC 13.4753** Yes 2.2824 No 
Note: BC = Bank Credits; DLK = Capital Stock Growth; DLY = Output Growth. * indicates 
statistic result is significant at the 5 percent level and ** at the I percent level. 
IAV as the most relevant and suitable substitution is based on the following two 
considerations. First, as we analysed in previous chapter, China is a rapidly 
developing country staying on the transitional stage into an industrialised economy. 
Hence, IAV can be treated as a good proxy to measure economic growth. Second, the 
implicit initial task for China's stock market establishment was to exploit another fund 
channel to finance SOEs, particularly those state-owned industrial enterprises. 
Additionally, there are over 65 percent of the listed companies are operating in 
industrial sector. In these circumstances, when we examine the causality relationship 
between stock market and economic growth, IAV is a more appropriate indicator 
instead of GDP to measure the economic performance. 
When we use monthly level data, the regular growth rate computed by first-order 
difference of raw data is no longer useful because of the seasonal effect. Therefore, the 
monthly growth rate is calculated by comparing the data of same month between the 
current year (to) and the previous year 4-12). Meanwhile, the raw data of IVA are 
termed in current price, indicating that it is necessary to remove the inflation effect 
from the original value of IVA before computing its growth rate. Among a number of 
price indices available for use as a deflator, the Ex-factory Price Indices of Industrial 
Products (EFPI) has been selected as the most relevant. 
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Nevertheless, the major weakness is that no monthly-based deflator is available to 
deflate the monthly raw IVA data correspondingly and thus applying one single annual 
price index throughout the whole year is rather arbitrary In order to obtain the real 
value of monthly IVA, it is vital to find the appropriate monthly deflator that is the 
monthly EFPI computed based on certain assumption. It is plausible to assume that the 
increase of price remains at the same rate in each month during a year time, i. e. at the 
monthly equivalent of the annual rate. Consequently, the annual increment of EFPI 
has been equally divided into 12 portions. Correspondingly, the real value of monthly 
IVA is calculated by deflating the normal value with monthly EFPI. 
Devising indicators for stock market development is not an easy task at all. Ideally, 
such an indicator should simultaneously reflect liquidity, volume of transactions, 
informational efficiency, degree of concentration, volatility, depth, legal and 
institutional and other factors that determine the overall performance of a stock 
exchange. Based on the work done by a number of researchers (for instance Levine, 
1991; King and Levine, 1993; Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1996; Levine and Zervos, 
1998), we are going to define six stock market development indicators categorised 
into three aspects: size, liquidity and volatility. 
7.3.2 Stock market development indicators 
Unlike most of the other cross-country analysis produced upon the effect of stock 
market, which mostly used annual-based or quarterly-based data, this empirical work 
mainly focuses on the China's stock market exclusively constituted on monthly-based 
data. Given the short history of China's stock market development (less than 15 years), 
the limitation of data is always the crucial problem in terms of both quality and 
availability, which highly constrains many researchers from constituting quantitative 
examination against the nexus of stock market and economic growth. Similarly, we 
should also bear the data restriction in mind when we conduct this study and we try to 
maximise our sample data by extending the time range to the monthly basis, covering 
as long period as possible for both financial market and economic growth indicators. 
In this section of empirical work, the data sample is the period from 1995MI to 
2004MI2. In addition, given that the major task of this study is to investigate the 
effect of domestic financial market upon economic growth, B-share (share issued and 
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traded aboard 3) and H-share (shares issued and traded in Hong Kong stock market) 
statistical information has been removed from the aggregated statistics. 
As we mentioned in Chapter 3, the most abnormal characteristic of Chinese stock 
market is high proportion of non-circulating shares. Stock rights owned by listed 
companies are artificially divided into two categories, namely, circulation stocks and 
non-circulation stocks. These are further partitioned into state-owned stocks, corporate 
stocks, public stocks and stocks sold by a given listed companies to its own staff 
members, which are different from one another in mobility and in rights and interests 
for the owners. The proportion not meant for circulation accounts for about 70 percent 
of the list companies' aggregate capital stock. Consequently, different market size will 
lead to different dimension of other indicators associated with market size. The 
statistics summary of stock market indicators has been displayed in Table 7.3. 
1. Size. Capitalisation is used to measure the size of the stock market and equals the 
value of listed domestic shares on domestic exchanges divided by total economic 
output. In terms of economic significance, the assumption behind market 
capitalization is that market size is positively correlated with the ability to 
mobilise capital and diversify risk. Due to the highly concentrated non-tradable 
state-owned share, capitalisation will be defined into two ways. The first one is the 
ratio of the overall value of listed domestic shares over IVA (OC), while the 
second one is yielded by substituting the overall value by tradable shares value 
(TC). Moreover, since the statistics of capitalisation is the market value at the end 
of month; while IVA is the accumulated stock value of a certain period, a whole 
calendar month in this study sample. Therefore, the validity of a ratio yielded by a 
time-point variable and stock value is questionable. Due to the restriction of data 
availability, the optimal solution to improve this situation is to use the average 
value of market capitalisation obtained by the beginning and end value of monthly 
capitalisation. 
2. Liquidity indicators. While economists advance many theoretical definitions of 
"liquidity" , analysts generally use 
the term "liquidity" to refer to the ability to 
3 Although the B-share market has been opened to domestic residents since 2000, the transaction of B-share should 
be transacted in either US dollar or HK dollar. Meanwhile, B-share market remains isolated from A-share market. 
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Table 7.3: Surnmarised statistics - monthly data (1995Ml-2004MI2) 
Standard Observatio 
Maximum Minimum Mean Deviation ns 
Output Growth 
(GIVA) 0.3859 -0.1536 0.1006 0.1176 120 
Overall Market 
28.248 1.771 12.099 6.205 120 Capitalisation (OC) 
Tradable 
9.260 0.424 3.699 2.082 120 Capitalisation (TC) 
Tumover (Overall 
0.420 0.016 0.107 0.082 120 
shares) (TNOC) 
Tumover (Tradable 
1.579 0.054 0.377 0.308 120 
shares) (TNTC) 
Value Traded (VT) 4.869 0.046 1.175 0.905 120 
Volatility (VOL) 0.083 0.006 0.017 0.011 120 
Financial Depth 2.059 -0.149 0.742 0.442 120 
Bank Credit 0.413 -0.985 0.052 0.169 120 
Note: Output growth = growth of IVA; Overall Market Capitalisation = the averaged value of overall 
domestic shares as a share of IVA; Tradable Capitalisation = the averaged value of tradable domestic 
shares as a share of IVA; Turnover (Overall Shares) = value of the trades of domestic shares as a share 
of overall market capitalisation; Turnover (Tradable Shares) = value of trades of domestic share as a 
share of tradable market capitalisation; Value Traded = value of the trades of domestic shares as a share 
of IVA; Volatility = measure of daily percent change of Shanghai composite price index; Financial 
Depth = the monthly change of M2 as a share of IVA; Bank Credit = the monthly change of overall 
financial institution credits as a share of IVA. 
easily buy and sell securities. A comprehensive measure of liquidity would 
quantify all the costs associated with trading, including the time costs and 
uncertainty of finding a counterpart and settling the trade. We simply use two 
measures of realized stock trading. 
First, Turnover (TN) equals the value of the trades of domestic shares on domestic 
exchanges divided by the value of list domestic shares. Turnover measures the 
volume of domestic equities traded on domestic exchanges relative to the size of 
the market. High turnover is often used as an indicator of low transactions costs. 
importantly, a large stock market is not necessarily a liquid market; a large but 
Hence, we only focus on the information of A-share in our empirical study exclusively. 
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inactive market will have large capitalisation but small turnover. Due to the two 
different ways to gauge market capitalisation, we obtained two types of TN 
correspondingly. The first one, denoted as TNOC, is yielded by using overall 
market size as denominator; while the second one is computed by replacing 
overall market size by tradable market size as denominator and termed as TNTC. 
The second measure of market liquidity is Value Traded (VT), which equals the 
value of the traded of domestic shares on domestic exchanges divided by IVA. 
Theoretical models of stock market liquidity and economic growth directly 
motivate VT while not a direct measure of trading costs or the uncertainty 
associated with trading on a particular exchange (Levine, 1991; Bencivenga et al., 
1995; Levine and Zervos, 1998). VT measures trading volume as a share of 
national output and should therefore positively reflect liquidity on an 
economywide basis. Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996) also identify the VT may 
be importantly different from TN: VT captures trading relative to the size of the 
economy, while TN measure trading relative to the size of the stock market. Thus, 
a small but liquid market will have high TN but small VT. 
Nevertheless, Levine and Zervos (1998) argue that since stock markets are 
forward looking, VT has a potential drawback and hence the prices effect should 
be taken into account. Stock prices will rise today based on the anticipation of 
large future corporate profits. As a result, the increasing price will lead to the rise 
of stock transactions value and thus raise VT. The same effect will also occur to 
the market capitalisation. However, the liquidity indicator would increase without 
a rise in the number of transactions or a fall in transaction costs. In these 
circumstances, there are two ways to gauge to the prices effect. First, both 
capitalisation and VT indicators are included together in the regressions. The idea 
is that after controlling for capitalisation, if VT remains significantly correlated 
with growth, the conclusion can be drawn that the price effect does not influence 
the relationship between VT and growth. The second way to measure the 
importance of the price effect is to examine TN. The formula of TN explicitly 
wipes out the price effect because the stock prices enter into both the numerator 
and denominator of TN. If TN is positively and robustly associated with economic 
growth, then this implies that the price effect is not dominating the relationship 
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between liquidity and long-run economic growth. 
I Volatility indicator (VOL) is simply measured by calculating the standard 
deviation of the daily percentage changes in the Shanghai composite share price 
index, while the daily index used for the computation is the average of start-of-day 
point and end-of-day point. 
7.4 The role of stock market development in economic growth 
7.4.1 Descriptive analysis 
China speeded up the development of the securities market during its reform process. 
When China established its stock market in Shanghai and Shenzhen respectively in 
1990 and 1991, there were only 10 listed enterprises; by the end of 2004, the listed 
companies in China had reached 1377 (1236 with A-share only companieS4), with a 
total market value amounting to RMB3.7 trillion, and a negotiable market value of 
RMBI. 2 trillion. The speedy development of the stock market not only provided a 
strong support of funds for China's economic growth, but also remarkably promoted 
the marketisation of capital in China. 
Nonetheless, it is noticed that Chinese enterprises rely more on raising funds from the 
stock market than from the corporate bond market. Companies were not allowed to 
issue corporate bonds until 1987, while only SOEs were qualified to do so. Chinese 
enterprises raised RMB151.1 billion from the stock market in 2004 and RMB24.5 
billion from the bond market. The proportion of raised funds from bond issues was 
only about one-fifth of that from stock issues. 
Both Shenzhen and Shanghai have a task not faced by Hong Kong or by the New York 
Stock Exchange. That task is to help to turn state-owned enterprises into joint stock 
4 A_share only companies refer to those companies only issue A-share (termed in RMB) in domestic stock 
exchanges, i. e. Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzben Stock Exchange. By contrast, a small group of companies 
are authorised to issue B-share denominated in RMB but traded and purchased in foreign currencies (usually in 
USD and HKD) strictly by foreign investors. Meanwhile, some companies are also authorised to issue H-share in 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange (termed in HKD). For more detail on China's stock share classification, see Section 
4.3.3 in Chapter Four. 
192 
enterprises and to increase the privatisation of the economy. China has been able to 
avoid the disasters of the Russian experience in massively privatisIng its industry 
where the corruption and opportunism among the politicians and businessmen created 
a new group of billionaires with little of the benefits of privatisation going to the 
public at large. 
China's stock market has been regarded as a financing channel for SOEs from its very 
inception, a clear distortion of the intended function of a stock market. In order to 
finance SOEs, the government has implemented very tight controls over the listing of 
companies. Securities regulatory organisations are responsible for stipulating listing 
standards and examining and approving the listing of publicly traded companies. The 
financing of SOEs by the government and its efforts to maintain a leading position for 
its holdings in SOEs has led to the prominent issue of disconnect between shares and 
rights. The inequality between the majority shareholder in SOEs (including their 
administrative institution and parent company) holding illiquid shares and other 
shareholders (individual households) with liquid shares is widely viewed as a 
structural drawback that needs to be resolved quickly. 
The severe results caused by this structural drawback can be presented in the 
following three aspects. First, given the excessively small volume of the negotiable 
shares (less then 35 percent of the overall shares), the major portion of the tradable 
shares of individual stock can be easily concentrated into the hands of a few 
dominating private traders. Associated with the media promotion and word-of-mouth 
transmission among the small and medium sized investors, the share price would be 
pushed up to an incredibly high level, which results in the seriously distorted share 
5 price . Since the market 
is full of speculative transactions, the stock market function 
of distributing resource efficiently has been hampered dramatically. 
Second, as nearly all the largest shareholders were state entities, state holding enables 
the government, especially the local government, to remain involved in, and even 
5A good example here is the rapid price rise of Wan Technology (K'an Keji, stock code 000008) from RMB26 to 
R-MB 126 per share within 70 transaction days (25/10/99-17/02/00); while the share price experienced a stunning 
collapse afterwards down to RMB8.52 per share on January 28,2002. Wan Technology is a typical small-sized 
share in China's stock market - with overall 72 million shares; while only 35 million shares arc tradable (less than 
50% of the total share volume). The investigation conducted by CSRC discovered that in these circumstances, the 
abnormal share price fluctuation was apparently manipulated by four big corporate shareholders (together possess 
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dominated, firms' decision making in both enterprises operation and management 
personnel appointment. In these circumstances, maximising profits is not the virtual 
incentive for managers to commit their efforts as their career promotion is hardly 
related to the company's business performance. As a result, the 
mergers-and-acquisitions (M&A) function is ineffective in China's stock market. In 
western developed stock markets, managers' incentive is highly associated with the 
company performance usually reflected in the share price. The declining share price 
conveys the infon-nation that the company would become the M&A target. 
Consequently, managers have also been placed under the threat of losing their 
positions. However, the state entities' intervention in China's listed companies, 
associated with the lack of rules governing takeovers, results in the violation of M&A 
function, which affect the corporate governance reform negatively. 
Third, it has been also widely observed that the largest shareholder of listed 
companies, usually the parent SOEs, use the listed companies to siphon the investment 
funds raised from the stock market to benefit itself. Consequently, it is undoubtedly 
the case that the raised funds have been misused or vanished 'mysteriously'. Small 
and medium sized investors' wealth has been seized by a few privilege groups and/or 
individuals under the disguise of raising investment funds from stock market; thus the 
interest of small and medium sized investors has been largely violated. 
7.4.2 Statistic analysis 
Although Levine and Zervos's study (1998) implies a causality direction from stock 
market to economic development, stronger evidence is required for the existence and 
the direction of a causality relationship as such. Based on Granger's (1969) definition 
of causality, we therefore choose to employ Sims (1972) test which as been further 
developed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995), Zapata and Rambaldi (1997) and Rambaldi 
and Doran (1996). 
Prior to conducting the causality tests, it should be borne in mind that the stationarity 
issue is the crucial premise to guarantee the reliability of the regression analysis. 
Based on this consideration, we will first conduct the unit root test against each 
85% of the tradable shares). 
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time-series variable by using ADF test. For each of the variables we were unable to 
reject the null hypothesis that they were integyated of order one (, (, ))6. 
Since the data are not seasonally adjusted, the generalised and conventional method 
has been introduced to filter the seasonal effect, which is simply adding dummy 
variables into the estimated function as control variables to capture the seasonal effect. 
As we are using monthly data, 11 dummy variables have been created, denoted as 
Si =1, where i=M 15 M2ý M3 ... MII (M=month) for each month while the 12 
th month 
has been treated as the base month. The causality test result has been listed in Table 
7.4. 
One difficulty of using current month IVA (to) and the IVA of the same month but in 
previous year (t-12) to compute the growth rate of IVA is that it tends to generate a 
great deal of serial correlation from the following consideration: the observationtO-t-12 
and the observation tl-t-11 considerably overlap in having the period to to t-11 in 
common, and hence are likely to be highly correlated. Therefore, Durbin-Watson (DW) 
test is employed concerning of the serial correlation issue. Given the DW upper bound 
(DJ critical value at I percent significant level is 2.034 with 22 regressors (excluding 
intercept) and 120 observations, the diagnostic tests results are higher than the critical 
value, indicating that the null hypothesis of no serial correlation cannot be rejected. 
Therefore, the estimated result is valid and reliable. 
The following VAR model is estimated: 
kII 
Zt =a+ L(DjZ, j + 
jbjSj + ct (7.1) 
i=1 j=1 
where Zt = 
[GIVA - 
(STMK is the set of stock market development indicators); LsTmT- 
= 
[a, ]=[ (D (D, ' 
a and (D 
12 
;S is the dummy variable for certain month 
a2 (1)121 (1)1221 
0=1,2,..., l 1) to capture the seasonal effect, which has been treated as exogenous 
variables in the VAR model. To test the hypothesis of no Granger causality from stock 
market development (STMK) to output growth (GIVA), we test 
' The numbers of the lags in the tests were determined using AIC and SBC. Results are not reported here for 
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H= (D' =V== where (D' are the coefficients of STMK in system 0 12 12 ... 
(D12 =0ý 12 
7.1. To test the hypothesis of no Granger causality from output growth to stock market 
development, we test HO = (D' = (D2 (Dk =0 where V2, are the 21 21 21 
coefficients of GIVA in system 7.1. 
Since modified WALD test (MWALD) statistic has an asymptotic X' distribution in 
a VAR(k + dý,, aj 
(Toda and Yamamoto, 1995), we need to identify k (the lag length of 
the VAR model) and d (the maximal order of integration suspected in the system) first. 
Based on the lag length selection criterion - AIC and SBC, we found the optimal order 
of VAR model for each case, which is reported in the second column in Table 7.4. As 
far as d,,, ax is concerned, we have specified each variable in VAR model is I(I). 
Hence, d equals one in this VAR model. 
From the statistics test result (Table 7.4), it can be seen that there is certain correlation 
between stock market development and economic growth. However, this causality 
nexus has only been discovered from economic growth to stock market development 
rather than in the opposite direction. Meanwhile, this result is only valid and robust by 
using in tenns of capitalisation since MWALD statistic results are highly significant at 
5 percent and I percent level by using total market capitalisation and tradable market 
capitalisation respectively. When using the liquidity and volatility indicators as proxy 
to measure stock market development, no causality relationship has been found. 
Hence, it can be concluded that stock market size is the result rather than the cause 
factor of industrial output growth. 
It is clear that the share price volatility has inevitably affected the stock market 
capitalisation (OC and TC) and the value traded (VT). Levine and Zervos (1998) 
suspect that the significant relationship between VT and economic growth (GIVA) 
would have been substantially influenced by the share price volatility. This 
consideration should also be born in mind when we operate the Granger-causality 
testing in China's context. Therefore, including both capitalisation and value traded 
indicators together in our VAR model is a similar approach suggested by Levine and 
Zervos. Though the direct Granger-causality relationship between value traded and 
simplicity, but are available on request from the author. 
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Table 7.4: Stock market development and economic growth: Granger-causality 
estimated result 
Direction of Causality Lag length (k) Log-likelihood DW statistic 
Ratio 
Stock Market OC GIVA k= 12 2 =24.0799 X13 2.1619 
Development (0.131) 
=> Economic TC GIVA k= 12 2 =34.0226* 4 2.1645 Growth 3 
(0.071) 
TNOC--> GIVA k =8 2 =10.4973 X9 2.0486 
(0.312) 
TNTC ---> GIVA k =9 
2 
=1 1.4013 X10 2.0536 
(0.327) 
VT GIVA k =6 2 =5.2693 X7 2.0816 
(0.627) 
VO GIVA k =9 
2 
=7.4283 X10 2.092 
(0.684) 
Economic GIVA OC k= 12 2 =45.5498** X13 2.1102 
Growth => (0.04) 
Stock Market GIVA TC k= 12 2 =58.3313*** X13 2.0501 Development 
(0.00) 
GIVA TNOC k =8 
2 
=12.308 X9 2.0790 
(0.196) 
GIVA TNTC k =9 
2 
=15.6305 X10 2.0863 
(0.111) 
GIVA VT k =6 
2 
=10.6585 X7 2.1601 
(0.154) 
GIVA VO k =9 
2 
=8.3074 X10 2.0914 
(0.599) 
Note: 
1. GIVA = Output growth; OC = Overall Market Capitalisation; TC = Tradable Capitalisation; TNOC 
= Turnover (Overall Shares); TNTC = Turnover (Tradable Shares); VT = Value Traded; VO = 
Volatility. For the details of calculation of each variable, please refer to Section 7.3.2 and Table 7.3. 
2. The pair of numbers in the parentheses in third colurrm is the p-value. The subscript of X2 
statistics is the optimal order of VAR model (i. e. k+d). The asterisk represents the 
significance at 10 percent (5 percent) (1 percent) level. 
3. DW critical value at I percent significance level is 2.034 (with 22 regressors and 120 
observations). 
growth is not statistically significant, we are still interested in detecting the 
relationship after eliminating the price volatility effect. 
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Table 7.5: Causality nexus between market size and market value traded 
Log-likelihood Ratio Reject null hypothesis 
A (k=u) (Ho) 
HO : Stock market size does not Granger-cause value traded 
OC respect to VT 9.2335 No 
TC respect to VT 11.6892 No 
HO : Value traded does not Granger-cause stock market size 
VT respect to OC 16.1403 Yes 
VT respect to TC 18.8173 Yes 
Note: OC = Overall Market Capitalisation; VT = Value Traded; TC = Tradable Capitalisation. k is the 
lag length of VAR model. The lag length selection procedure is based on AIC and SBC criterions which 
have not been reported here for simplicity, but are available on request from the author. The asterisk 
(**) represents the significance at 5 percent (I percent) level. 
Table 7.6: Causality nexus between output growth and market value traded 
(tradable capitalisation is treated as control variable) 
Log-likelihood Ratio Reject null hypothesis 
(k= 12) (Ho) 
HO : Market value traded does not Granger-cause output growth 
VT respect to GIVA 49.7227 * Yes 
Ho : Output growth does not Granger-cause market value traded 
GIVA respect to VT 35.5857 No 
Note: VT = Value Traded; GIVA = Output growth. k is the lag length of VAR model. 
The lag length selection procedure is based on AIC and SBC criterions which have not been reported 
here for simplicity, but are available on request from the author. The asterisk * represents the 
significance at I percent level. 
We first testify the direct causality relation between stock market size and value traded 
(Table 7.5). When testing the hypothesis that capitalisation (OC & TC) determines the 
value traded (VT), log-likelihood ratio yields 9.2335 and 11.6892 for OC and TC 
respectively, indicating a high probability of not rejecting the hypothesis. In the 
reverse causality relation test, log-likelihood ratio is 16.1403 and 18.8173 for OC and 
TC respectively, which is highly significant. Therefore, we can draw the conclusion 
that capitalisation is a result rather than the cause effect of value traded. 
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In the second step, we add tradable capitalisation JQ as a control variable into the 
causality test VAR model between growth and market value traded. The result is 
displayed in Table 7.6. It is found that the value traded is the significant leading factor 
to output growth (Log-likelihood ratio = 49.7227, p<1 percent), while the reserve 
direction between these two indicators does not hold given that the statistic result 
(35.5857) failed to pass the hypothesis test at any significance level. Thus, comparing 
with the no direct causality effect between value traded and growth (Table 7.4), the 
conclusion could be drawn that after controlling the market size, value traded is found 
to be the leading factor rather than the result of economic growth. In other words, 
since value traded determines the size (capitalisation) of stock market while the size 
(measured by tradable capitalisation) has been identified as a weak leading factor of 
economic growth, it could be interpreted that the value traded causes output growth 
indirectly mainly through the its influence on market size. 
These empirical findings support the hypothesis that China's stock market is 
established to raise fixed assets investment funds for enterprises, particularly for SOEs. 
However, the performance of China's stock market is primitive and less sophisticated 
in channel capital efficiently. Moreover, the proposed solution for corporate 
governance issue has not yet been implemented successfully due to the existence of 
majority state shareholder in listed companies. In such instance, many economists 
argue that China's stock market is more likely to become a gambling site breeding 
numerous speculative activities and financial scandals. 
7.5 Causality nexus between Financial Market Development and Economic 
Growth 
In this subsection, we investigate the Granger-causality relation between the entire 
financial market development and economic growth where we take both stock market 
and banking sector together into account. To test this causality hypothesis, we use a 
VAR model based on the vector V, where 
V =(Output,, BC,, STMK t 1) 
Economic growth is defined as the growth rate of real IVA. TC and VT are two key 
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STMK indicators which we have been defined and tested in the previous subsection - 
tradable capitalisation and value traded. From the statistic result in previous section, 
we notice that a significant feedback relationship has been found between market 
value traded and economic growth after setting the tradable capitalisation as a control 
variable. In these circumstances, we conduct the causality test between financial 
market development and economic growth in two steps: 
Step 1: use BC and TC together to capture the performance of entire financial market; 
Step 2: introduce VT into the estimated system while treat TC as control variable, thus 
using BC and VT to capture the performance of entire financial market. 
To gauge the banking sector development, we mainly follow the idea of Levine and 
Zervos (1998) by using bank credit (BQ as the proxy. In Levine and Zervos study, 
they define BC as the ratio of loans made to the private sector by commercial banks 
and other deposit-taking banks to GDP. Meanwhile, they also argue that using 
MI/GDP or M2/GDP in the econometric modelling is inappropriate since these two 
indicators measure only financial depth but they do not measure whether the liabilities 
are those of banks, the central banks or other financial intermediaries, nor do they 
identify where the financial system allocates capital. In other words, they suggest that 
there is no theoretical relationship between this ratio and economic growth but, 
instead, it depends on the functions carried out by the financial sector. They propose 
that bank credit is useful in measuring financial development because it isolates 
"credit issued by banks, as opposed to credit issued by the central bank or other 
intermediaries and by identifying credit to the private sector, as opposed to 
governments" (ibid, p. 542-43). However, in this empirical study, BC is no longer 
suitable to be defined in such way since we concentrate on the industrial sector rather 
than the whole economy. Hence, we propose to use ratio of bank loans allocated by 
overall domestic financial institutions to industrial enterprises over IVA to proxy the 
banking sector development. Moreover, since bank loans are an accumulated stock 
value while IVA is measured by newly increment of industrial output on monthly basis, 
the ratio of BC computed by using these two variables is implausible. Therefore, we 
amend bank loan into the monthly increment amount by taking the first-order 
difference of the original value. 
According to a seemingly unrelated regression approach adopted by Rambaldi and 
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Doran (1996), our estimated VAR model takes the fonn: 
kII 
Vt = AO +LAjVj +I BjSj +ct (7.2) 
i=1 j=I 
where: Step 1: Vt = (Output,, B Ct, TC, ); Step 2: Vt = (Output,, B Ct, VT,, TC, ); 
S is the dummy variable for certain month j to capture the 
seasonal effect, which has been treated as exogenous variables in the VAR 
model; 
Ao is an identity matrix. 
In Step 1, Ai is three by three matrices of coefficients which can be termed as 
A, '., All. 2 All 
.3 
A A' A' A' where i=1,2,..., k; i 21 22 23 
A' . A' . A'. 31 32 33 
similarly, Ai is four by four matrices of coefficients. 
To test the hypothesis of no Granger causality from financial development to 
economic growth, we test H: a(12) = a(13) =0 or a(12) = a(13) = Cr(14) =0 in two 0iiiii 
steps respectively, where a 
(12) 
,a 
(13) 
and a 
(14) 
are the coefficients of BCt-I to iii 
BCt-k, TC t-I to 
TCt-k and VTt-I to VTt-k in system (7.2). To test the hypothesis of no 
Granger causality from economic growth to financial development, we test 
H :a 
(21) 
= 0, where a 
(21) 
are the coefficients of Output t-I to 
OUtPUtt-k in system 0ii 
(7.2). 
The MWALD -statistics result is exhibited as Table 7.7. In Step I where the financial 
market performance was measured by BC and TC jointly, the statistic result indicates 
that there is evidence of one-way causality from economic growth to financial 
development in China. However, it is more interesting to find that a two-way causality 
nexus has been observed when the stock market performance is gauged by market 
value traded while controlling the tradable market size as information set. This 
empirical result is in sharp contrast to those of Levine (1997) and Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) who take a cross-sectional approach. They conclude that financial development 
promotes to economic development and that reverse causation is unlikely to occur. 
Meanwhile, this empirical finding is also contrast to the conclusion drawn by Shan, 
Morris and Sun (2001), who argue that the it is hardly to believe that 'financial 
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Table 7.7: Causality nexus between financial market development and economic 
growth 
Log-likelihood Ratio Reject null 
hypothesis (Ho) 
HO : Financial development does not Granger-cause economic growth 
Step 1: BC and TC respect to GIVA 25.8607 No (k=10) 
Step 2: BC and VT respect to GIVA 52.2863 Yes (k= 12) 
HO : Economic growth does not Granger-cause financial development 
Step 1: GIVA respect to BC and TC 37.9672 ** Yes (k= 10) 
Step 2: GIVA respect to BC and VT 69.4963 Yes (k= 12) 
Note: BC = Bank Credits; TC = Tradable Capitalisation; GIVA = Output growth; VT = Value Traded. k 
is the lag length of the corresponding VAR model. 
The lag length selection procedure is based on AIC and SBC criterions which have not been reported 
here for simplicity, but are available on request from the author. 
The asterisk * (**) (***) indicate the statistic is significant at 10 percent (5 percent) (I percent) level. 
development leads economic growth when financial sectors are less developed than in 
the West' (p. 45 0). 
Given the limited investment channels available to households, savings are highly 
concentrated in either banking sector or stock market. At the same time, investment 
projects (particularly the fixed assets investment) are mostly funded by rapid increase 
of bank credits allocation, and investment funds collected from stock market through 
share transaction. As a result, the dramatic increase of capital stock is the major 
contribution to the entire economic growth. Hence, the empirical findings in this 
research are convincing: financial development seems leading to economic growth in 
the context of China to some extent. 
7.6 Summary 
This chapter examines the Granger-causality nexus between financial development 
and economic growth by adopting the VAR model analysis technique. Our emphasis 
has been focused on banking sector development first (Section 7.2), followed by the 
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concentration on stock market individually (Section 7.4), then examining the whole 
financial market by taking both banking sector and stock market performance into 
account (Section 7.5). 
By adopting the annual aggregate data sample, no evidence can be found to support 
the hypothesis that China's banking sector has been playing a leading role in the 
process of economic growth. In order to testify the consistency of Granger-causality 
relationship across the economic reform period, data sample has been separated into 
two sub-samples, 1952-1978 and 1979-2003. The statistic result indicated that the 
financial development kept playing the 'demanding-following' role in economic 
growth in pre- and post-reform era. However, in the post-reform stage, the increase of 
investment does not necessarily enhance the demand for bank loans, which is more or 
less associated with the innovation and diversification of financial market in China 
providing another important channel for enterprises raise investment funds. 
Further evidence on the relationship between stock market development and economic 
growth has been provided by the empirical study result based on the Granger-causality 
test. In order to gauge the development of China's stock market, five indicators have 
been employed from three aspects - size, liquidity and volatility. The estimated results 
only concluded one-way causality relation in China's context, indicating that 
economic growth (measured by IVA) is the Granger-cause of the stock market size 
(capitalistaion) while the reverse causation is unlikely to occur. Meanwhile, there no 
causality relationship exists between stock market development and economic growth 
when in term of market liquidity and volatility. 
After adding tradable capitalisation as a control variable into the causality test VAR 
model between growth and market value traded, the statistic result found that the 
value traded is the significant leading factor to output growth while the reserve 
direction between these two indicators does not hold. Since value traded determines 
the size (capitalisation) of stock market while the size (measured by tradable 
capitalisation) has been identified as a weak leading factor of economic growth, it 
could be interpreted that the value traded causes output growth indirectly mainly 
through the its influence on market size. 
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The causality relationship was finally examined on the basis of the whole financial 
market, in which circumstance the ratio of bank credit assigned to industry sector to 
IVA was adopted to be the proxy for banking sector development. The estimated result 
further confirmed that financial development is the effect rather than cause of China's 
economic growth when tradable capitalisation of stock market was adopted. Moreover, 
a bio-direction (two-way) Granger-causality nexus has been observed when market 
value traded entered the VAR model while market size was controlled as information 
set, though the feedback effect (financial development is Granger-cause factor of 
economic growth) is significant at just 10 percent level. 
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Chapter 8: Policy Implications 
The policy implications for both China's banking sector and stock market and for 
economic growth are discussed in this chapter, based on the empirical results derived 
in Chapters 5,6 and 7. 
8.1 Implications for economic growth pattern 
This empirical study first investigated the economic growth pattern in China on both 
an aggregated level (Chapter 5) and a provincial level (Chapter 6). By using 
time-series aggregated level data, it has been indicated that growth of economic output 
is largely based on the capital stock accumulation, while the contribution from labour 
force input is less economically significant. However, it has been observed that the 
efficiency of the rapidly accumulating investment is rather low, resulting in the lower 
productivity of capital stock. In Chapter 6 Section 6.4, the contribution of input factor 
growth to the real sector growth has been examined by using the cross-province and 
time-series panel data. As a result, positive influence from growth of capital stock has 
been found while the change of labour did not produce any contribution to the overall 
output growth. 
It has been discussed thoroughly in Chapter 5 that in the present statistics scheme, 
labour input is measured in terms of the number of persons employed rather than 
person-hours worked due to the lack of information. Hence, there is a strong 
likelihood that the actual person-hours worked per worker have increased rapidly in 
the post-reform stage despite the low growth rate of number of worker employed. 
Consequently, it suggests that the coefficient on labour input may be biased upwards 
given the understating growth of the effective labour force. 
Furthermore, the statistical result also indicated the dramatic changes in employment 
and investment structures, which is the major contribution to the rapid economic 
growth. First, there is an increasing surplus of labour force released from agriculture 
partly due to the increased labour productivity and the shortage of land. Second, an 
increasing number of workers and staff employed by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
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became unemployed due to the market liberalisation and fierce competition from the 
private sectors. Third, employment and investment have been shifted or diversified 
away from agriculture to manufacturing and services, and from heavy and 
defence-based industries to light industries. 
China is on its transition process to be an industrialised country while the Tertiary 
Sector is also expanding rapidly. Dramatic structural change results in the continuing 
large differences in both labour and capital productivity across sectors, suggesting that 
China still has great potential for further efficiency gains through continued structural 
change. To realise this potential, many restrictions on the intersectoral movement of 
resources need to be removed. For example, government should encourage the 
development of rural enterprises, urban industry and service sectors which will help to 
absorb the surplus labour forced out from agriculture sector. In addition, the Hukou 
system (household registration system), the key factor in the fragmentation of the 
labour market, should be abolished gradually, which encouraging the labour force 
shifts and the mobility of educated people among regions. 
More attention should be paid to the education industry to enhance the labourer 
quality and productivity The goal for education should be raising enrolment in higher 
education as well as the lower levels of education. In the short run, this policy would 
delay the population studying in universities from entering the employment sector and 
promote expenditures in higher education as well as promoting the development of the 
education sector. In the long run, this policy would undoubtedly improve the quality 
and the productivity of the labour force. 
Based on the findings of lower efficiency of capital investment, the policy 
implications should focus not only on the volume of investment, but also on 
improving its quality and efficiency. Given that China is a rapidly developing country 
with limited energy resources, the future economic growth should depend on using the 
resources more efficiently. In order to economise resources, the crucial issue is to stop 
the repetitive construction projects regardless the actual capacity. For instance, there 
was a fierce car industry competition among the provinces during the later 1990s as 
car industry has been regarded as a leading industry. At least one car manufactory has 
been built in each province. In these circumstances, the local government offered 
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many privileges to support the car production. However, this repetitive construction 
led to the huge waste of human resource and raw material while the competition 
seriously hampered the achievement of the economics of scale. 
By inspecting the investment efficiency, the conclusion can be drawn that the 
investment in China is severely underutilised and generating a huge waste on 
resources (for details, see Section 5.5). Meanwhile, it has been found that most of the 
enterprises have not yet considered about using environmental resources. In order to 
chase the maximum profit and high growth speed, they would rather sacrifice the 
environmental protection. In these circumstances, to achieve the goal of coordinated 
and sustainable development, it has been argued that the concept of 'Green GDP' 
should be introduced to the economic growth statistics, which implies that the speed 
of GDP growth is not the only indicator to measure the development, while substantial 
consideration should be focused on the environmental protection. 
Green GDP includes integrated environmental and economic accounting systems and 
attempts to measure the actual amount of environmental pollution. The system also 
attempts to account for the cost of environmental losses and adjust GDP calculations 
to match those losses. In other words, China's future sustainable economic growth 
should not be based on undermining environmental protection. Thus, Green GDP 
reflects not only the economic growth rate, but also the quality of growth. 
Nevertheless, the major difficulty of adopting Green GDP system is setting the prices 
for environmental costs as well as formulating the related laws and regulations, which 
will cost at least three to six years to establish an initial framework of the Green GDP 
(People's Daily Online, 15/09/2004). 
8.2 Improve the quality of bank loans 
In Section 7.2.2, the causality test on financial development, measured by the ratio of 
bank credit granted over GDP level, and the real sector growth was undertaken using 
the annual aggregated data. The result indicated that financial development in terms of 
bank credit allocation in China is unlikely to be the leading factor to the economic 
growth, while 'demand- following' is the actual feature of financial development. 
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Furthermore, considering the influence of financial reform, causality test has been 
conducted in two separated sub-samples respectively, where the result indicated that 
the financial development remained as the effect of both economic growth and capital 
stock accumulation robustly, while in post-reform stage no causality relationship 
existed between bank credit increment and capital stock growth. 
Hence, this empirical result implies that banking sector remained functioning with 
characteristics of plan-oriented economy In the pre-refonn stage, only one bank 
existed in China which had acted as a cashier of the Ministry of Finance: collecting 
the profits from enterprises and allocating the state budget to each individual industry 
and enterprises in accordance with the very specific plan. After the implementation of 
financial reforms, the funding for SOEs' basic construction investment was changed 
from state budget grants to bank loans. However, due to the long-tenn relationship 
between SOEs and state-owned banks, the credit allocation to SOEs has been largely 
interfered by state and local governments political instruction, which resulted in the 
soft budget constrain leaving a heavy burden on China's banking system in terms of 
the huge amount of non-performing loans. Bank loans are mostly granted on the basis 
of local government's preferences in order to enhance their political achievements 
associated with individual governor's career promotion. 
Apart from the causality test on aggregated level, the correlation between banking 
sector development and real sector growth has also been inspected by using the panel 
analysis technique in Section 6.4, where the banking sector performance was gauged 
by five indicators. The positive but insignificant coefficient of liquidity indicator - the 
size of financial sector, measured by banking deposit over GDP, indicated no 
correlation with economic growth, which runs counter to the general cross-country 
estimated result of a positive relationship. In addition, the significantly negative 
relationship has also been noticed existing between the ratio of bank credit to GDP 
(LGDP) and local economic growth, which is unlikely to support the hypothesis that 
bank credit allocation has contributions to capital investment thereby fostering the real 
sector growth. 
The negative correlation can be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, since bank 
credit is not the unique fund resource of capital investment, the negative relationship 
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could be attributed to the increasing proportion of other investment resources. Within 
the four major categories of investment fund sources in China, domestic bank credit is 
the second biggest fund source. The most important fund resource is internal funds, 
taking a share of over 60 percent of total funds, where self-retained profit is the major 
component. In these circumstances, it can be argued that the more successful the 
enterprises are the more profits they earn. Consequently, the larger amount of retained 
profits will be contributed to the investment projects, resulting in the less reliance on 
the other fund sources including bank credits. By contrast, when a region is dominated 
by the weak performing enterprises, they hardly raise investment funds by themselves, 
thus relying on bank loans heavily. Additionally, the launch of stock market in 1992 
provided another significant channel for investment fund raising, which should dilute 
the importance of bank credit in raising investment funds. 
On the other hand, the negative relationship could also be interpreted as the increasing 
proportion of Non-performing Loans (NPLs) with the successive expansion of bank 
credit, which deteriorates the overall bank credit quality. It is generally argued that the 
extensive amount of NPLs is the result of the soft budget constrain in terms of 
directed credit lending (policy lending) granted under the pressure from both central 
and provincial authorities to favoured sectors and enterprise via the credit quota plan. 
Furthermore, it has been noticed that due to the lack of credit-tracking tools, a national 
accounting standard and a sound legal framework including collateral and bankruptcy 
legislation, the volume of NPLs keeps accumulating after the credit quota plan was 
abolished in 1998. 
Additionally, owing to the poor national accounting standard and the lack of credit 
history records, it is extremely difficult for domestic banks in China to obtain a fair 
and objective assessment on loan applications. Hence, China's commercial banks are 
reluctant to extend loans to privatised and new start-up enterprises given that these 
enterprises are not under the bailout protection scheme, and so appear to be of higher 
risk than their SOE counterparts. However, these non-state-owned market entities 
have played a substantial role in national economic growth increasingly yet their 
development has long been restrained by lack of funds. Therefore, it is further 
evidence for the negative relationship between bank credit allocation and economic 
growth. 
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Correspondingly, the policy implications derived from these empirical findings can be 
focused on the following three aspects. First, a set of international accounting and 
auditing standards should be adopted and applied to the entire financial industry, 
including bank and non-bank financial institutions, which helps to classify the true 
level of existing NPLs. Second, take stronger actions to end policy lending by 
state-owned commercial banks (SOCB) and other government interference with 
application of strict commercial standards in bank lending. One obvious step would be 
to shift more of this lending to the policy banks, while leaving the commercial banks 
operating strictly according to market discipline in terms of less political intervention 
but more profit-maximising orientation. Third, the severe information asymmetry 
appears to be the essential handicap during the credit assessment. Thus, it is necessary 
to establish the credit grade system and create a database where keeping a detailed 
record over debtor's credit information. This database should be accessible by both 
state administrative office and commercial banks, which will be helpful for 
monitoring and assessing the credibility of loan applicants. Though it is a huge 
workload which requires the joint effort from various departments as well as the 
technical support from both hardware facility and software exploration, once the 
establishment is completed, it will substantially reduce the information cost while 
enhance the transparency of bank-corporate relationship. 
8.3 Encourage competition within banking sector 
From the empirical analysis illustrated in Section 6.5, higher bank concentration has 
been found significantly associated with lower economic growth. This result supports 
the idea that banking competition is likely to improve economic performance as found 
by Cetorelli and Gamberra (2001) using a cross-country sample. It may also imply 
that greater entry into the banking sector improves bank performance, which in turn 
improves resource allocation in the province and leads to higher local economic 
growth. 
Meanwhile, SOB - the indicator used to gauge the performance of big four SOCB in 
respect to the overall financial instItutions - is defined as the credits from four 
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state-owned banks to the credits from total local financial institutions and has been 
identified as negatively correlated with economic growth. This result implies that the 
credit market dominated by SOCB is unlikely to channel funds efficiently thereby 
hampering the economic performance. Partly due to the lack of competition and the 
implicit protection from state government, the SOCBs, the absolute dominant player 
in the financial system, appear to be most secure place for Chinese people to hold 
bank deposits. There is little necessity for state banks to strive for deposits, and 
consequently, they hardly make prudential decision on credit allocation since these 
loans have been either guaranteed by government's protection or under the direct of 
government. Moreover, a high level of state-owned bank credit is also likely to be 
translated into a higher dependence on central bank lending to cover the balance 
between loans and deposits, affecting the efficiency negatively. Thus, it is unsurprising 
to find a negative impact of central bank intervention upon real sector development. 
Based on these empirical results, introducing competition into the banking sector is a 
plausible way to dilute the concentration of SOCBs and push them to behave 
according to market discipline. This can be included the openness to both foreign and 
domestic competitor. It is widely believed that in general, the entry of foreign banks 
provides a vital motivation for China's banking sector to speed up the domestic 
financial reform. In addition, domestic banks will benefit from the entry of foreign 
banks in terms of improving corporate governance, stimulating the financial product 
innovation and enhancing the customer service quality. Particularly, the conventional 
operation concept in China's banking sector is purely interest-based. By fostering the 
cooperation with foreign banks, the foreign advanced and mature financial product 
portfolio will be a good example for domestic banks pursuing the product innovation, 
eventually catching up in high-end banking services such as investment banking 
instruments and fee-based services. 
Apart from opening the market to foreign banks, the openness towards the domestic 
competitors is also important. A more active strategy should be pursued to encourage 
the development of joint-stock banks, city banks, and other newer banks and to 
promote the constructive downsizing of the SOCB. In particular, regulatory 
constraints discriminating against the other banks need to be ended. City banks could 
be authorised to expand their business beyond their current jurisdictions. While likely 
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to remain the largest players for the foreseeable future, the SOCB will inevitably 
decline in importance and a more explicit strategy to manage this downsizing could 
help in improving their performances. One proposal, advocated by a senior official of 
the PBC, is to eventually divide the current SOCB into a larger number of regionally 
oriented large banks. Another possibility would be to transform current SOCB into 
bank holding company type entities controlling several subsidiary banks focused on 
major areas (Nam et al., 2001). Some of these units might then at a future point be 
transformed into wholly independent new banking entities. 
8.4 Encourage the establishment of Local Private-owned Banks (LPOB) 
In order to highlight the different influence of financial development among regions, 
the 30 provinces have been grouped into eight economic zones where the provinces 
within each zone share the similar natural resources and industrialisation level. In 
these circumstances, the banking sector performance has been investigated within 
each zone. The empirical result indicated that the impact of financial intermediaries' 
development on economic growth only statistically existed in three most developed 
regions, while no finance-growth nexus has been found in the other regions. In 
particular, given the credit market characterised as largest LGDP ratio, highly 
concentrated banking institutions and overwhelming SOCB credit allocation, it is 
unlikely to find that the economic growth in Northeast Zone (NEZ) has been benefited 
from such a financial environment. 
By comparing the structure of investment fund resources of NEZ with the structure of 
the three most developed regions, it has been discovered that the investment in fixed 
assets in NEZ increasingly relies on the state appropriation, while the proportion of 
domestic loans apparently declined in recent years. Therefore, this could be one 
interpretation of the empirical result of no impact from banking sector on the real 
sector growth. Apart from that, the abnormally prosperous 'underground financial 
market' (UFM) in NEZ can be interpreted as another reason for the underperforming 
official banking sector. 
UFM first existed in a number of developed coastal regions, which was mainly 
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functioning as a complementary fund resource to facilitate the local small and medium 
sized enterprises (SMEs) development. The positive contribution from UFM in those 
regions has been noticed in a survey operated by Central University of Finance and 
Economics in 2004. This survey also explores that the largest size of UFM exists in 
the least developed region - NEZ, where the existence of UFM is largely associated 
with the 'underground economy' (firms or enterprises running illegal business) in 
local province. It has been argued that the expansion of UFM severely influence the 
stability of official financial market. As a result, it is observed that the existence of 
UFM produces a negative impact on the local economic growth. More detail on the 
feature and effect of UFM has been discussed in Chapter 6, Section 6.5.3. 
In these instances, eliminating the impact from illegal credit market will be the 
essential advantage of setting up LPOB. Due to the critical constraint imposed on 
SMEs when they tend to access to the legal credit market, they had to seek for 
investment funds from UFM. Since the development of UFM is out of control and 
supervision of state government, interest rates have been set much higher than the 
official level. A recent survey indicates that the average monthly interest rate in 
Wenzhou's UFM was up to 0.96 percent at the end of 2004; where in some individual 
cases even climbed up to 1.8 percent, which was much higher than the official level 
0.39 percent. Most of the credit clients in UFM are SMEs that are not qualified to be 
served by big and more prudential banks and non-bank financial institutions. In these 
circumstances, it appears that the existence of UFM has a more or less contribution to 
fuelling the development of SMEs. However, it occurs that the uncontrollable 
expansion of UFM will eventually undermine the stability of the financial market and 
consequently results in the society turbulence. Hence, instead of bearing the risk of the 
explosion of UFM's potential threats, the foundation of LPOB is a practicable way to 
legitimise the private financial institutions. In these circumstances, LPOB appears to 
be a vital banking sector participant, serving SMEs efficiently while operating under 
the official monitoring. 
Setting up LPOB is a plausible way to dilute the extreme concentration of SOCBs 
thereby facilitating the development of SMEs more efficiently. This proposition is 
aroused based on the strong interrelationship between the private-owned firms and 
private-owned banks operating in the same area. Since both entities share the same 
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culture and customs, additionally, LPOBs are SME-oriented while their business 
strictly focuses on the local area, it is convincing that LPOBs have a more 
comprehensive understanding on local SMEs' performance than other banks do, 
including SME's virtual business risk, profitability and financing requirement. 
Moreover, since LPOBs are apparently profit-driven market entities, they have 
incentives to maximize their profits. Neither central nor local state government will 
take the responsibility to their losses in any instance that the borrowers could not 
amortize their loans. From this point of view, LPOBs will be more careful and rational 
than SOCBs in assigning credits. The establishment of Zhejiang Commerial Bank in 
July 2004 is the first LPOB in China, whose shareholders are 15 private-owned 
enterprises. 
Nevertheless, opponents of LPOB criticise the development of LPOB on the grounds 
that it is poorly controlled and monitored given to the lack of sound and transparent 
administrative mechanism and legal system. Regardless the motivation of financing 
SMEs' development, it has been argued that the intrinsic feature of LPOB is chasing 
maximum profit. In order to maximise profit, LPOB is believed to be risk adventurer 
and make less prudential decision. There are many concerns that the efficiency of 
LPOB will be unexpectedly affected once the privilege groups get involved where 
they take the advantage of LPOB as a platform to maximise their own profits; 
meanwhile, how to prevent the major shareholders of LPOB abuse their rights in 
credit allocating on behalf of their own interests is another prior consideration. 
Therefore, the opponents insist that without a sound supervision mechanism, 
establishing LPOB can be dangerous, generating financial instability. 
8.5 Implications for stock market development 
Chapter 7 examines the effect of stock market development upon economic growth. In 
order to gauge the development of China's stock market, five indicators have been 
employed from three aspects, including size, liquidity and volatility. The estimated 
results only concluded one-way causality relation in China's context, indicating that 
economic growth (measured by industrial value-added) is the Granger-cause of the 
stock market capitalisation while the reverse causation is unlikely to occur. Meanwhile, 
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there no causality relationship exists between stock market development and 
economic growth in term of market liquidity and volatility. Hence, it implies that the 
existence of China's stock market has not yet channelled the investment fund resource 
efficiently. 
The inefficient functioning of China's stock market mostly stems from the distorted 
feature of the market since it was launched in 1991. This distorted feature is mainly 
embodied in two aspects: the characteristics of centralised planned economy and lack 
of sound and powerful legal and monitoring mechanism, where these two aspects are 
inter- correlated. 
China initiated its economic reform since 1978, aiming at switching the economy 
pattern from a centralised one to a market-force driven one. In financial sector, 
banking system has undergone a prominent reform in terins of configuration 
reconstruction and operation discipline changes. Meanwhile, the launch of China's 
stock market has been termed as another milestone during the financial reform process. 
However, before establishing a sound legal environment, the launch of China's stock 
market is the preference of state authority rather than a product introduced on a market 
basis. In these circumstances, the operation of stock market has been conducting under 
the state government's control and plan. In addition, without an efficient monitoring 
mechanism, the majority shareholder's violation behaviour and speculative activities 
are extremely severe thereby further deteriorating the market efficiency. 
China's stock market was established to facilitate the reform of SOEs at a time when 
the government found it increasingly costly to pursue its policy of lending or 
subsidising SOEs. It was proposed that establishing a stock market provided an 
important investment channel for individuals while handing the responsibility for SOE 
monitoring over to more efficient institutions and individual investors. 
In the early stages, the number of stocks to be listed was constrained by the quota 
system, where the State Planning Committee implemented the overall balance of the 
quota allocation at both provincial and industrial level. The quota system was not 
abolished until 2000. Additionally, state intervention is the vital determinant to the 
perforinance of stock market. In particular when the stock market experienced the 
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downturn, state goverm-nent would step into by promulgating certain policies to 
stimulate the market transaction. Hence, it has been stressed that China's stock market 
is not operating fully under the discipline of the market. In such a market, the 
distribution of investment sources is undertaken on the basis of government's design 
rather than driven by the market forces. Thus, the efficiency of stock market in 
channelling investment funds is undermined. 
Unlike the stock markets in other countries where shares have been categorised into 
ordinary share and preferred share, the corporate shares in China have been segmented 
into three forms: state shares, legal person shares and public individual shares. The 
more unusual phenomenon is that only the public individual shares are tradable where 
the proportion counts for around 30 percent of the total volume. This fundamental 
drawback leads to the serious consequences for the stock market as follows. 
First, the small volume of tradable shares offers a chance for pursuing speculation 
activities which results in the price distortion. Second, the tremendous amount of 
non-trading shares unjustly distributes the rights among shareholders. Third, it also 
limits the function of stock markets as a mechanism to evaluate the management 
performance of listed companies. Meanwhile, mergers and acquisitions appear to be 
impossible because of the price distinction. Finally, the isolation of tradable and 
non-tradable shares leads to the over-concentration of stock rights, and consequently 
the supervision and decision making mechanisms are apparently ineffective. The 
parent company, by taking the advantage of being as the major shareholder of the 
listed subsidiary company, siphons investment funds raised from the stock market 
from its subsidiary, while this kind of behaviour is unobservable to the individual 
shares. In these circumstances, solving the problem of non-tradable state/legal person 
shares is the prior issue in developing China's stock market. 
Under the present condition, it is impossible to raise a huge amount of money to make 
all the state shares and legal person shares listed on the market. Almost 
RMBIOOO-1500 billion (USD122-183 billion) would be required to inject into the 
market in order to activate state/legal person shares based on their current market 
value. Some scholars propose that issuance of new stocks should be suspended for a 
few years so as to ensure the task of activating non-tradable shares accomplished first. 
216 
This may not be the best and most realistic solution as it has been argued that the 
suspension of issuing new stocks could not only slow down SOE reform inevitably, 
but also affect the pace of entire economic reform adversely. However, this objection 
statement is also questionable as its emphasis remains on raising money to finance 
SOE as much and fast as possible from issuing shares in stock market. The initial 
function of stock market is to enhance the efficiency while improving the 
principle-agent relationship by introducing the external monitoring from the outside 
shareholders and potential threats of mergers and acquisition. Without eliminating the 
influence of non-tradable shares, the issuance of new shares while remaining the large 
proportion of state/legal person shares non-tradable would only accumulate the 
problem like rolling the snow ball. Thus, the fact that more and more companies (both 
SOE and private-owned firms) going public is an inevitable tendency during the 
process of financial market liberalisation. Ceasing the issuance of new shares is not a 
wise decision to cope with the historical problems. It is plausible to encourage the 
non-SOE go-public while stopping issuing non-tradable shares. 
Meanwhile, a number of alternatives have been raised to eradicate the problem. The 
first suggestion is transferring the state/legal person shares into preferred shares. The 
idea is that preferred shares enjoy two 'priorities': one is priority of reaping dividends 
while the other is residual claimant. Hence, it is believed that preferred shares can help 
to change the structure of ownership and consequently solving the problem of the 
over-concentration of shareholders. Furthermore, the preferred shares can be traded on 
the markets which can dilute the enthusiasm on speculative profits by transferring 
original shares often on the markets. However, the question again focuses on the price 
setting on the preferred shares: who will pay for the price difference between the 
current market value and the original face value of the non-tradable shares. The 
second possibility is to establish specialised investment funds which mainly pursue 
the transaction of state/legal person shares, especially state shares. The investment 
funds could be sponsored by state-owned non-financial institutions or raised from the 
public. Recently, the prevailing debate focuses on the pension funds could take this 
responsibility, suggesting that the minimum proportion of the funds invested in trading 
of state shares must be no less than 55 percent. 
Another option can be changing the state/legal person shares into employee shares, 
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which is derived from the rationale of employee ownership scheme. In China, issuing 
and transacting employee shares is not a brand-new issue. Similar as the tremendous 
price difference of state/legal person shares in comparison with the public tradable 
shares, in order to beneficiate employees, the purchase price of employee shares is 
much lower than the transaction price in the secondary market. Hence, most of the 
employees sold their shares immediately when the restrictions over trading these 
shares have been removed. In such instances, the initial intent of issuing employee 
shares as an incentive and award to the employees' participation and commitment has 
been distorted. Thus, it is necessary to establish a new employee stock ownership 
scheme which ties employees', particularly the manager's pension and bonus with the 
firm's long-term development, which can be useful to correct the short-term behaviour 
of Chinese worker shareholders. 
Generally speaking, no matter which solution will be finally adopted, the successful 
implementation has to be backed up by a sound and powerful legal and monitoring 
mechanism. As Tam (1991) stresses in his description work on the existence and 
development of China's capital market, China already possesses many necessary 
conditions for capital market development expect the missing key factor: a well 
defined property rights systems, with a constitutional and legal framework to protect 
the claims of economic agents and enforce their responsibilities (p. 525). 
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Chapter 9: Conclusions 
9.1 Introduction 
The financial- growth nexus has been widely discussed during the last few decades, 
both theoretically and empirically. The financial intermediation was ignored in the 
earlier economic growth model until it was identified as playing an essential role in 
the real sector performance first by Schumpeter (1911). Apart from the examination 
on the relationship, the direction of causality between financial development and 
economic growth has also been extensively investigated by using firm-level and/or 
industrial-level data of cross-country, though the empirical results have not yet offered 
any clear-cut answer upon this issue. Furthermore, the launch and expansion of stock 
market in many less developed countries (LDCs), as a crucial part of domestic 
financial liberalisation (DFL) process, attracted substantial interest vis-a-vis the 
impact of the stock market behaviour on the real sector growth. 
This thesis has attempted to investigate the influence of financial development on 
economic growth in China principally by examining the banking sector and stock 
market performance. Due to the ignorance or little effort placed on China in the most 
existing empirical studies, this thesis employs a consolidated dataset covering 30 
provinces for 18 years to conduct the panel technique. Meanwhile, a monthly dataset 
of 10 years has also been established to explore Granger-causality tests of the financial 
development and economic growth linkages. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 11.2 provides a summary of 
the findings of this study including the existing literatures on financial-growth nexus 
as well as the specific empirical findings achieved by the researcher individually. 
Section 11.3 discusses the limitation of the study. Section 11.4 focuses on issues 
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important for the future research. 
9.2 Summary of the research findings 
9.2.1 A synopsis of theoretical findings 
Chapter 2 essentially surveyed the most existing theoretic and empirical literatures on 
financial- growth nexus issue. Following Keynes's General Theory, the 
macroeconomics literature largely ignored the potential link between output behaviour 
and the perfon-nance of credit market. Based on the debate over the central importance 
of money in the Great Depression, the significance of all other aspects of the financial 
system was deemphasized (see, Fisher, 1933; Friedman and Schwartz, 1963; Mishkin, 
1978). Soon after the importance of financial structure (the form of financial 
intermediary) within the financial/real nexus was aroused by Gurley and Shaw (195 5), 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) derived the formal proposition that real economic 
decisions were independent of financial structure. Similarly, the irrelevance of 
financial intermediation has also been suggested by Hall and Jorgenson (1967), Brock 
and Mirman (1972). 
On a micro level, Alkerlof's idea about 'lemon' problem (1969) has been widely 
applied to explain the effect of asymmetric information upon credit market (Jaffee and 
Russell, 1976; Stiglitz and Weiss, 198 1; Mankiw, 1986) and equity market (Myers and 
Majluf, 1984; Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss, 1984). Thus, Fama (1985) states that by 
taking the advantage of gathering information about borrowers, banking institutions 
are the most efficient intermediaries to minimise the informational distortions. Similar 
evidence has also been provided by Diamond (1984). 
Derived from the simplest endogenous growth model (AK model), the potential effect 
of financial development on economic growth has been illustrated from three aspects: 
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1) reducing the leakage of investment resources and funnelling savings to firms; 2) 
increasing the overall capital productivity; 3) altering the saving rate. 
The functional approach proposed by Levine (1996) describes the macroeconomic 
consequences of the existence and the development of the financial structure as a 
whole and not of each particular financial instrument or market separately This 
approach highlights the relationship between financial structure - the mix of financial 
instruments, markets and institutions - and the provision of financial services. In 
particular, it focuses on the quality of functions performed by financial sector, which 
includes 1) mobilising savings; 2) acquiring information and allocating resources; 3) 
diversifying and pooling risks and 4) monitoring managers and exerting corporate 
control. 
Chapter 2 also studied the role of stock market during the DFL process. Some 
economists suggest that stock market can be understood as a good complement of 
credit markets in DFL process, while some of them propose that stock markets have 
much more significantly positive effect on economic growth than credit markets do. 
Meanwhile, an increasing research observed that the stock markets in LDCs are likely 
to perform worse since these emerging markets lack of well-defined regulation and 
adequate monitoring. Correspondingly, economists suggests that the financing pattern 
of developing country firms should be emphasising less on the share issuing but more 
largely relying on the retained profit. 
9.2.2 A synopsis of existing empirical findings 
Various empirical works can be found on the identification of the relationship between 
financial development and economic growth, particularly country-case study and 
econometrical statistics are two major approaches adopted by researchers. The 
empirical work in the early stages was mainly conducted with case study method. As 
the econometrical techniques being improved gradually, more and more evidence has 
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been provided through the statistical analysis approach. 
Cameron et al. (1967) scrutinised the historical relationship between banking 
development and the early stages of industrialisation for England, Scotland, France, 
Belgium, Germany, Russia, and Japan, thus drawing the conclusion that the banking 
system plays a positive, growth-inducing role. By comparing industrial and capital 
market development in Brazil, Mexico and the United States between 1830 and 1930, 
Haber (1991,1996) finds that the differences in capital market development had a 
significant influence on the rate of industrial growth. 
The development of financial intermediaries was first introduced into cross-country 
statistic analysis by Goldsmith (1969), who found that rapid economic growth is often 
accompanied by dramatic financial development. Although Goldsmith's finding has 
been treated as a comer stone, several critiques have been made about this study, such 
as the limited data sample and the ignorance of other influential factors. After 
Goldsmith, a flourishing body of empirical work aiming at testing the sign and 
magnitude of financial depth on economic growth based on an estimated model where 
the economic growth is a function of a set of control variables and financial depth 
indicator. 
The pioneering empirical study on financial-growth nexus was carried out by King 
and Levine (1993a, b and c). They find that there is significantly and strongly a 
positive relationship between each of the four financial development indicators (the 
size of financial intermediaries; the degree to which the central bank versus 
commercial banks are allocating credit; share of total credit allocated to private 
non-financial firms and the ratio of credit to private non-financial enterprises to GDP) 
and the three growth indicators (long-run real per capita growth rates, capital 
accumulation and productivity growth). The similar result has also been obtained by 
Munnde and Eng (1994), Neusser and Kugler (1996), AI-Yousif (2002). Nevertheless, 
Fernandez and Galetovic (1994) point out that if the King and Levine's observation 
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sample is split between OECD and non-OECD countries, the positive correlations 
become insignificant for OECD countries. Meanwhile, several researchers insist that 
finance is a relatively unimportant factor in economic development (Lucas, 1988; 
Dornbusch and Reygue, 1989), while some economists discovered a negative 
relationship existing in the Latin American countries (De Gregorio and Guidotti, 
1995). 
Although a positive correlation between growth and indicators of financial 
development was largely discovered in both cross-country/section study and panel 
analysis, the study on causal relationship between these two variables remained 
untouched until the first attempt taken by Gupta (1984). By operating the research 
with relatively small sample covering 14 developing countries, Gupta concludes that 
the causality cannot be described as simply as either 'supply-leading' or 
'demand-following'. However, he expands the causality patterns influentially with 
bidirectional causality: both financial development and economic growth complement 
each other, which is similarly suggested by Demetriades and Hussein (1996), Kul and 
Khan (1999). Moreover, the causality pattern has a tendency to vary with countries 
and more specifically with the outcomes of financial reforms implemented (Jung, 
1986; Habibullah, 1999; Dernetriades and Hussein, 1996; Arestis and Demetriades, 
1996). 
Nevertheless, Beck and Levine (2002) stress that omitting stock market development 
makes the empirical studies incomplete and less convincing. An influential study done 
by Levine and Zervos (1998) indicates that initial measures of stock market liquidity 
and banking sector development are both strong predictors of economic growth. 
However, after controlling the other variables, Levine (1999) stresses that the striking 
importance of bank development could be the result of impediments to the 
development of equity markets or political intervention. 
Within the context of domestic financial liberalisation, the role of stock market has 
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been examined thoroughly again. A number of influential empirical researches have 
been done to examine the effects of stock market on the financing of corporate growth 
(see as Je Cho, 1986; Mullin, 1993; Levine, 1990,1996; Singh, 1997), indicating that 
the development of stock market does not assist the economic growth as predicted, but 
rather undermines the effects of the higher real interest rates arising from FL. 
Therefore, it has been suggested that LDCs would have been better off by reforming 
and expanding their existing banking-dominated financial system rather than by too 
much emphasis on the establishment of stock markets during DFL (Singh, 1997). 
9.2.3 A synopsis of individual empirical results 
9.2.3.1 Estimated result on economic growth pattern 
In Chapter 5, the production function, the conventional Cobb-Douglas model, is 
applied in the context of China by using time-serial data on aggregated state level 
from 1952 to 2002 for the purpose of investigating the productivity of two main input 
factors - human capital and physical capital. By exploring the benefit of ECM, both 
short-term dynamic and long-term equilibrium of economic growth in China have 
been thoroughly demonstrated. The statistical result provided significant evidence that 
China's economic growth is driven by the swiftly accumulated capital stock attributed 
to the rapid increase of fixed assets investment, 
The contribution to the national economic growth can be illustrated in two aspects: 
capital stock accumulation and improvement of labour force productivity. It has been 
asserted that the dramatic increase of savings and FD1 are two major investment 
sources. The contribution of labour input to GDP gTowth is statistically modest. It has 
been argued that this result is underestimated which stems from the bias in 
measurement of labour growth on one hand. On the other hand, the changes in the 
quality of labour and the intensity of work have been treated as another factor to the 
underestimated contribution from the labour force input. 
224 
In Chapter 6, the economic growth pattern in China was studied by using panel data 
technique - the combination of cross section and time serial data. The empirical 
framework was established on a classical economic growth model, which contains the 
growth input factor, financial factors and other control variables. The weight of 
sectoral labour force (manufactory and servicing sector) has also been taken into 
account in order to capture the impact of the structural change on economic growth. 
The estimated result indicated that the major contribution to the national economic 
growth is the substantial capital stock accumulation, while less commitment comes 
from the growth of labour force. During the economic and financial reform period, 
production factors have significantly shifted from lower productivity sector (such as 
agricultural sector) to the higher one (such as manufactory and servicing sectors). 
Nevertheless, it seems it is the servicing sector that mostly benefits from such 
structural change. Meanwhile, the empirical finding that there is significant and 
positive effect of FDI on national economic growth is consistent with most existing 
empirical studies. In addition, the vital contribution of educational level enhancement 
indicates the improvement in the quality of human capital is another essential resource 
attributed to the productivity increase. 
9.2.3.2 Estimated result on financial-growth nexus - banking sector 
The role of financial sector in form of banking industry in economic growth process 
has been carefully illustrated in both provincial panel and regional panel. Five 
indicators have been introduced to replace the existing ones which are not applicable 
on China's provincial level: (1) SIZE - the ratio of total deposits (of Overall Financial 
Institutions) over GDP, (2) CENTRAL - the ratio of loans to deposits of the State 
Banks, (3) LGDP - the ratio of loans to GDP, (4) CONCENTRATION -a Herfindahl 
index of banking sector to present the provincial banking market structure and 
competition intensity and (5) SOB - the credits from four state-owned banks to the 
credits from total local financial institutions. 
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Then we illustrated the relationship between real GDP growth and each financial 
intennediation indicator by statistical description. The statistical result showed that 
these five indicators were all negatively related to economic gTowth. The descriptive 
data analysis of these five indicators suggests that the size of provincial financial 
intermediation does not necessarily have a firm relationship with the level of 
economic development, while provinces with a lower rate of economic growth receive 
larger credit flows from the central government. Moreover, higher market 
concentration is associated with lower growth perforinance. Similarly, more credits 
granted by state-owned banks also result in the lower growth rate. 
Unlike the common findings obtained from the cross-country analysis supporting the 
positive correlation between financial inten-nediaries' development and economic 
growth, this empirical study discovered that none of these five banking indicators was 
positively correlated with the economic growth, indicating that China's banking sector 
has not statistically generated any contribution to the economic development. 
Particularly, it is unusual to find that the increasing bank credit volume has no impact 
upon the GDP growth whilst the other four banking indicators are negatively 
correlated to the economic growth. The result firmly provided the evidence that, 
associated with the worsening credit quality in terms of the increasing volume of 
non-perforyning loans, the over concentration of credit resource distribution in such a 
state-owned-bank-dominated banking sector obviously hampered the efficiency of 
credit allocation hence impeding the economic growth. 
By dividing the overall provinces into eight regions, the financial-growth nexus has 
been further investigated on regional level. The estimated result exhibited a positive 
relationship between the size of banking sector and the regional economic growth in 
three coastal regions. It has been also noticed that the loan to GDP ratio is positively 
related to the economic growth in East Coastal Region only, which is in contrast to the 
estimated result obtained from the provincial panel data. Nonetheless, the most 
striking finding is that the development of banking sector did not statistically correlate 
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with the economic growth in the least developed region - Northeast Zone (NEZ), 
though the ratio of bank credits over GDP is the highest within the eight regions. 
Furthen-nore, the survey undertaken on the scale and function of underground 
financial market (UFM) found out that the dramatic expansion of UFM in NEZ has 
produced seriously negative impact on the stability of official financial system and 
regional economic growth. 
The role of the banking sector in economic development process has also been 
examined by adopting Granger-causality method and operating the aggregated level 
data (Chapter 7). During the entire sample period, no evidence can be found to support 
the hypothesis that China's banking sector has been playing a leading role in the 
process of economic growth. In order to testify the consistency of Granger-causality 
relationship across the financial reform period, data sample has been separated into 
two sub-samples: 1952-1978 and 1979-2003. The statistical result indicated that the 
banking sector development in terms of the expansion of credit allocation is the effect 
rather than the cause of the national economic growth in pre- and post-reform era. 
However, in the post-reform stage, the increase of investment does not necessarily 
enhance the demand for bank loans, which is more or less associated with the 
innovation and diversification of financial market in China providing another 
important channel for enterprises to raise investment funds. 
9.2.3.3 Estimated result on financial-growth nexus - stock market 
Given the rapid development of China's stock market, the analysis of the 
financial- growth nexus has been applied to China's stock market in Chapter 7. China's 
stock market was established to facilitate the reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
at a time when the government found it increasingly costly to pursue its policy of 
lending or subsidising SOEs. It was believed that by establishing a stock market it 
would provide an important investment channel for individuals while handing the 
responsibility for SOE monitoring over to more efficient institutions and individual 
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investors. 
However, given to the government's reluctance to privatise, most of the listed 
companies have ownership structure where the state is the absolute majority 
shareholder and many individual constitute the minority shareholder. Such an 
ownership makes it impossible for small investor to carry out efficient monitoring. 
Moreover, when trading the state-owned shares is forbidden at the exchanges, it 
substantially widens the gap between majority shareholder's interests and those of 
individual investors. Since the essential conflict between the majority shareholder's 
interest and that of minority individual shareholders remains unresolved, more and 
more severe problems associated or derived from this essential conflict have been 
propagated which further deteriorate the market deficiencies. As a result, when state 
government can no longer stimulate the investors' participation and enthusiasm, the 
stock market apparently starts shrinking. 
The relationship between stock market development and economic growth has been 
provided by the empirical study result based on the Granger-causality test. In order to 
gauge the development of China's stock market, five indicators have been employed 
from three aspects, including size, liquidity and volatility. The estimated results only 
concluded one-way causality relation in the context of China, indicating that economic 
growth (measured by IVA) is the Granger-cause of the stock market capitalisation 
while the reverse causation is unlikely to occur. Meanwhile, there is no causality 
relationship existing between stock market development and economic growth when 
in term of market liquidity and volatility. 
After adding tradable capitalisation as a control variable into the causality test VAR 
model between growth and market value traded, the statistic result found that the 
value traded is the significant leading factor to output growth while the reserve 
direction between these two indicators does not hold. Since value traded determines 
the size (capitalisation) of stock market while the size (measured by tradable 
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capitalisation) has been identified as a weak leading factor of economic growth, it 
could be interpreted that the value traded causes output growth indirectly mainly 
through the its influence on market size. 
The causality relationship was finally examined on the basis of the whole financial 
market, in which circumstance the ratio of bank credit assigned to industry sector to 
IVA was adopted to be the proxy for banking sector development. The estimated result 
further confinned that financial development is the effect rather than cause of China's 
economic growth when tradable capitalisation of stock market was adopted. Moreover, 
a bio-direction (two-way) Granger-causality nexus has been observed when market 
value traded entered the VAR model while market size was controlled as inforination 
set, though the feedback effect (financial development is Granger-cause factor of 
economic growth) is significant at just 10 percent level. 
Last but not the least, it is hard to find any influence from direct financing (measured 
by the ratio of stock market and corporate bond marketing financing over the credit 
market financing) on economic growth. Given that the bank credit market remains as 
the major financial source, direct financing market appears to be shrinking in most 
recent year, which further enhances the burden of banking sector. In these 
circumstances, it is undoubted to find that direct financing in terms of the 
development of stock market (with bond market as well) did not contribute to the 
economic development in respect to the rapid rise of bank credit allocation. 
9.3 Contribution of the empirical study 
This study contributes to the existing literature in two main facets. First, the economic 
growth pattern of China has been investigated by taking the sectoral shift (presented 
by the weight of labour force of manufactory and servicing sector respectively) into 
account. Thus, this empirical framework enables us to evaluate the impact of 
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structural change on economic growth. In these circumstances, the sectoral factor 
contribution to the overall economic growth has been examined. Furthermore, the 
rapidly increasing disparity between the coastal regions and interior provinces 
stimulates the concerns on the growth variation in different regions In China. Instead 
of using the conventional three- economic-zone classification (East, Middle and West 
Zone), the newly introduced eight- economic-region classification has been adopted. 
Thus, the three-sector growth model has been examined in eight economic regions 
individually. 
Secondly, the financial-growth nexus in the context of China has not only been 
examined in banking sector (with panel estimation technique), but also been explored 
in stock market development (with Granger-causality analysis). Eventually, the 
causality direction has been studied by jointly considering both banking sector and 
stock market. The estimated result robustly supports the hypothesis that China's 
financial sector development is the Granger effect of the economic growth, i. e. 
demand- following role of financial market, while neither the Granger cause 
(supply-leading) hypothesis nor bidirectional causality hypothesis is tenable. 
Currently, cross-section and time-series analysis has been widely applied on 
cross-country basis. The application of panel technique by using the statistical data of 
one single country - China, conversely, is rarely explored. Hence, the empirical study 
in this thesis provides a valuable attempt by establishing a large consolidated dataset 
consisting of 30 provinces (except Chongqing municipality) and 18 years (from 1984 
to 2002) for the first time. Moreover, given the unavailability of the data, three 
prevailing banking development indicators are not applicable in our empirical study. 
Therefore, we introduced five alternative banking indicators to measure China's 
banking sector development on provincial level, concerning the size of the banking 
sector, the level of governmental intervention on banking sector, the importance of 
bank credits relative to the other fund resources in financing corporate investment, the 
competition intensity in banking sector and the perfonnance of the four state-owned 
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banks respect to the overall financial institutions. 
9.4 The limitations of the study 
The study result would be improved if the limitation in this research could be 
eliminated. The short time period examined in the relationship between the stock 
market development and economic growth is the first weakness in this empirical 
research. Particularly in the Granger-causality analysis, the study only covered ten 
years monthly data (1995MI to 2004M12). This time span is relatively short to 
conclude the causal direction between stock market development and economic 
growth. It is therefore recommended to replicate this study after a longer period of 
time to give a better view and enable more accurate conclusions to be reached. 
Second, the measurement of several key variables is based on certain assumptions. 
Capital stock has not yet been adopted as a major item in the current statistical scheme, 
while the concentration has been emphasised on capital investment expenditure. As 
computing the reasonable capital stock value is essential to be able to undertake the 
statistical estimation, the calculation is conducted based on certain assumption and 
simplifications (see Section 4.3.2). Thus the computed capital stock value is likely to 
be a mismeasurement. Similarly, given the unknown monthly inflation rate, the real 
monthly IVA is not observable but has to be substituted by the most plausible 
manipulated outcome (see Section 7.3.1). 
9.5 Suggestions for future research 
Given the small coefficients on labour discovered, further exploration of the role of 
labour in the growth process should be concerned. Particularly, it is argued that the 
labour force contribution has been considerably underestimated due to the downward 
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bias in the measurement of labour growth. Therefore, a better way to evaluate the 
more accurate effect of labour force input should re-compile the labour force data by 
person-hours worked instead of by number of persons employed. Furthermore, the 
seasonal movement of the labour force between agricultural sector and manufacturing 
sector, agricultural sector and servicing sector is another major stimulus to be 
considered. 
The future research can further explore the effects of the changes in the Chinese 
financial system on economic growth and development. This empirical study, like 
many others, mainly concentrated on the financial development in 'monetary' sense 
rather than in 'real quality' term. Therefore, it is possible to address the question 
whether the resources have been optimally channelled into financial services. Hence, 
in order to measure the efficiency of financial sector, another four indicators deserve 
highest consideration: 1) the share of manpower employed in the financial system, 2) 
the educational level of manpower employed in the financial system, 3) the share of 
the financial system in the national accounts of GDP and 4) the number of banks and 
branches per capita, which are useful to measure the operating costs of financial 
system. Such variables have been compiled and published by NBSC. However, only 
national aggregated data are available. The regional level ones should be obtained by 
conducting primary data collection via survey or questionnaire in each individual 
province, particularly the share of manpower employed, the educational level of 
manpower and the number of banks and branches. 
Additionally, the decision-making power of local governments (and local party 
committees) on the performance of China's listed firms can be measured and taken 
into account in the regional financial- growth nexus examination. Meanwhile, since 
China's A-share stock market is opening to overseas investors gradually, the effect of 
QFII (Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors) scheme, described as a milestone 
move in the refon-n process of China's stock market, on real sector performance is 
worth studying. Given to the share price and share rights distortion originating from 
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the isolation between tradable and non-tradable shares, activating non-tradable shares 
will generate a substantial impact on the stock market performance and consequently 
on economic growth, which provides another appealing issue for further research. 
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